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Preface 
 
 
The reforms initiated by the Ottoman Empire in the 1820–30s and the 
changes it triggered in the political-administrative and social sphere and 
economic system are topics that deserve special attention of both Balkan 
and foreign scholars. 
The comparison of numerous researches shows, that social-economic 
processes induced in this period in the Empire offered opportunity for 
interpretations and analyses on broadened, deepened basis, which can 
lead even to new theses sometimes.  This opens new fields and aspects 
securing new arguments to answer important questions – namely, to 
what level the modernization of the Empire advanced, how efficient the 
reforms of institutions and administrative system were,  how the 
reforms changed the living standard of different layers, whether the 
economic development decreased the distance between the Empire and 
the West, what perspectives these changes offered to the local 
population and how these triggered new social movements leading to 
the further transformation of the Empire. And these are only some of 
the numerous questions, which broaden the topic of modernization in 
the Ottoman Empire. Among the numerous relevant literature dealing 
with such questions, we have to mention the book of the young 
Hungarian scholar Gábor Demeter. 
The booklet contains 4 studies already published in different 
scientific journals and all investigate different aspects of the Ottoman 
Empire’s socio-economic development from the Tanzimat to the last 
decades of the 19th century. Using a quantitative approach this work 
analyses the cost-efficiency and long term socio-economic consequences 
of the Ottoman Tanzimat. Instead of focusing on bureaucratic and 
financial questions providing a macro-level approach, the essays focus 
on the local-regional level of socio-economic phenomena induced by the 
changes between the 1840–70s. Among these one can find the problem 
of industrialization, the costs and social consequences of military 
reforms, the change in welfare of different urban layers, the analysis of 
the economic driving force of the changes – the grain prosperity – and 
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its contribution to the temporal mitigation of socio-economic tensions in 
different regions of the peninsula. 
Using a wide range of statistical material derived partly from 
published sources while comparing the views and data of leading 
historians, the author sketches up a quite broad picture of the socio-
economic life in the Ottoman Empire during the investigated period. 
Good research methodology proper selectionand deep analysis of facts 
offers a possibility for Gábor Demeter to reach important results and 
make significant statements, generalizations. Especially successful and 
valid parts of the work are those where the author compares the results 
of reforms between different regions or investigates the effect of 
modernization on social and ethno-religious classes, thus where 
regional or comparative approach dominates. 
In this respect both comparisons applying temporal and spatial 
approach of modernization processes in the Empire as well as the 
structure is worth appreciation. Although the 19th-century results look 
impressive compared to the previous historical period, this is not the 
case when they are compared to the achievements of the developed 
European nations. 
The comparative approach also makes it possible for the author to 
draw a picture on micro-level: how modernization influenced the 
general situation of the population, who were the winners and losers 
during the transformation processes in the Empire. When analyzing the 
historical materials and especially defining the conclusions the 
distanced view of one researcher - though perfectly familiar, but still 
external to the Balkan region – turns to be very useful. With this book 
the Hungarian historian Gabor Demeter proves to be a thorough 
researcher of the socio-economic history of 19th century Southeastern 
Europe. 
 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Daniel Vachkov 
Sofia 
June 2017 
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Introduction 
 
This volume contains several essays highlighting the crucial economic 
questions of the Ottoman modernization. (1) The integration of the 
Ottoman economy into the international division of labour during and 
after the great grain prosperity and the impact of these global processes 
on local industrialization is a key process in understanding the 
sustainability of the Ottoman state. The effect of the ’first globalization’, 
the development of the ’wheat for artifacts’ system hindered local 
industrialization, thus the central budget (and modernization efforts) 
had to be financed from the agriculture, which created discontent 
among the overloaded producers and made economy vulnerable to 
external processes. (2) The increase of welfare (like social stability) can 
be a good indicator of reforms and it can provide legitimative power for 
the state as well. The Balkan historiography traditionally claims that the 
reforms were unsuccessful regarding social aspects, as many strata did 
not profit from the changes. But it is undeniable that there was some – 
although regionally and socially uneven – economic progress, thus the 
strata benefiting from the reforms (fuelled by the grain prosperity 
induced by external processes) can be identified and their welfare can 
be compared to the living standards of the pre-Tanzimat era. 
Nonetheless, if growing welfare generates growing inequalities, it also 
increases social tensions instead of eliminating them. (3); Finally, 
creating a modern army without substantial financial resources to 
defend the state is a great challenge to cope with. 
The first study aims at investigating the reasons why 
industrialization in the Ottoman Balkans – contrary to the upswing in 
Bulgarian lands – failed in the mid-19th century. Compared to general 
interpretations focusing on global, transnational processes and relations 
we used a different approach. By analyzing the profit rates, capital 
demand, wages, living standards and retail prices of semi-processed 
and processed materials in the case of different agricultural and 
industrial activities we try to highlight – using local-scale data – how 
the often generally interpreted international division of labour really 
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took place in the peninsula (thus testing the thesis of ’first 
globalization’), and what effects it had on the local economies. In order 
to trace the general or specific character of the circumstances and 
consequences we traced both the regional differences (between Syria 
and the Balkans) and also applied a temporal comparative approach 
(for Bulgaria and Macedonia before and after 1878). 
The second study deals with the social transformations among the 
landlords, producers and other strata comparing pre-Tanzimat 
landlocked urban communities with rural communities of the Anatolian 
countryside and with urban communities in the 30-year later Balkans, 
analyzing intra- and interregional differences and changes in welfare. 
Our hypothesis is that increasing welfare – owing to the external factors 
– could prolong the existence of the Ottoman Empire even when it 
lacked any ideological cohesive forces. 
The third study investigates the social and economic consequences 
of the spahis’ pensioning and traces the utilization of the new financial 
resources stemming from pensioning and the sale of spahi estates after 
1858. The key question is whether these resources were substantial 
enough to support the creation of a new army or extra income was 
needed for this. 
Finally, the last chapter investigates the effects of the grain 
prosperity on the economic performance of the Balkans based on local 
scale data (commercial registers). We have attempted to decompose the 
aggregated data down to producer-level, thus beyond the general, 
macroeconomic effect of grain prosperity, its local socio-economic 
impact on the Balkan peninsula can also be analyzed. Comparing the 
different land-tenure systems we have measured the involvement of 
producer layers in grain exports in several regions during the 
Napoleonic era and after it, and we have tried to quantify the surpluses 
and assess their role in mitigating social tensions using the observations 
of contemporary travelers, like Sax, Kanitz, etc. 
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Why Did Initial Industrialization Fail?  
Measuring Profit Rates, Productivity of Different Activities 
 and the Change in Purchase Power in the Ottoman Empire in 
Regional Comparison 
 
 
The increasing demand for food in Western Europe parallel with its 
increasing purchase power resulted in growing grain prices and made 
exports of cereals – either legal or illegal – profitable for the Eastern 
basin of the Mediterranean. The destruction of the janissaries, 
propagators of protectionism and defenders of small-scale industry in 
1826, the Balta Liman agreement in 1838, that deprived the Ottoman 
state of monopolizing the trade, putting an end to the provisionist 
economic policy, and finally the abolition of Corn Law in England in 
1846 created a new economic order in the region enhancing the 
international division of labour. The almost free influx of industrial 
goods and the welcome of Eastern cereals turned the attention of the 
Ottoman Empire towards the agrarian sector, resulting in the so-called 
de-industrialization of the ’first globalization’1 in the 1840s–1870s.  
Although this concept of international division of labour is generally 
accepted, it is rather based on regional (or macroeconomic) observations 
or on economic theories2 than on local evidence or data series. Our goal 
is to test this thesis at local scale, by investigating the profitability of 
different economic activities throughout the 19th century. Our 
hypothesis is that the profit rate can serve as an indicator of (de)-
industrialization. If de-industrialization really took place, industrial 
activities could not be more rewarding than agrarian activities, in other 
words, the profit rate of industry could not exceed that of measured in 
other sectors. 
                                                 
1   O’Rourke, K.–Williamson, J. G.: Globalization and History. Mass. Cambridge, 2009. This study is 
the extended version of conference speeches delivered at IBAC conferences in Sofia (2015 
Nov.) and in Belgrade (2016 Dec.). 
2  Pamuk, S.–Williamson, J. G.: Ottoman De-Industrialisation 1800-1913: Assessing the Shock, Its 
Impact and the Response. NBER publications, 2009. http://www.nber.org/papers/w14763 
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Using a comparative approach we have analyzed (1) the differences 
in profit rate of agricultural, industrial and business activities such as 
chifliks, smallholdings, husbandry, textile manufacturing, Verlag-
system, banking, ore-mining, silk-reeling etc. (2) We have also 
compared the profitability of these activities in different regions using 
examples from Bulgaria, Macedonia, Lebanon and Palestine, etc. based 
on the material collected by Todorov, Issawi; (3) We have attempted to 
trace the changes in profit rate over time. Furthermore, we have 
compared agrarian income (surplus) with that of those employees who 
earned their living from industry. This also gives us an opportunity to 
measure the changes in purchase power of different worker classes 
(industrial and agricultural) throughout the century. 
Concerning Bulgaria Lampe generally speaks about 8% yearly profit 
rate in industry after 18783 which is low compared to the interests of 
industrial credits starting at 10%. This means that industrial activity on 
the Balkans was considered risky, where investments hardly returned 
within few years, therefore it was not recommended for investors. The 
lack of capital accumulation (capital outflow towards the central part of 
the empire was substantial during the Ottoman era)4 and the shortage of 
favourable credits (which could solve the former problem) failed to 
trigger a self-sustaining industrialization.  
Low profit rates could have been overcome either (a) by low wages – 
but this hindered the restratification of population into industry, thus 
decelerated general industrialization processes; or (b) by mass 
production that needed engines for which the required capital was 
missing. This resulted in a vicious circle for industrialization, while 
agriculture was suffering from low incomes per capita owing to the 
                                                 
3   Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950. From Imperial Borderlands to 
Developing Nations. Bloomington, 1982. 
4   More than 50% of the provincial revenues was transferred to the centre that time and only 
25% of the provincial revenues were spent on public affairs (the army was financed from 
the central budget). See: Draganova, Sl.: Les Dépenses du vilayet de Janina et du Danube pour 
L’Année Budgetaire 1870–1871. In: Relations et Influences Réciproques entre Grecs et 
Bulgares XVIIIe-XXe Siécle. Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991. 152. (This changed in the case 
of Macedonia after the uprising in 1903, when high military costs made the maintenance of 
Ottoman rule unprofitable at macro-level).  
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overpopulation. According to Egoroff overpopulation in agriculture 
had reached 800 000 persons in Bulgaria by the 1930s, in other words 
33% labour force remained unexploited.5 
In the forthcoming paragraphs we analyze how the profit rate, 
accumulated capital, wage levels, wages measured to production and output 
per capita measured to other countries – determining the profitability of 
different economic activities – varied in different sectors of economy 
prior to 1878, and which branches were the most competitive. 
During the great grain prosperity induced by the previously 
mentioned changes in international division of labour, investing into 
agriculture was a profitable activity: during the Crimean War the 
Kisimov merchant house collected a capital of 1.2 million kurush.6 The 
chorbadjis in Ljaskovec made 80 000 grosh surplus by exploiting the 
possibilities of compulsory transportation. But – despite the increasing 
grain prices and the profitability of trade – the amount of capital 
accumulated in the hands of Balkan merchants remained low. In 
Svishtov the available free capital was not more than 40 000 francs for 
larger trade houses, which equalled to the value of 300-400 hectares of 
cropland – a larger chiflik (chiftlik) indeed. In 1876 in Ruse, another 
centre of grain trade, the Jewish Rozenec family could not mobilize 
more than 20 000 francs of capital. The Rachkov, Sahatchiyski and 
Arnaudov families had some 250-300 000 grosh capital (50-60 000 
francs).7 Neither of them were match for the great merchants in Saloniki 
(whether be Jews, Greeks or English), whose capital reached 100 000-
1 000 000 francs.8  
                                                 
5  Egoroff, P.: Die Arbeit in der Landwirtschaft. In: Die sozialökonomische Struktur der 
bulgarischen Wirtschaft. Hrsg.: Molloff , J. Berlin, 1936. 131–159. esp. 151–153. 
6    Kosev, D.: Otrazhenieto na Krimskata voina (1853-1856) v Balgariya. Istoricheski Pregled, 1946–
1947/2. 185. 
7    Berov, Ly.: Ikonomicheskoto razvitie na Balgariya prez vekovete. Profizdat, Sofia, 1974. 78. In 1803 
the total capital of Hristo Rachkov was 73 000 grosh from which he lent 42 000 grosh. His 
total wealth was around 146 000 grosh (the grosh then equalled to the franc). Kosev, D.: Kam 
izyasnyavane na nyakoi problemi ot istoriyata na Balgariya prez XVIII i nachaloto na XIX v. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1956/3. 34. 
8   For this see: Damianov, S.: French Commerce with the Bulgarian Territories from the Eighteenth 
Century to 1914. In: Vacalopoulos, A. E.–Svolopoulos, C. D.–Kiraly, B. K.: Southeast 
European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid Eighteenth Century to 
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Thus, great differences – determined mainly by geographical 
advantages – existed even within the same branch of trade. The amount 
of money was enough to buy large estates and thus intensify the 
merchants’ interest in grain trade, but it was inefficient for investments 
in large-scale industry. Installing a large factory – like the one operated 
(but not owned!) by Dobri Zhelyazkov – required at least 1 million 
kurush (200 000 francs) initial capital. Hardly anyone could fulfill this 
condition in Bulgarian lands: Tapchilestov in Istanbul and the Georgiev 
brothers in Bucharest had such amount of capital,9 but even they did not 
limit their activity to industrial investments, since other activities 
showed similar rate of return.  
As the available amount of free capital abled merchants to invest into 
agriculture, but the lack of capital concentration hindered investments 
in industry, when the wheat prosperity was over (due to the dumping 
of the American, Russian and Argentinian wheat onto the markets), 
many of these middle-scale merchants could not respond to the 
challenge by transferring their capital into other sectors. They were 
suffocating compared to those who were able to diversify their activity.  
Merchants also had the choice to invest into imports (besides export) 
or simply deal with transportation without being involved into the 
production of crops (comprador capital). Importing goods could 
produce a 15-30% profit compared to the value of the stock even at the 
end of the 18th century in Russian-Ottoman relation.10 In the first half of 
the 19th century, after the fall of transport prices British textile export 
had a 20% return rate measured to the value of goods. And even if the 
profit rate in industry was lower, the low rate of return could be 
counterbalanced by mass-production, which increased the total amount 
of profit (although not its rate). Imports thus became profitable 
                                                                                                            
1914. War and Society in East Central Europe. Thessaloniki, 1988. In Saloniki Argiri 
Matheos had 100 000 francs capital and 250 000 francs income. The Jewish merchant houses 
like the Allatini, Modiano and Fernandez had more than 1 million francs, the yearly 
turnover reached 2 million. The English Abbots had 1.5 million francs capital, while 
Theagenis Kharissis had 0.25 million. 
9   Davidova, Ev.: Balkan Transitions to Modernity and Nation States: Through the Eyes of Three 
Generations of Merchants (1780s–1890s). Leiden, 2013. 73. 
10    Mihov, N.: Prinos kam istoriyata na targoviyata na Turciya i Balgariya. Tom. 6. Sofia, 1971. 45. 
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compared to the local industrial products, that might have similar profit 
rates, but the small amount of output simply hindered the purchase of 
engines, in order to make a step towards mass-production and 
profitability. Thus, low rate of return cannot be considered as the sole 
reason for decreasing competitiveness. 
We have data on the profitability of transportation itself. Although 
the era of compulsory delivery of goods at low fixed prices was over, 
wheat prices at ports were still much higher than in the centre of the 
peninsula: the difference could range from 20-30% to 50-100%, only 
partly as a result of transport costs. In 1853 1 kg of wheat equalled to 
0.77 grams of silver in Saloniki and 0.65-0.80 in Varna, while in 
Berkovica and Sofia the unit price of grain bought from producers was 
0.33 grams in silver. By 1870 the ratio between the export and local 
prices had increased to 2:1,11 while raw transportation costs had been 
decreasing – Berov states that freight rates fell from 40% of prices at the 
end of the 18th century to 25% then to 13% by the 1840s’ in the case of 
wheat. This enables us the estimate the profits of transportation towards 
the large harbours.12 Subtracting this 13-25% from the grain prices one 
can get a profit rate in transportation exceeding 20-25% measured to the 
value of transported stock. This was significant compared to other 
regions and centuries: in Poland the profit rate of traders using had 
mainland roads decreased from 14-17% to 5-15% by the 18th century.13 
Data also show that beside transportation merchants tended to invest 
into grain production as well. The following data illustrate the differences 
in profitability between smallholdings and large estates, organised as 
chifliks. Near Plovdiv a land of 200 ha (of which only 80 ha was 
cultivated) produced 80 000 kurush income (200 francs/ha), of which 
’chista pechalba’ was 40 000 (profits after the deduction of tax, seeds, land 
rent, labour price, etc.)14 Although the fallow land decreased the profit 
                                                 
11 Berov, Ly.: Parvite tsiklichni krizi na evropeyskiya kapitalizam i stopanskata konyunktura v 
balgarskite zemi prez XIX. v. Istoricheski Pregled, 1978/6. 22–36. 
12 Interregional freight prices were even lower after the invention of steamships, and goods 
carried on water were cheaper than those carried on roads. 
13 Berov, Ly.: Transport Costs and their Role in the Balkan Lands in the 16–19th centuries. Bulgarian 
Historical Review, 1975/4. 75. 
14   Ibid. 
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to 40 francs/ha, this still surpassed the per hectare profits of a 
smallholding ranging to 5-10 ha, which – according to the calculations 
of Palairet – did not produce more than 50-100 francs net profits (10 
francs/ha) in Serbia in 1910 (when the wheat prosperity was over; 
compare data with table 26 for other regions).15 This meant a 10-15% 
profit rate measured to total income from wheat (and only 1-2% return 
rate measured to the value of the estate). 
Another chiflik rented by the merchant Brakalov – who borrowed 
money from Tapchileshtov – reached 700-1000 ha and produced 20 000 
kile (1500 tons)16 of wheat, which meant 1500 kg/ha, so its output was 
greater than that of smallholdings in Berkovica or Kyustendil (under 
1000 kg/ha). The rent was 400 000 kurush for 6 years (yearly average: 
70 000), which was hardly more than 10% of the production.17 After 
paying the workers’ wages and deducting state tax and seeds, the estate 
was still prosperous. The land of Brakalov was cultivated by 60 chifts + 
30 buffaloes and 100 men on 1000 ha. Animal fodder meant an expense 
of 130 000 grosh. Further 350-400 part-time workers were needed from 
the regions of Strandzha and Elena, who earned daily wages.18 The 100 
permanent men meant 0.8 million grosh expenses, labourers got 4-5 
grosh daily, which meant 1400-2000 grosh for 350-400 workers and 0.15-
0.2 million grosh for 100 days. Adding up these and the rental price the 
total costs reach 1.1 million grosh (+seed for next year). So this estate 
was only profitable, if the averagely 1500 tons of wheat produced more 
income than this. If wheat prices exceeded 700 grosh/ton (140 francs), 
the estate was prosperous. Wheat prices reaching even 1000 grosh/ton 
(200 francs/ha), as in 1868, meant a 25% profit rate. But after 1878 the 
wheat prices fell from 160 to 110 francs/t (1882–94) making the estate 
unprofitable. The limits of profitability for such a huge estate are 
                                                 
15  Palairet, M.: Fiscal Pressure and Peasant Impoverishment in Serbia before World War I. The Journal 
of Economic History 39, No. 3, 1979. 719–40. 
16   Burgas kile is three times bigger than Constantinople kile. 
17  Calculating with 800 piasters/ton price during the price upswing, it is only 90 tons of wheat, 
calculating with 500 piasters/ton normal price it is 150 tons. Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto 
Chernomorie prez Vazrazhdaneto. Sofia, 1995. 73–74.  
18   Ibid.  
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calculated in table 2, while the same constraints for a chiflik of only 60 ha 
are given in table 1. 19  
As the tables prove, not all of the operating chifliks were in 
favourable situation: besides external circumstances, like price 
fluctuations, profitability was also limited by labour wages (as these 
estates were rarely mechanized). While wage labourers received only 2 
grosh daily in the 1820s and 4-5 in the 1850s (meaning stagnating wages 
in terms of silver), by 1877 in Stara Zagora daily wages had increased 
from 10 grosh/day to 15-17 grosh. In Gabrovo harvesters received 5-12 
grosh in 1877, but asked for 40 in 1885.20 Furthermore, after 1873/1878, 
wheat prices also began to fall. Under these circumstances the profits of 
large estates were eliminated. The establishment of the third Bulgarian 
state and the distribution of estates abandoned by Muslim inhabitants 
created a temporary oversupply of land. As most of the peasants had 
his own smallholding of 5 hectares that made self-subsistence possible 
and they were not compelled to work for others any more, this caused a 
shortage of labour force in large estates and resulted in increasing 
agricultural wages. These triggered an increase of wages in industry too 
(to hinder the further restratification of population in agriculture). The 
excess of wheat on international markets and the diminishing landless 
labour force put an end to the prosperous chiflik estates.  
 
                                                 
19   In 1864 a chiflik of 60 ha needed 3 workers in winter and 9 in summer. A chifchi (chitlik 
peasant) working on the fields received 1000-1200 grosh cash and crop while cultivated 3-5 
hectares by a pair of oxen. For such an estate 10-20 workers were needed permanently and 
this meant 10-24 000 grosh expense. The 150 harvesters meant further 6000 grosh. The 60 
hectares produced 90-100 tons of wheat, the 1500-1800 kg/ha output exceeded that of the 
smallholdings, where 1000 kg/ha was general and the proportion of harvested and sown 
seed was not above 5:1. (After 1878 there was a fallback in the output / hectares on 
smallholdings). At that time 1 ton of wheat was worth 100-130 francs, this meant 10 000 
francs (25-50 000 grosh) income, while the expenses reached 7000 francs (16-33 000 grosh), 
making the profit rate to 30%. If we use prices from 3 years earlier, this profit is eliminated. 
Hristov, Hr.: Nyakoi problemi na prehoda ot feodalizma kam kapitalizma v istoriyata na Balgariya. 
Istoricheski Pregled 17, 1961/3. 83–107. Original data were cited by  Todorov, N.: Novi danni 
za agrarnite otnosheniya…   
20  Mollov, Y.–Totev, Yu.: Tseni na zemedelskite proizvedeniya u nas prez poslednite 54 godini 1881–
1934. Sofia, 1935. 90. and Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies, 1800–1914. Evolution without 
Development, 1800–1914. Cambridge, 1997. 181.  
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Table 1. Profitability of a large estate (chiflik) with 600 dönüm arable land (sown area) 
in optimal and deteriorating case (1870s–1880s)  
 
Wheat price in 
francs (t) 
Daily wage 
of labourers 
(grosh) 
Yield 
/ha (kg) 
Income 
(grosh) 
Expenses 
(grosh) 
 
Income/Expense 
ratio 
Maximum 
value 
160  
(before 1880) 
16  
(after 1880) 
1800 80-90 000 40 000 
 Optimal case 
(cca. 1870): 
 3 : 1 
Minimum 
value 
100  
(after1880)  
5-10  
(prior to1880) 
1500 50-60 000 20-30000 
 Worst case (cca. 
1880) 
5 : 4 
Based on: Todorov, N.: Novi danni za agrarnite otnosheniya u nas ot 60-te godini na XIX. vek. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1958/5. 102–113. 
 
Table 2. Limits of profitability in the chifliks of Brakalov  
(1000 hectares with 1500 kg/ha yield)  
Wheat price 
(francs/t) 
Expenditure (million grosh) 
land rent + wage labourers+permanent 
workers+other cost, seed 
Income (million grosh) 
100 0,07+0,2+0,13+0,8=1,2 0,75 
160 0,07+0,2+0,13+0,8=1,2 1,2 
200 0,07+0,2+0,13+0,8=1,2 1,5 
Wheat price 
(francs/t) 
Expenses in case of doubled wages (million grosh) Income (million grosh) 
200 0,07+0,4+0,26+0,8=1,5 1,5 
Based on the data of Palairet, Kosev, Tonev, Todorov, Mollov, Razboynikov and Berov.  
 
Could mechanization be a solution for these estates? Maybe. In 1869 
Zafiropul bey bought a threshing machine that produced 4 times greater 
amount of grains than 70 horses and 24 men at the same time.21 But this 
implied huge costs. According to the Hungarian statistician, Károly 
Keleti, in 1885 such an engine cost 10 000 francs. Such expenses were not 
eligible within few years for a chiflik ranging to 60 hectares (as the 
example given in table 1) since the yearly profit was not more than 
20 000 grosh (3-4000 francs).22  But even larger estates could not afford 
to buy engines: in Thrace in 1908 the chiflik of Büyük Kaluçli ranging 
                                                 
21  Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto Chernomorie… 74. 
22  Keleti, K.: A Balkán-félsziget némely országai- és tartományainak közgazdasági viszonyai. Budapest, 
1885. 169–170. 
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up to 450 hectares produced 300 TL in 1908 and 480 in 1912,23 which was 
7000-11 000 francs – equalling to the cost of a threshing machine or 
tractor. Even buying modern a plough was a risky enterprise: this cost 
370 grosh (70 francs) and calculating with 5 hectares/chifchi for 300 
hectares it meant altogether 22 000 grosh (4500 francs). 
As for per capita productivity of different economic activities, while 
textile industry with its 4900 tons of wool as raw material and 65-75 
million piasters of output24 employed 70 000 persons with an average 
output of 1000 piasters per worker, a smallholding of 5 ha could 
produce 3000 piasters in Pleven in the 1840s, 3000-4000 in Berkovica in 
the 1870s and the same in Kazanlik, Stara Zagora in 1859 (table 3).25 
Therefore industry could be attractive for those, who did not have 
sufficient land (less than 5 ha), and needed supplementary earnings – 
like in N-Bulgaria prior to the 1860s. 
 
Table 3. Income per peasant household in different regions 
Region 
Kazanlik 
kaza, 
1859 
Stara 
Zagora 
kaza, 1859 
Kyustendil 
kaza, 1864–
1874 
Berkovica, 
8 villages, 
1874 
N-Bulgaria,  
1850 
N-
Bulgaria, 
1867 
Sanjak of 
Plovdiv, 
1874–1875  
Income 
per 
household 
in piasters 
3050 3700/5000 
1070–
1700+520** 
4240 
1000 
 (+ industry, 
 appr. 1000) 
3700 4600 
*** 
As we could see, the profit rate of large estates could reach 20-25% 
under favourable circumstances, so it was similar to the profit rate of 
the transport. But what about other agricultural activities? The 
                                                 
23  Data: Razboynikov, A.: Chiftlitsi i chiftligari v Trakiya predi i sled 1878 g. Izvestiya na Instituta za 
Istoriya 9, 1960. 143–187. 
24  Palaré, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki 1800–1914. 81–83. 
25  Draganova, Sl.: Documents of the 1840’s on the Economic Position of the Villages in Central North 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian Historical Review, 1988/2. 87–100; Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo v 
navecherieto na Osvobozhdenieto: statistichesko izsledvane spored osmanskite danachni registri. 
Sofia, 1985; Poyet, C. F.: IIé lettre du docteur Poyet á la Société de géographie contenant la 
description du kaza de Eski-Zagra (Bulgarie). Bulletin de la Société de géographie. IVé série. 
Tome 18. Paris, 1859. 145–179; Poyet, C. F.: IIIé lettre du docteur Poyet á la Société de géographie 
contenant la description de Quezanlik Turquie d'Europe (Thrace). Bulletin de la Société de 
géographie. IVé série. Tome 18. Paris, 1859. 179–200. 
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Hungarian balkanologist Adolf Strausz analyzed the chances of 
diversification in agriculture based on output ratios and prices after 
1878 in Bulgaria. Phylloxera ruined the grape production, outputs per 
dönüms decreased from 350–700 to 120 kg. As incomes from grape 
decreased, and became similar in terms of money to the income from 
wheat production (13 francs/dönüm), this labour intensive culture 
became neglected. Sesame produced 11.5 francs/dönüm output, thus it 
was also not profitable. Sheer/flax could give 55 francs/dönüms, but the 
decline of the Bulgarian textile industry made its cultivation futile. Flax, 
like potato was uncommon in the Balkans. Tobacco and poppy seed had 
similar yields/ha (over 50 francs/dönüm), but due to climatic conditions 
it was more frequent in Macedonia.26 
There were also late examples on profitable large estates from 
Macedonia, Kočani. The cultivation of 1 dönüm riceland cost here 100 
grosh,27 while the rice output was 240 okes at 30 paras, producing 
altogether 180 grosh income. Thus the return rate measured to the 
expenses exceeded 40%. It is not surprising that 1 dönüm of riceland 
was worth 15-20 Ottoman liras, while wheatlands cost only 0.5-2 liras.28 
In ’traditional’ wheat-producing large estates the expenses were 
smaller, estimated to 63 grosh, but incomes were also lower: 120 oke of 
wheat on one dönüm (150 kgs) produced 90 grosh. This meant a 33% 
return rate for grains. The more profitable, but capital and work-
intensive rice was not frequent in Bulgaria, as the cultivation of 
ricelands here was prohibited by Russians, because it resulted in the 
spead of swamps and malaria, although the sewage of drinking water 
could have solved the problem.29 
Animal husbandry was also profitable, because the wool was used by 
textile firms supplying the Ottoman army prior to 1878 and sheep were 
also to supply the meat markets of the capital, Istanbul. Nonetheless, 
until population pressure remained low and intensification in cereal 
                                                 
26 Income/ha from tobacco was 700-1500 francs around 1900! Data: Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien. 
Posen–Leipzig–Budapest–Konstantinopel–Sofia. 1917. 64–66. 
27 Tilling: 10 grosh, seed: 9 grosh, tithe 30 grosh, transport 15 grosh, reaping 10 grosh. 
28 Central State Archives (CSA), Sofia, Fond. 321. Inventory. 1. archival unit 1616. 2–13. 
29 Strausz, A.: Grossbulgarien… 122. 
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production took place, there was no conflict between animal husbandry 
and grain production. Since the proportion of fallow land reached even 
40% in the 1850s, and decreased under 20% only to the 1920s, this 
offered plenty of space for animals, which also produced manure to 
fertilize arable lands. But as circumstances changed, the rivalry grew: in 
Serbia the conflict between the profitable pig exports and the urge for 
new ploughands owing to the relative overpopulation (without much 
technical advance) caused the decline of animal husbandry. After the 
loss of Istanbul and the army as main purchaser, a similar process took 
place in Bulgaria. 
But in 1846–47 husbandry was still prosperous. That year 623 
thousand sheep arrived from Transylvania to Bulgarian grazing lands. 
Calculating with 45 grosh per each they were worth 25 million piasters. 
These animals gave 1.2 million okes of wool, which meant 5 million 
piasters (calculating with 4 grosh/oke), with an added value of 20%! If 
we deduce the rental costs of pastures, which was 2-3000 piasters for 
1000 sheep, still remains at least 3.5 million grosh profit, making the 
profit rate over 17% or 7777 piasters per shepherds. This wool worth 4 
piasters in Ottoman Turkey was sold at 10 piasters/oke in the Viennese 
market, since transport costs from Brasov to Vienna meant only a 10% 
extra burden, so it was still profitable. 
As population grew, pastures were abandoned and turned first into 
arable land producing fodder for animals, because corn was more 
productive than wheat. In Bitola the cultivation of one dönüm 
wheatland (seeds: 22-30 oke, tilling 50 grosh, harvesting 20 grosh) cost 
100 grosh in 1908, while the expenses for one dönüm cornfield were 
estimated to 170 grosh.30 But the latter produced 500-800 grosh, while 
the wheatland produced only 450-650 grosh even at 12:1 output ratio, 
which was quite rare in the Balkans.31  
Food processing takes us to the world of industry. Our hypothesis that 
the profit rate of industrial activities was not higher than that of 
                                                 
30  Only 8 oke seed owing to better output ratios, tilling for 60 grosh, hoeing twice for 60 grosh, 
harvesting 30 grosh. 
31  Istoriya na Balgarite 1878–1944 v dokumenti. Tom. I–II. Eds.: Trifonov, S.–Georgiev, V. Sofia, 
1996. I/2. 97. 
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agricultural or other economic activity was tested here first. This is also 
a good example to investigate how the size of enterprises influenced the 
profit rate. (As we have already seen, estate size was not a negligible 
factor in wheat production.) Food processing was rather of small scale. 
In a salhane (slaughterhouse) of Gabrovo 30 workers produced 11 000 
grosh net profits meaning a 20% profit rate and only 336 piasters 
profit/worker (or 1800 piasters output/worker). This is quite low 
compared that of mokan shepherds (or to that of the large estates, where 
maximum 1000 piasters/worker was measured as profit). 4 similar 
slaughterhouses were operating in that town butchering 2500-2500 
larger and 20-20 000 smaller animals yearly.32  
In other branches of industry the size of the enterprises also 
influenced the income and profits. In leather industry small enterprises 
with 10-12 workers had a profit of 4-5000 grosh, larger units over 30 
workers had a profit of 30 000 gros, which meant 500 and 1000 grosh 
profits per worker respectively. In the textile enterprises of 
Gyumyushgerdan per capita profits were not exceeding 600 grosh in 
1853.33 So the rate of productivity measured to workers was not high 
either in factories or in manufactures (see table 5 for comparisons).  
Although the exploitation of iron ore produced higher output values 
per capita, labour costs were also high. Thus, imported iron soon 
became cheaper than local, putting an end to the profitability of this 
activity. While 1 ton of Bulgarian iron cost 400 francs,34 the English iron 
was only 200 francs/ton. Although the Bulgarian production reached 
2000 tons in the 1860s,35 the value of the British import was about 
800 000 piasters, which means 800 tons imports early in the 1840s. In 
Samokov 770 workers were involved in ore mining (output: 5200 
piasters/worker), but even the knife-workshops in Gabrovo used 
Austrian iron because of its better quality: 50% of Bulgarian ore was 
thrown away when processing to iron owing to quality problems and 
                                                 
32  Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század 
végétől a 20. század közepéig. Budapest, 2014. Vol. I. 261.  
33  Istoriya na Balgariya, Tom. 6. Sofia, 1987. 52–53. See also as: Gümüşgerdan. 
34  Keleti K: A Balkán-félsziget… 217. and 243. 
35  Istoriya na Balgariya, Tom. 6. 52. 
25 
 
the lack of technical advance. One centner of Bulgarian raw iron cost 160 
piasters in the markets, while its production cost 122 piasters. Thus, the 
profit rate can be put to 25-30%, which is not low, but at the same time 
the similar amount of English nails (as a processed end-product) cost 
only 110 piasters, clearly marking the limits of sustainability of the 
Bulgarian ore production.36 Although the profits per worker exceeded 
1500 piasters, surpassing the profits measured in the textile industry, 
the external circumstances hindered the further extensification of 
production. 
The problems of industry can be illustrated on the example of the 
activity of the Jewish Arie entrepreneur clan. They gave up their interest 
in ore mining because of the low profit rate and unfavourable 
conditions to buy engines, and rather invested in land: their chifliks 
produced 20-30% profits measured to expenses, while the textile works 
of Gyumyushgerdan did not exceed 20% (see below)! According to 
Palairet the profit rate in textile industry only exceeded the profit rate in 
agriculture around 1885. In both industrial branches conditions were 
similar: wages were increasing owing to the previously mentioned 
phenomena in agriculture producing a shortage in labour force, while 
product prices were decreasing from the 1840s (in agriculture only after 
the 1870s), due to external circumstances (competition of imports). 
Therefore, it is evident that higher profit rates in textile industry could 
be achieved only by the installation of engines (mass production, in case 
of higher wages)37 or by low wages characteristic for Macedonia, where 
agrarian wages were still below industrial wages and Bulgarian 
agrarian wages even up to 1910.38  
Even tax-farming was profitable: the same Arie family – instead of 
investing into direct production either in industry or agriculture – 
bought the right to collect the tithe in Niš and this produced a 10% 
                                                 
36   Data: Hilberg, A.: Nach Eski-Djumaia. Reise Skizzen aus Bulgarien. Wien, 1876.  
37  As we have already indicated this is not necessary: mechanization made possible the 
survival of firms even in the case of decreasing profit rate owing to mass consumption. 
38  In Bulgaria industrial wages exceeded remarkably agrarian wages only after 1920. Prior to 
1840 industrial wages were higher, in the 1860–1880s agrarian wages were higher, then the 
temporary shortage of labour increased industrial wages as well up to the 1890s, then came 
a fallback till the 1910s. 
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profit rate. Tax-farming was usually considered easy money for those 
who had enough capital to invest.39 In this case they used up their good 
contacts with the government, especially with Midhat Pasha, to win the 
bid.40 This connection was also used to change the terms of contracts 
with ore miners, if the price of ore changed in favour of workers. The 
repeatedly occurring phenomenon reveals that we cannot speak about 
free competition: the market was distorted owing to government 
intervention, guarranteed state purchases and the uneven availability of 
juristiction for the actors of economy.  
Loans could also produce similar profit rate: the Georgiev brothers 
were lending money for an interest rate of 12-25%. Although their 
capital increased from 2.6 million grosh (1859) to 11.5 million (1877), 
their activity involved industry only indirectly, in forms of lending 
money, for which the profit rate was between 7% (1859) and 15% 
(1870).41 After their withdrawal from direct production and commercial 
activity they turned to banking and their profit rate began to increase.42 
Summing up the mentioned (table 4) we come to the conslusion that 
the profit rate of almost all forms of economic activities were similar to that of 
industrial activities, or even surpassed that, while the latter required definitely 
much capital, which was missing. The first factory of Zhelyazkov cost 
only 140 000 piasters, the second one 1 000 000!  
*** 
 
 
                                                 
39  Brophy and St Clair writes that the tax of a village was sold for 400 pounds, but 970 was 
collected. In the chiflik of Küchük Seymen in 1911 tax farming produced 40% surplus for the 
tax-farmer measured to the investment, while at the end of the 18th century at state level 
only 4 million £ were collected yearly in the central treasury, while around 20 million £ was 
expropriated from producers! See: St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria. Twelve 
Year Study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria. Chapman and Hall, London, 1877. 178; 
Razboynikov, A.: Chiftlitsi i chiftligari… 143–87; also McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 1699–
1812. In: An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Vol II. Eds.: Inalçik, H.–
Quataert, D. Cambridge, 1994/1997. 
40 Eskenazi, E.: Za nachina na sabiraneto na nyakoi danaci v Zapadna Balgariya prez XIXv. do 
Osvobozhdenieto. Izvestiya na Instituta za Istoriya 16–17, 1967. 339. 
41  Koen, D.: Bankerskata deynost na kashtata „Evlogi i Hristo Georgievi” v balgarskite zemi do 
Osvobozhdenieto. Istoricheski Pregled, 1975/6. 67. 
42    Ibid. 63–75.  
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Table 4. Profit rate of some economic activities (measured to income or to initial capital) 
Textile industry of Gyumyushgerdan, 1853 (measured to income) 20–22% 
Verlag system of Gyumyushgerdan 1840 (measured to income) 12–15% 
Butchery in Gabrovo in 1860 (measured to income after the deduction of costs on 
animals and wages) 
20% 
Georgiev brothers, banking (measured to base capital) 7–18% 
Textile factory of Ivan Kalpazanov 1860 (measured to output) 70% 
British merchant, 1829 (measured to value of imported goods) 20% 
Average profit rate of industrial activity in Bulgaria around 1900 according to Lampe 
(measured to invested capital) 
8% 
Export of wool to Austria, 1863  20% 
Smalholdings of 5 ha-os (monoculture, measured to output, measured to total 
investment, between 1880-1900) 
1–2 or 15% 
Large estates around 1860 during the wheat boom (measured to output) 25–30 % 
Textile processed for the army in Kotel (1850-60) (measured to output, guarranteed state 
purchase) 
25–30% 
Tax-farming (minimal profitability, Arie family) 2, 10, 18 and  
Tax-farming (maximum, 1912, Küchük Seymen) 40% 
Russian export trader in 1786 (measured to value of goods) 12–30% 
Samokov iron  25% 
Husbandry (measured to value of herds) 17–20% 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom I. 261. Table II.28. 
 
In the forthcoming pages we are investigating the profitability of textile 
industry as main contributor to/indicator of the industrial (industrious) 
revolution and its change over time, and the regional disparities in the 
profitability of different activities within the Empire.  
The increasing prices of labour force and the falling prices of 
industrial goods owing to the mass imports after 1838 was another 
challenge beyond the lack of capital that had to be tackled with. In 1847 
Gyumyushgerdan paid 75 piasters for 25 days, which was then smaller 
than the salary of agricultural wage-labourers (4-5 piasters daily), but it 
had increased from 0.5 francs to daily 2.5 francs by 1868.43 Finally the 
                                                 
43  Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies… 81.   2.5 grosh and 13 grosh. 
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factory bankrupted owing to falling product prices (see table 7)44 and 
declining profit rate (similarly to large estates!).  
 
Table 5. Profits per labour force for different economic activities (in grosh) 
Large estate 600-2000 
Sheep 7500 
Slaughterhouse 350 
Iron ore 1500 
Leather industry 
500 for small scale 
1000 for large scale units 
Textile industry (1853) 600 
 
Table 6. Prices, wages and purchase power of workers 
 
1845 1847 1860–1870 cca. 1900 
Wheat price (piasters/t) 400 800 600–900 600–700 
Wheat price in grams of silver 400 800 600–900 600–700 
Price of cotton cloth (francs/kg) 24 10 8–10 
 
Price of woolen cloth (francs/kg) 26 24 17–22 16** 
Daily wage in agriculture (grams of silver) 2 4* 10 12.5–14 
Industrial daily wage (in grams of silver) 4 5 12–14 10–12 
Purchase power on cotton stuff for 
agricultural workers (index) 
1 4 10–15 
 
Purchase power on woolen stuff for 
agricultural workers (index) 
1 2 5.8–7.5 10 
Purchase power on grain for agricultural 
workers (index) 
1 1 2.2–3.3 3.4–4 
Purchase power on cotton stuff for 
industrial workers (index) 
1 3.1 7–9 
 
Purchase power on woolen stuff for 
industrial workers (index) 
1 1.35 3.8–5 5 
Purchase power on grain for industrial 
workers  (index) 
1 0.6 1.7–2.3 1.7–2 
Industrial products’ prices are from Michoff, N.: Contribution a l’histoire du commerce de la Turquie et 
de la Bulgarie III. Rapports consulaires français. Svichtov, 1950.  *cca. 1860  **In 1892, Sariivanov. For 
detailed sources see: Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom… Vol. I. Appendix. 762–66. 
                                                 
44 In 1815 one top of aba was sold at 18-20 grosh by Atanas Gyumyushgerdan, in 1850 for 35 
grosh by Mihail Gyumyushgerdan, but the silver content of grosh was halved in this period. 
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Table 7. Differences in agricultural and industrial wages for the centre and the periphery 
Year 
Daily 
wage of 
harvester  
Bulgarian 
industrial daily 
wage  
unskilled/skilled 
Ratio of 
industrial/ 
agricultural wage 
Daily wage of 
unskilled 
industrial 
worker in 
Istanbul 
Daily wage of 
skilled 
industrial 
worker in 
Istanbul 
1840 2 4 
2 = favourable for 
industrialization 
5.9 10.1 
1850 4 5* / 7 1.2 7.8–8 13.3 
1870 10 10 / 14 1.2 7.8 16.6 
1883 15 8 / 10 
0.5 =critical for 
industrialization 
7.9 17.2 
1900/1905 12.5–14 10 / 14 1 8.9 17.9 
See: Ta Van Long: Evoluciya na propadashtite zanayati v Balgarija (ot kraya na XIX v. do 1910 g.) 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1990/5. 33–44; and Ta Van Long: Razvitie na naemniya trud v zanayatchiystvoto v 
Balgariya (1888-1910). Istoricheski Pregled, 1991/12. 54–69; Özmucur, S.–Pamuk, S.: Real Wages and 
Standards of Living Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489–1914. The Journal of Economic History 62, 
2002/2. *Smaller values in Bulgaria are equal to Macedonian average. 
 
Table 8. Productivity of different economic activities measured to wages  
Activity 
Output per capita 
(grosh) 
Own wage of worker 
(prior to taxation) 
Proportion of own 
wage 
Gyumyushgerdan 
factory worker, 1853 
3000 minus raw 
material = 2000 grosh 
600-700 
net profit per worker: 550 
grosh  
20-30% 
Factory of 
Zhelyazkov, 1865 
2800-4500 grosh 900 grosh 20-33% 
Verlag worker of 
Gyumyushgerdan, 
1839 
800 (industrial)+1000 
(agriculture) 
minus raw material in 
industry = 400 grosh 
130+800 
 net profits per worker for 
owner:  
90  grosh 
50% 
Smallholder peasant 
with 5 ha (3 sown) 
(depending on grain 
price) 
900-3000 minus 180-600 
grosh for seeds 
600-2000 
60%  
(taxes and seed 
deduced, but 
consumption not) 
Chiftchi, 1864 2000-2500 minus seeds 600-1200 35-40% 
Samokov miner, 1870  
7000 (minus 2700 grosh 
of raw material   
trading profits equal to: 
1800  
2000 
 
net profits per capita: 1500 
30% 
Sariivanov textile 
factory, Sliven, 1892 
4200 leva, minus 1900 
for raw material 
wage: 900-1000 leva 
net profits per worker (for 
owner) 1450 leva 
20% 
Kantardzhiev textile 
factory, Sliven, 1892 
7000 leva, minus raw 
material: 3000 leva 
salary: 900-1000 leva 
net profits per worker (for 
owner): 3000 leva 
10% 
Husbandry can mean an extra 20-30% in revenues. See: Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom… Vol. I. 263. 
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In order to measure the profit rate in different forms of textile 
industry we may rely on the well documented activity of the 
Gyumyushgerdans. In the 1830s in Verlag system they produced twice as 
much yearly income as in the 1850s. But the expenses were also greater 
in the 1830s, thus the profit rate remained around 20% in both periods. 
It is also worth mentioning that the output was higher in the 1830s than 
during the industrialized forms of production (10 000 top vs. 2-3000 top), 
because they employed 300 part-time workers, while in the 1850s they 
had only some 40 permanent employees. Thus, up to the 1850s per 
capita output increased from 33 top to 50-75 top, while expenses were 
halved (from 150 000 to 80 000 grosh).  
In 1851 the firm (now a factory) created 2000 top aba worth 68 000 
grosh from 6100 oke wool bought at 8 grosh/oke unit price (48 800 grosh 
altogether).45 Although the unit price of the processed product was 4-5 
times valuable than that of the raw material, but if we calculate with 
weight-equivalent (3 okes of raw wool was needed for 1 oke aba) the 
difference is not remarkable. Furthermore, if we deduce the wage of 
workers earning 50 grosh monthly reaching altogether 20 000 piasters 
(calculating with 40 workers), then the wage totally eliminated the 
profits. Although one worker dealt with 150 oke of wool and produced 
50 top of aba, which was better than the 30 top for a worker working in 
Verlag system, but was more expensive – regarding expenses per capita 
(although total expenses decreased). In the Verlag system processing 
one top cost only 4 grosh in 1839, in the factory with engines it was 10 
grosh! So is it surprising that industrialization was simply not worth 
under these circumstances? 
Few years later (1853) the situation ameliorated a bit – mainly due to 
war circumstances and guarranteed state purchases. 8800 okes of wool 
were processed (raw material cost 81 000 grosh, increasing to 10 
grosh/oke unit price similarly to the Viennese value mentioned earlier), 
the workers’ wage was 18 500 grosh reaching 18-20% of all expenses 
(see comparisons in table 9), but the income was 122 000 grosh making 
22 000 grosh profits at 20% profit rate. This rate of return was not 
                                                 
45 Todorov, N.: Balkanskiyat grad v XV-XIX v. Sofia, 1972. 275–78. 
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exceptional, it was the lower boundary of profits which made the 
activity sustainable: credits were issued at 12-15%, other merchant firms 
like Minchoglu and Tapchileshtov also operated at 24-30% profit rate.46 
The merchant company in Varna reached 10% profit rate in its first year, 
and 25% in its second year.47 The retail price of the produced 3000 top 
aba was thus 40 grosh per each, while the labour costs of processing fell 
back to 6 grosh/top. This seems to be a remarkable development 
(compared to 2000 top total output, 34 piasters/top unit price, 10 
grosh/aba labour costs and 0% profits in 1851), but since 
Gyumyushgerdan was able to reach 15% profit rate in the Verlag-
system as well in 1839, the change was not significant indeed. Especially 
not, if we take into consideration that the price and purchase quantity 
was guarranteed by the Ottoman state (without this the total expenses 
on – or the price of – 1 top aba would have been the same, 34 piasters as 
in 1851!). So, the 25% profit rate was reached among distorted market 
conditions and not in free competition: the industry was able to produce 
profit rate similar to other sectors, but only under special 
circumstances.48 The only advantage was that the firm required less 
persons and less yearly expenses (the capital demand was decreasing), 
but it was not more efficient than the Verlag system regarding expenses 
per 1 top or profit rates! This is a great difference measured to western 
factories, where efficiency exceeded the efficiency in Verlag-system. 
If we compare these results with another branch of – traditional – 
textile industry, one may come to the conclusion that profit rates at guilds 
interested in clothing were not smaller than in factories. Indeed, their 
profits were around 50% between 1810–78 – which was as high as in the 
1890s in the case of factories – despite the doubling of daily wages and 
                                                 
46  Todorov, N.: Za naemniya trud v balgarskite zemi kam sredata na XIX. v. Istoricheski Pregled, 
1959/2. 14. 
47  Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto Chernomorie… 133–34. In the 4th year the base capital reached 45 000 
grosh, too small compared to that of the above mentioned merchants. 
48  The low return rate can be illustrated by the Greek numbers as well. Here 26 million 
drachmas were spent on establishing factories, raw material and wages cost 48 million 
drachmas, while processed material was worth some 60 million and energy costs reached 3 
million. Summing up, these the 7500 workers produced hardly any profits. Babanászisz, Szt.: 
A görög ipar kialakulása és fejlődése. In: Gazdasági elmaradottság, kiutak és kudarcok a XIX. 
századi Európában. Eds.: Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy. Budapest, 1979. 378. 
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prices of raw material. (This also implies that the prices of processed 
products, dresses, clothes produced at Gyumyushgerdan and in Varna 
also increased, doubled indeed – due to state support of prices). 
Artizans of guilds representing small scale industry were able to 
produce 700–1000 dresses yearly (200 per person) during the 
Napoleonic boom, and this was not higher even in 1878 without engines 
in Varna (table 14). With the absence of mechanization it was the 
number of employees that mainly determined the output. (In the early 
stages costs and profit rates were not affected by mechanization, it was 
the quantity of output – thus share from the total market – that could be 
influenced by the application of engines). 
*** 
The consequence of integration to world market is evident from the 
aspect of industrial wage labourers: although industrial wages were 
increasing (table 7), this did not follow that of the grain prices, therefore 
the purchase power on wheat decreased in the case of industrial 
workers (table 6). At the same time the price of cotton products fell (table 
6), thus the purchase power on textiles tripled after the 1840s! It meant 
especially favourable conditions for the agricultural smallholders, who 
did not suffer from the increase of wheat prices as being self-subsistent, 
while they were able to buy more industrial goods. Improving purchase 
power of the markets meant favourable condition for enterprises, which 
were – on the other hand – forced to implement mass-production: for 
these firms investments into mechanization became inevitable to 
compensate the decrease of profits. Profits were decreasing owing to 
falling prices after the end of imperial price support and due to 
increasing wages. As agricultural wages were still higher after the early 
years of liberation in Bulgaria (table 7), this hindered the accumulation 
of labour force in industry, triggering a reverse movement (de-
industrialization), which increased industrial wages too and urged for 
mechanization. (Engines required skilled, thus better paid staff, while at 
the same time substituted workforce).49 Furthermore, the price gap 
between processed products and semi-processed material was 
                                                 
49  As the operating costs in case of mechanized factories were not higher than in manufactures, 
it was the high initial capital of engines that limited their presence. 
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decreasing in the case of wool and cotton, which – together with the 
increase of wages – threatened the profits of local producers (table 9). 
Both phenomena urged for the substitution of labour force with 
engines, but due to the lack of capital concentration, this was difficult. 
The loss of Ottoman markets and state purchases, the implementation 
of real market circumstances in a region where small-scale peasant 
economies dominated, severely affected the textile industry. The 
number of craftsmen in Samokov fell from 426 to 53 between 1878–88. 
In Stara Zagora it was 493 in 1877, and 186 in 1879. Wool production in 
E-Rumelia dropped back to 40% compared to a decade earlier. The 
share of textiles from export fell from 20–30% to 5% of the total (table 
14).50  
 
Table 9. The price ratio of processed and raw products (added value) 
Year 
Woolen 
cloth 
(franc/kg) 
Thread 
(francs / 
kg) 
Ratio 
Cotton 
cloth 
(francs/kg) 
Thread 
(francs 
/ kg) 
Ratio 
Silk cloth 
(francs / 
kg) 
Raw 
silk and 
cocoon 
Ratio 
1846 26 1.33 19.5 24.5 1.2 20.4 110 38–40* 2.9 
1851 24 1.1 21.8 10.1 1.37 7.3 140–150** 33–36** 4.2 
1856 26 1.8 14.4 9.7 1.45 6.6 166 48 3.4 
1860–70 17–22 
 
10 8–10 
  
105–115 30–35 3–3.5 
Selected from and calculated based on Michoff, N.: Contribution a l’histoire du commerce de la 
Turquie et de la Bulgarie III.  *1845–48; **1851–55. 
 
Table 10. Ratio of wages and raw material 
Year 
Woolen thread 
(francs/kg) 
Cotton thread 
(francs/kg) 
Raw silk 
(francs/kg) 
Daily wage 
(grosh) 
1846 1.33 1.2 38 4 
1851 1.1 1.37 33 5 
1856 1.8 1.45 48 6-7 
 
Year 
Index of 
woolen thread 
Index of cotton 
thread 
Index of raw 
silk  
Index of 
daily wage 
1846 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1851 0.83 1.14 0.90 1.25 
1856 1.35 1.21 1.26 1.5-1.75 
Selected from and calculated based on Michoff, N.: Contribution a l’histoire du commerce … Vol. III.  
                                                 
50 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History … 246. 
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Owing to the above mentioned problems of industry around the 
1870s, the shift in local production from processed stuff to semi-
processed goods (textiles-thread) was therefore a common practise (in 
Ottoman Turkey as well). As the increase of wages was not greater than 
the increase in prices of semi-processed material (table 10), these 
products could not contribute to the increase of the living standard of 
industrial workers on the long run!  
 
Table 11. Productivity rate of Bulgarian textile industrial forms and units I 
Cloth 
Factory of 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 1851 
Factory of 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 1853 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 
Verlag, 1839 
  
Sariivanov, 
1892 
Kantardzhiev, 
1892 
Expenses on raw 
material (grosh) 
48 800 81 000 150 000 leva 105 000 75 000 
Expenses on wage 
(grosh) 
20 000 20 000 40 000 leva 50 000 25 000 
Woolen raw 
material (oka) 
6100 8800 30 000 kg 
60 000– 
70 000 
50 000 
Processed (top) 2 000 3 000 10 000       
Workers 40 40 300   55 30 
Raw material per 
worker (oka) 
150 220 100 kg 1400 1666 
Processed material 
per worker (top) 
50 75 33       
Wage /worker 
(grosh) 
500 500 132 leva 1000 900 
Revenues (grosh) 68 800 122 000 240 000 leva 230 000 210 000 
Revenue / worker 
(grosh) 
1 720 3 050 800 leva 4 200 7 000 
Profit rate before 
taxation (measured 
to income, %) 
0 22 21   33 50 
Profits / worker 
(grosh) 
0 570 166 leva 1300 3000 
Data indicated by bold are from sources, others are calculated based on analogies and the text of 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom I. Budapest, 2014. Appendix, 762–766. Data from 1892: 
Doklad za sastoyanieto na okruga i hoda na raznite v nego dosti sluzhbi za vremeto ot 31 avg. 1891 do 
31 avg. 1892. Sliven, 1892, 32–35. Data for 1851–53: Todorov, N.: Za naemniya trud v balgarskite zemi… 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 12. Productivity rate of Bulgarian textile industrial firms II. 
Indicator 
1839, state 
owned 
factory, 
guarranteed 
prices  
1839, state 
owned 
factory, 
guarranteed 
prices 
(grosh) 
1839, 
local 
price 
(grosh) 
1839, 
Istanbul 
local price 
(grosh) 
Gümüş-
gerdan 
factory, 
1851 
Gümüş-
gerdan 
factory, 
1853 
Kantardzhiev 
factory, 1892 
Price of raw 
material (3 
okes of wool) 
12 15 15 15 24 27 
32 grosh (at 
1.5 leva unit 
price) 
Wage / top 
(grosh) 
4 4 4 
4+1 
(transport) 
10 6 14 
Price of 
processed 
material  
19 19 24 28 34 40 
4.2 leva/kg,  
20 leva/4kg, 
or 100 grosh 
Profit rate / 
income (%) 
16 0 21 30 0 20 50 
Raw material / 
income (%) 
63 75 62 53 66 66 38 
Wage / income 
(%) 
21 25 17 14 30 15 12 
Data are from Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom… Vol. I. Appendix.  Data for 1892: 
Doklad za sastoyanieto na okruga… 32–35. Data for: 1851-1853 from Todorov, N.: Za naemniya trud v 
balgarskite zemi …  1 top aba = appr. 10 m / 4.5 kg / 5 m2 / 2 dresses. 1 grosh = 1 gram of silver. 
 
Table 13. Productivity rate of Bulgarian textile industrial forms and units before and after 
1878 
Textile industry in Eastern 
Rumelia (Sliven, Plovdiv) 
1883 1867 
aba sayak factory clothes aba sayak factory clothes 
Altogether (1000 kg) 121 70 54 500 300 80 
Produced value (1000 leva) 860 960+560= 1520 4 000 3 700 
Unit price (leva/kg) 7.11 13.71 10.37 8 11 9.1 
Unit price of raw material 
(leva/kg) 
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 
 
Year 
Textile factories of 
Eastern Rumelia 
(output in t) 
Output in 
1000 leva 
Unit price 
(leva/kg) 
N- Bulgaria 
(output in t) 
Output in 
1000 leva 
Unit 
price 
(leva/kg) 
1867 1500 7000 4.67 540 200051 3.70 
1883/1903 610 3100 5.08 500 2650 5.30 
Source: Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies…  
                                                 
51 While the production of textile factories, manufactures were 9 million francs in 1867, total 
textile production (including home-spun textiles) reached 15 million. 
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Table 14. Productivity rate of Bulgarian textile industrial firms III (clothing) 
Dress 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 
1806 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 
1809 
Gyumyush-
gerdan, 
1815 
Varna, 
one unit 
1878 
Varna, 1878 
20 units with 80 
workers  
Raw material  
(1 top aba, cca 2 dresses) 
365 963 380 400 8 000 
Total costs of raw material  
(in piasters)* 
6 570 19 250 6 840 
16 000–32 
000 
320 000–640 000 
Unit price of raw material 
(in piasters)* 
18 20 18 40–80 40–80 
Labour force  
(1 master with 1 apprentice, 
yearly 250 days, max. 500 
dresses) 
4 10 4 4 80 
Dress (pieces) 720 2 000 720 800 16 000 
Total value of dresses  
(in piasters) 
15 000– 
30 000* 
40 000– 
80 000 
15 000–
30 000* 
100 000** 2 000 000 
Total wage  
(without the master/owner) 
5 000 5 000 8 000 13 000 250 000 
Daily wage for 1 person  
(grosh) 
5  5  8  
10–13  
(yearly 2 500) 
Profits (piasters) 
min.  
3 000 
min.  
15 000 
0–15 000* 
 
1 000 000 
Profit rate measured to income 
(%) 
20–50 40 50 55 50 
Data from 1878: Tonev, V.: Balgarskoto Chernomorie… Data for cca. 1800: Todorov, N.: Balkanskiyat 
grad… Data indicated by bold letters are from sources, the others are calculated.  
*At 1839 prices (with decreased silver content compared to 1809). Unit price of dress: 20 and later 40 
piasters (devalvation). **Unit price of dresses after 1878 based on the data of Keleti, K.: A Balkán-
félsziget… 25 francs/piece, equalling to 125 piasters after the devalvations (1790–1840). 
 
How did the reborn Bulgarian textile industry perform after the 
liberation? After the early stage of decline (table 13) the Bulgarian textile 
industry showed similar productivity rate in 1892 as England did in 1814 
(!) (table 16), or a western guildsman who produced 1 m of textile per 
hour. Compared to the western guildsmen the employees of the 
Bulgarian Verlag-system produced only 0.33 m textiles/hour in the 
1850s, but there were also factories in 1892 that could not produce more 
(firm Gyaurov in table 16).52 The per capita productivity of (post-) 
                                                 
52  The Bulgarian efficiency in the 19th century exceeded that of the Hungarian in the 18th 
century. In Sopron between 1776–86 1 m per capita was the daily average. In Esztergom 
(Gran) between 1780–86 0.8 m/day was normal. Silk-spinning reached daily 1 m per capita 
in Italy, but 3-5 m in India using traditional spinning-wheels. The theoretical maximum 
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Ottoman era reached only one-fifth of a factory in the USA. Compared 
to the 1850s the productivity increased, but so did the wages. Owing to 
the relative oversupply of land between 1878–90s noone wanted to 
work in a factory for smaller wages that the land of 5 hectares could 
produce (600–1000 francs) until relative overpopulation became a 
problem a generation later. The costs of wage measured to production 
was still great in Bulgaria compared to western countries (table 16). The 
output per capita was similar to the Russian values in the 1890s (table 
15) and did not ameliorate significantly over the century.  
Although the wage costs/m and outputs were similar in 1892 to the 
values measured in 1853, the profit rate improved remarkably. The firm 
of Sariivanov produced a 33% profit rate, the Kantardzhiev factory in 
Sliven operated under 50%. What was the reason for this difference, if 
many of the major indicators were similar? The first reason was that 
these products were still sold at the Ottoman market, western markets 
remained unavailable for the Balkan quality. The second reason is that 
the installation of engines increased the output per capita. (Since the 
price of raw material was fluctuating, while prices of products were 
stagnating, the only possibility to influence profitability was to 
influence the wages or to increase the output). This was to balance the 
increasing wages. The output per worker was still weak in western 
comparison, but the improvement is undeniable compared to the last 50 
years.  
 
Table 15. The productivity of Bulgarian weaving industry in international context I 
Factory Productivity for one worker 
Moscow, Vladimir, 1892 (14 hours daily) 456 rubles =1825 leva* 
St. Petersburg 1892 (12 hours daily) 1102 rubles = 4410 leva 
Estonia, 1892 (12 hours daily) 1327 rubles = 5308 leva 
Dobri Zhelyazkov (12 hours daily) 1850 2800 - 5500 leva ** 
Sariivanov, 1892 4500 leva (wage: 900-1000 leva, raw material: 1500 leva) 
Kantardzhiev, 1892 7000 leva (wage 800-900 leva, raw material 1500 leva) 
*1 rubel equals to 4 leva prior to 1897 and 2.66 leva after. ** 120 000 okes of washed wool, 40-50 000 top 
at 18-20 grosh unit price or at 40 grosh unit price. Data from: Istoriya na balgarite v dokumenti, I/1.  
 
                                                                                                            
under these circumstances (without mechanization), supposing continuous supply of thread 
was daily 4 m/capita or 0.5 m/capita/hour (see table 16 for comparisons!). Endrei, W: A 
textilipari technikák termelékenységének története. Budapest, 1993. 181. 113–15. 52–53. 
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Table 16. The productivity of Bulgarian weaving industry in international context II 
Region, year 
Working 
hours / 
week 
Productivity 
m / person / 
week 
m / 
person / 
hour 
Weekly wage 
Wage costs 
for a meter 
of product 
1814, England 80 131 1.5   
1832, England 72 220 2.8   
1890, England 54 540 9   
Germany, Switzerland 
1890 
68 466 6.8 
11 s 8d*** 
  (50-60 
piasters) 
0.3 d/m 
(under 0.2 
piasters/m) 
Lancashire, 1890 54 706 13 
16 s 3 d  
(80 piasters) 
0.27 d/m 
USA, 1890 60 1200 20 
20 s 3 d  
(100-120 
piasters) 
0.2 d/m 
Plovdiv, Gyumyusgerdan-
factory without machines, 
1850, aba clothes 
80 30 0.33 
2 leva 
 (10 grosh) 
2.5 
piasters/m 
Plovdiv, Gyumyushgerdan 
1853, aba factory 
80 40 0.5 
2 leva 
 (10 grosh) 
0.6 
piasters/m 
Dobri Zhelyazkov, 1865 
250 thousand oke  
or 100 000 top 
aba, textiles and dress 
72 30-60 0.5-0.8** 18 grosh 
0.3-0.6 
grosh/m 
Abadjis of Samokov with 
peasant smallholdings, 
1876, aba 
  
0.6 m 
/day 
cca. 100 grosh 
for a year, 
at 666 grosh / 
person / 
year 
productivity 
0.6 grosh/m 
Sliven, 1892: Sariivanov, 
yearly 150 000 m* 50 
workers +50-100 spinners 
60 60 1** 
20 leva 
(100 piasters) 
0.33 leva/m 
 (1.5-1.65 
piasters) 
Sliven, 1892: Tanev és 
Kantardzhiev, 30 workers, 
yearly 140 000 m 
60 100 1.6 
16-18 leva 
(80-90 piasters) 
0.25 leva/m 
(1.25 
piasters) 
Sliven, 1892: Balgarija, 
100 workers, yearly 50 000 
m 
60 10 0.2   
Sliven, 1892: Gyaurov, 
yearly 50 000 m, 30 
workers 
60 33 0.5   
* clothes of 45 cm and 135 cm width are recalculated to 45 cm width; **total vertical integration with 
spinners, so total production can be doubled; *** 1 pound sterling = 20 shilling = 240 pence (d) 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom… Vol. I. 267. 
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The Bulgarian textile industry remained underdeveloped. There had 
been 12 thousand weaving machines in England already in 1812, the 
British had invested 1 million pounds (22 million francs) to the textile 
industry by 1790, while in Bulgaria the value of total industrial 
investments had reached 100 million francs by 1910.53 In India 1000 
spindles was handled by 25 persons (1:40 ratio), while in Bulgaria this 
ratio was 10. After the spread of potato as foodstuff English 
entrepreneurs were complaining that the workers earned their weekly 
foodstuff within 2 days, therefore in the other days of the week their 
productivity decreased. Therefore the interest of entrepreneurs was to 
cut back salaries.54 But in Bulgaria salaries could not be cut back under 
agricultural wages (not only because potato was not a common 
foodstuff), because it would have triggered a reverse stratification into 
agriculture (until there was enough land). The lack of capital 
concentration can be observed in the selection of machines as well. A 
manual weaving machine cost 8-10 pound sterlings in England, while a 
’mule’ machine was 30-35 pounds. The previous lasted for 20-30 years, 
the latter for 15 years. The previous had an output of 1m/hour at 1.5 
shilling, the latter produced 20 m/hour at 0.66 shilling unit price. 4 
Bulgarians rather bought 4 manual weaving machine than one ’mule’ 
for the same total amount of money because of the lack of capital 
concentration, although the productivity of the ’mule’ was 40-50 times 
greater (or 20-25 times, if amortization is calculated with).55  
Prior to the industrial revolution in Bulgaria, Bulgarian guilds have 
similar output to that of English guildsmen. That is why factories did 
not push out guildsmen from the market immediately. In Saloniki the 
spinning factory produced 1 kg/spindles/day = 4000 m/spindles/day = 
300 m/spindles/hour in 1850, while in England and Switzerland the 
similar value was reached already in 1793, and in India the same 
production rate was measured – using the traditional spinning wheel.56 
In Chemnitz, the factory owner Kreissing bought 50 Spinning Jennies in 
                                                 
53 Endrei W.: A textilipari technikák termelékenységének története… 160. 
54 Ibid., 34. 
55 Ibid., 14–15. 
56 Ibid., 103–104. 
40 
 
1800, thus substituting 300 workers, reaching an output of 38x8150 m 
early, which was exactly 170-200 m/spindles/hour, or 300 m/capita/h,57 
just slightly worse than the output of the firm in Saloniki in 1850.  
The following example reveals how vulnerable the Bulgarian textile 
industry was after 1878. In 1892 the Sariivanov textile factory in Sliven 
produced 120 000 x 0.45 m textile at 1.5 leva/m unit price and and 10 000 
x 1.4 m textile at 5 leva/m unit price with its 55 workers. This meant an 
income of 230 000 francs. The workers’ wage reached 55 000 leva (1000 
francs/capita – compare it with the 600 grosh or 120 francs paid by 
Gyumyushgerdan in 1853). This output needed 50 000 kg raw, 
unwashed wool bought at 1.5 leva/kg unit price, so the cost of raw 
material was 75 000 francs. The revenues exceeded the expenses by 
100 000 francs meaning a 40% profit rate measured to expenses. This 
exceeded the profit rate of firms analyzed prior to 1878. Thus, it seems 
to be a profitable investment: the added value exceeded 3 times that of 
the raw material, and the investment (without buildings and engines) 
showed a three-year rate of return, which is similar to the return rate of 
the large landholdings (also measured without the costs of buying the 
land).58 But taxes modified this favourable situation. Surtax on profits 
reached 15 000 francs, the tax on income was 23 000 francs (10%). If the 
entrepreneur did not have enough initial capital to invest, he needed a 
credit to run such an enterprise: 200 000 francs loan for 10 years at an 
interest rate of 10% means yearly 50 000 francs deduction from the 
profit. And the remainder is not too much: 100 000 – (15 000 + 23 000 + 
50 000) = 12 000 francs! If there was a 10% decrease in the price of the 
textiles (or increase in prices of raw material), while the wages remained 
constant, it meant that the income would fall to 200 000 francs (expenses 
remained around 130 000). In this case the profit rate (measured to 
income) was still above 25%, but taxes took away 20+12 thousand leva 
(the state also loses 6000 francs tax-income owing to price fluctuations). 
The remainder was only 42 000 francs, thus the yearly payment of 
credits could not be fulfilled in this case! This means that under these 
circumstances both the state and the entrepreneur and even the creditor 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 67. 
58 Doklad za sastoyanieto na okruga … 32–35. 
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(bank) had a clear interest to cut back industrial wages in order to 
increase the rate and amount of profit! 59 (Not to mention the workers, 
who could lose their jobs in case of bankruptcy). Thus at the end of the 
19th century wages in textile industry began to stagnate. 
Certainly these conditions and the lack of capital meant that Balkan 
textile factories could not compete with the western firms, only with the 
Russians (table 19-21). The Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian firms were 
similar regarding their output indicators.60 In Macedonia it was the 
cheap labour force that maintained the profitability of the production 
(as in Syria). Low industrial wages here were still attractive enough 
compared to the even lower earnings in agriculture, as in Macedonia the 
chiflik dominated (extending to more than 50% of lands) after 1878. 
Landlords (and the state) tried to deprive the surplus of the producers 
in order to compensate the losses in revenues (due to the decrease of 
wheat prices) through the increase of exported volume and taxes. Akarli 
proved that between 1890–99 per capita agricultural taxes increased by 
70%, while the grain prices fell by 15% (table 21): thus the outbreak of the 
Ilinden revolt in 1903 can be explained by economic reasons as well. The 
decrease of wheat prices and the increase of taxes resulted in a decline 
in agrarian population (although per capita output volumes increased, 
but the incomes did not, as grain prices fell) and a relative 
industrialization in rural Macedonia too (table 17). The number of spindles 
increased eightfold in the countryside within 20 years, and the 
productivity per one spindle also doubled in the next 10 years reaching 
                                                 
59  Under these circumstances the factory could only survive if the interest to be paid was not 
more than 35 000 francs, so the loan could not exceed 140 000 leva, thus at least 100 000 leva 
own capital is needed for the first year of operation.  
60   Per capita output was 2800-5500 leva at Zhelyazkov, 4400 leva in St. Petersburg, 5300 leva in 
Estonia, 4500 leva in the Sariivanov factory. The Polish center, Łódz had 569 industrial units 
in 1913 with 1 539 000 spindles, 36 384 looms and 81 000 workers. The total product of silk 
industry was 16 441 000 rubles, while industrial output of textiles was 187 million rubles 
(2300 rubles/person). In 1910 other forms of industry produced only 10 million rubles with 
8000 workers (1200 rubles/capita; steel industry was leading among them with 4 million). 
13% of workers was children, the proportion of adult males reached only 55%. The salaries 
reached 29 675 000 or 333 rubles per person (16% of the output). National Széchényi Library, 
Budapest (Országos Széchényi Könyvtár). Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök hátrahagyott 
iratai sztenographalt részének átírása. Fol. Hung. 1677. Bosniaca, IX/3. 608–09, 613. 
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the average of Saloniki (160 pounds/spindle). (The Prince Boris factory 
in Varna produced 223 pounds in 1902, Niš 138 pounds/spindle). 
 
Table 17. Industrial deconcentration and increase of productivity in Macedonian textile 
production, 1879–1912 
Year 
Saloniki Countryside Altogether 
Spindles 
Production 
in million 
pounds*  
For one 
spindle 
Spindles 
Production 
in million 
pounds*  
For 
one 
spindle 
Spindles 
Production 
in million 
pounds*  
For 
one 
spindle 
1879 12 000 0.7 58.3 1500 
  
13 500 
  
1891 18 800 3 159.5 4200 0.8 190.5 23 000 3.8 165.2 
1908 18 000 3 166.3 33 000 3 90.9 51 000 6.5 127.4 
1912 22 800 
  
47 200 6.4 135.6 70 000 8.5 121.4 
Own calculation after Palare, M.: Balkanskite ikonomiki… 370.  * Pound is a weight unit here. 
 
Table 18. Comparison of indicators of textile (thread) production between Saloniki and 
Paraćin 
Place Spindles Looms 
Production 
(meters) 
Production 
(dinars) 
For one 
spindle 
(m) 
For one 
spindle 
(dinars) 
Worker 
Production per 
worker 
Paraćin 
1891 
3400 96 250 000 2 000 000 73.5 588.2 400 
625 m*  
(weekly 15 m)**  
5000 dinars 
Paraćin 
1897 
3400 96 170 000 1 108 000 50 325.9 400 
425 m 
and 2770 dinars 
Saloniki 
1910 
23 000 
 
3 000 000 
pound 
weight 
   
2800 
1071 pounds*** 
(weekly 22 m) 
*Wage costs/meter equal to 1 dinar which was high: in Bulgaria it was about 0.25-0.33 leva/m. In Serbia 
1 m of cloth cost 8 dinars, thus the ratio of wage costs was only 12% while in Bulgaria it was 12-20%.  
**In Sliven at Gyaurov’s factory in 1892 it was weekly 33 m, in the Balgariya factory weekly 15, at 
Sariivanov’s weekly 60 m clothes were produced by one worker, at Zhelyazkov’s firm it was 30-60 m.  
***As 1 kg of clothes equals to 2 m x 0.5 m thus 1 pound is cca. 1 m x 0.5 m. The factory in Saloniki 
produced only thread and not cloth, that is the reason for the higher output values.  
 
Table 19. Productivity of textile factories in the Balkans 
Factory Spindles 
Production  
(in pounds / or in 
meters) 
For one spindle 
(in pounds) 
Prince Boris, Varna, 1902 11 200 2 500 000 223 
Niš 3600 500 000 138 
Saloniki altogether in 1879 12 000 700 000 58 
Saloniki altogether in 1891/1908 19 000 3 000 000 166 
Data from: Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol. III. 287–88.  (0.5 kg = 1x0.5 m2) 
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Table 20. Productivity and efficiency of Balkan and western textile factories  
 USA, 1831 England, 1833 Saloniki, 1879 Saloniki, 1900 
Cotton spindles / capita 22 39 10–12 10–15 
Capital / capita (USD) 33 18   
Cotton (pound) / spindle 62 28 58 130 
Cotton (pound) / person 
1364 
(610 kgs) 
1100 
(500 kgs) 
700 1200–1400 
Endrei W.: A textilipari technológiák … 60. Supplemented with the data of Palairet.  
 
Table 21. Tithe incomes in Macedonia 
Year 
Tax 
incomes 
(francs) 
Rural 
population 
Tax per 
capita 
(francs) 
Wheat 
price 
index 
Grain output 
(million tons) 
Output 
/ capita 
(tons) 
1888–1890 41.5 million 2.04 million 20 100 1.1 0.5 
1901–1903 58.3 million 1.7 million 34 85 1 0.6 
After Akarli, A. O.: Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880–1910. In: The Mediterranean 
Response to Globalisation before 1950. Eds: Pamuk, S.–Williamson, J. G. Routledge, 2000. 121.  
 
*** 
It is also worth making a comparison between the return rate of 
different economic activities in different regions. A mediocre landholding 
of 30 hectares (under dry cultivation by 5 adult males, so land/male 
worker was similar to that measured in Bulgaria) in Hebron (Palestine) 
produced 3500 francs revenue (incuding income from animals, which 
totalled 600-700 francs) at the turn of the century after the deduction of 
the tithe, 277 francs. This means only 100 francs/ha revenue, lower that 
came in either from the smallholdings (over 150 francs) or large estates 
in Bulgaria. Among the expenses one could enumerate the taxes on 
estates, altogether 56 francs, tax on goats and sheep, altogether 200 
francs + the tithe, altogether 530 francs. Taxes altogether constituted 
16% of the income, similar to the value in Rumelia prior to 1878 (when it 
decreased to 11 %). Further 344 francs should be deduced as wage for 
assistant workers. Expenses on clothing were estimated to 170 francs. 
Foodstuff (that the estate was unable to produce) cost further 150 francs. 
Altogether 340 francs were spent on needs. Thus total costs reached 900 
francs, while the net gain was 2500 francs, or 17-20% of the total value of 
the estate (14 500 francs = animals, 3200 francs + house for 3600 francs + 
44 
 
1.5 ha of wineyard for 3000 francs + 30 ha land for 4500 francs).61 This 
means that the rate of return was quicker than in case of a silk-reeling 
factory in Lebanon, which produced only 10% profit rate measured to 
base capital. For one male workforce 480 francs net profit was calculated 
(5 males were working on the lands one for each 7 hectares), which is 
remarkable, but not unique compared to other activities (see table 5, and 
seeds and consumption should be deduced from this sum, thus 
consuming half of the profit).62 If we compare these data to the inquiry 
of Daux and Le Play on Bulgarian conditions around 1850 in a 
household that partly gained incomes from industrial activity (the head 
of the family was a smith) we found 400 francs income and 285 francs 
expenses (the value of the estate was 400 francs), which is similar 
percentage value to that measured in Hebron. Per capita expenses were 
similar (60 francs), while the income/male workforce remained under 
the value measured in Palestine (700 vs. 400 francs). However, later 
Bulgarian examples with one adult male worker settling on an estate of 
5 hectares also suppose 600–1000 francs income, which is similar to that 
measured in Hebron. 
If we compare this basic landholding with dry-cultivation to the 
intensely cultivated, irrigated estate of similar extent in Sarona we may 
find significant differences including total income or the structure of 
products and profitability rate. One hectare of orange orchard was 4 
times more expensive than a wineyard and 15 times more expensive 
than a hectare of ploughland. Although the cultivation was capital-
intensive, the income from this orchard showed 33% rate of return. 
Other products like milk, grape showed similar profitability (calculated 
without the cost of water and drainage). The agricultural labour force 
earned 4-500 francs yearly, which was a bit lower than in Bulgaria, but 
was similar to that measured in Macedonia. Since this amount 
represented the net income of the worker, it was similar to those working 
                                                 
61  cca. 150 francs/ha (similarly to Bulgaria prior to 1878. Uncultivated fallow land was valued at 
50 francs/ha. 
62  Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent 1800–1914. A Documentary Economic History. New York, 1988. 
330–335. Calculating with 1:5 seed : crop ratio, from the net output of 2700 francs further 550 
should be deduced. The 20 inhabitants consumed 250 kg wheat/capita, altogether 5 tons, 
meaning further 700 francs.  
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on the farm around Hebron. The composition of products was favourable, 
as many were exempted from tithe, thus this tax reached only 5% of the 
total income compared to the 12% in Hebron. The wage of labourers 
constituted 25% of the expenses (in Hebron it was 10%), while the total 
profit rate was around 10–13% (measured to total investment). This 
seems to be a low value compared to the former example (17%), but the 
absolute value of profits was high, 8000 francs.63 (The value of the estate 
itself was estimated to 85 000 francs compared to the 14 500 francs in the 
former example). Per hectare profits reached 260 francs (4 times higher 
than in Hebron), and although the costs of labour force were also higher 
measured to the total expenses than in Hebron, one male workforce 
produced 2900 francs income in Sarona (and 1200 francs profit) – three 
times greater than in Hebron. But the income/expense ratio was only 1.8, 
while in case of dry economy it was 3. It seems that both forms had 
certain advantages (small investment with small absolute profits and 
quick return rate in Hebron; labour and capital intensive, but diverse 
and high-producing agriculture in Sarona, with smaller return rate, but 
with low taxes). Comparing this intensely used orchard of 30 ha with 
the investment costs and profits of a silk-reeling factory, the latter still 
seems to be an inadequate form of investment with its 200 000 francs of 
initial costs (2.5 times greater) and yearly profits rated at 8-28 000 francs 
(similar to, or maximum 2.5 times greater than measured in Sarona). 
Alternatives in agriculture should be also considered. Animal 
husbandry was rewarding in Syria too. Let us suppose a herd of sheep 
with 100 ewes, each worth 30 piasters. Together with rams the sum 
totalled 5000 piasters (1000 francs). 100 ewes raised 50 new sheep yearly 
(half of which is female) and some butter and wool. The owner of the 
herd received half of the wool and one third of the butter/cheese. The 
bedouin shepherd earned 37 wool and 48 ratl butter. Thus the profits 
can be calculated as follows: 25 newborn ewe lambs, each 30 worth 
piasters and 25 newborn rams each rated to 20 piasters giving a total 
750+500 piasters. The 23 ratl butter cost 322 piasters, the wool 190 
piasters, which was altogether 1760 piasters. The profit rate was 35%, 
                                                 
63   Without the deduction of local consumption and seeds. 
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but deceased animals should be deduced, which is 850 piasters 
calculating with 25-33% mortality rate. Thus 1000 piasters remained, 
approximately 20% of the value of the herd (similar to the case of 
Transylvanian herds). The benefit of the bedouin shepherd was around 
850 piasters from butter and wool (48x14+37x5 piasters respectively). 
The usage of grazing land was free in return for this payment. Although 
the profit rate for the owner was similar to that of the estate in Hebron, 
per capita profit wass smaller (480 francs vs. 200 francs). But one should 
admit that the investments costs were especially low in this case, which 
was a key element in the popularity of this economic activity. The 
shepherd’s income was also smaller than that of those working for the 
orchard, but his work was less intense.64 
 
Table 22. Expenses and revenues of the irrigated estate at Sarona, profits measured to 
incomes 
 
Incomes 
(francs) 
Income measured 
to capital 
investment (%) 
Income 
% 
Expenses (francs) % 
Orange 5500 33 27.1 Workforce (6 persons) 2100 17.5 
Milk 4200 
90 (35 measured 
to expenses) 
20.7 
Gardener’s share 
(50% of products) 
1100 9.2 
Groceries 3500 
 
17.2 Amortization costs 4400 36.7 
Grapes 2900 30 14.3 Household expenses 3000 25.0 
Melon 1000 
 
4.9 Tithe 1100 9.2 
Potatoes 1300 
 
6.4 Together 12 000 100.0 
Together 20 300 
 
100.0 Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent… 335. 
 
Issawi gave a detailed account on the profitability of the industrial 
sector too. A factory processing 5000 kgs of silk cost 35 000 francs,65 the 
yearly wage was put to 5000 francs. The cost of the raw material has to 
be added to this value. Raw silk cost 47–52 francs/kg depending on the 
quality, while cocoons cost 37 francs. Thus the total output reached 230–
260 000 francs yearly, but the raw material itself was 180 000 francs. This 
                                                 
64  Based on Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent… 300. 
65  According to Issawi in 1858 two silk-reeling factories were sold at 300 000 piasters.  
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still allows a profit rate of 20%, but further costs should be deduced, in 
connection with the processing of raw silk (7 francs/kgs = 35 000 francs), 
and transport costs or paying the interests of credits. So the real profit 
was rated somewhere between 1.8 and 5.5 francs/kg, shrinking the total 
profits to 8-28 thousand francs, which reached only 4-12% of the 
investment (without the cost of the buildings). So, the rate of return was 
really slow despite the high income and profits. Similar amount of 
profits could be produced by an orange orchard of 30 ha in agriculture. 
Furthermore, the 55 workers of a modern European silk factory 
produced more silk than the 100 workers of a Lebanese firm, while costs 
were reduced to 4 francs/kg in the former compared to the 7 francs in 
Lebanon. With an additional investment of 24 thousand francs (the 
profits of 2 average years) Libanese factories could have been 
modernized, reaching the output levels of European-owned factories 
and 10-18% profit rate.66  
These above-explained factors are responsible for the fact that in 
Lebanon semi-processed industrial goods were more profitable to invest 
into. Cocoons produced a larger profit rate, many small producers 
remained at the level of profitable silkworm-breeding and did not 
invest into silk-reeling. Thus a relative de-industrialization occurred here, 
similarly to the Balkans. Agriculture was also a viable alternative here 
owing to the favourable trends in terms of trade prior to 1873 and after 
1900, and those who lacked capital hardly invested into the industry. 
The profit rate in other branches of textile industry was remarkably 
higher than in silk-reeling (table 23-25), the latter could only overtake 
the 5-6% profit rate of crop export in Iraq. 
As Bulgarian lands were the centre of textile industry in the Empire 
before 1878, it is worth comparing their indicators with that of the 
Middle East. The costs of production were not significantly higher than in 
Syria. The wages constituted 15-30% of costs in Bulgaria prior to 1878, 
then fell back to 10–25%, while it was 15–20% in Lebanon. Textile 
production per capita was higher in Bulgaria. In Homs 12 thousand 
people were engaged in this industry with 4000 looms67 producing 9 
                                                 
66  Issawi, Ch: The Fertile Crescent… 325–26. 
67  Ibid. 68–75. 
48 
 
million francs – this was 750 francs per capita (of course the wage was 
smaller). In Bulgaria the Verlag system applied by Gyumyushgerdan 
produced 800 francs/capita output in 1839 and more than 3000 in 1853. 
After 1878 per capita output reached 4000–7000 francs (in Russia it was 
1800–4400, in the Serbian Paraćin this increased from 2700 to 5000 
francs/worker between 1880–1900) far exceeding the Syrian value. The 
Syrian town of Hama had 400 looms in 1870 and 1000 in 1880 engaging 
3000 persons, which put the per capita output only to 333 francs. But 
this may indicate small scale industry (the output of cotton products in 
Damascus doubled after 1879). Similar output/capita values to the 
Bulgarian production were only produced in the silk industry (1500–
2500 francs), but the cost of raw material was high, it was a capital-
intensive industrial branch in Syria too. 
In Bulgaria the income could exceed the expenses by 20-33% prior to 
1878 and 33-50% after, while in Syria it was 7-12% in the case of silk and 
25% in the case of aba. Wages were also different: in Syria these were 
around 420-750 piasters yearly in leather and pottery industry around 
1890, which was remarkably smaller than the characteristic Bulgarian 
payment after 1890 (reaching 2000–3500 piasters) and resembled rather 
the era prior to 1850. Probably this was one of the comparative 
advantages of Syrian textile industry: cheap labour force. In silk 
industry wages were somewhat higher and reached daily 11 piasters 
(2.4 francs), similar to the Bulgarian value. 
The output per capita in Syria was yearly 500–700 m (as in Serbia – 
425–650 m or weekly 15 m), while in Saloniki it was about 1000 m. In 
Bulgaria it was 30-40 metres weekly at Gyumyushgerdan’s prior to 1878 
– and increased up to 60-100 m/week at the turn of the century. In 
England this value exceeded 130 m/week/person early in 1814 and had 
doubled by 1832. So, it is evident that the Syrian textile industry was 
characterized by low effectiveness and could be competitive only owing 
to its low unit prices (which was partly due to low wages). The price of 
the aladja textile was 3-5 francs/m in 1879, while in case of cotton it was 
only 0.5-1 franc/m. In Bulgaria around the 1850s one top aba (5m2 or 
10x0,5m) was 35-40 piasters, similar to the Syrian price (0.8-1 franc/m), 
but by 1890 the former had increased to 14 francs (or 1.5 francs/m).  
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Table 23. Productivity of Lebanese factories in 1899 
Products of 
Beyrut 
Pieces Units 
Raw 
material 
(quintar) 
Price of raw 
material and 
cost per unit 
(1000 piasters) 
Costs of 
processing and 
cost per unit 
(1000 piasters) 
Value of 
products and 
value per 
units (1000 
piasters) 
Silk belts 120 looms 36 882 (24) 360 (3) 1323 (11) 
Shirts 40 looms 16 392 (24) 66 (1.5) 504 (12.5) 
Ribbons 100 shops 100 2000 1000 4000  
Leather 200 worker 
 
300 150 (0.75) 600 (3) 
Pottery 120 worker 
 
100 50 (0.4) 200 (1.6) 
Sesame and 
halva 
12 shops 
 
300 150 600 
Ship 1 factory 
 
250 200 600 
Dayr el-Qamar 
     
Silk and 
cotton goods 
120 looms 60 1200 900 (7.5) 2400 (20) 
Aba 40 looms 10 200 100 (2.5) 400 (10) 
Products of 
Beyrut 
Profits 
(1000 
piasters) 
Profit rate 
measured to 
income %  
Profit/unit 
(1000 
piasters) 
Production per 
unit (1000 
piasters) 
Yearly wage 
per capita (1000 
piasters) 
Costs of 
processing 
(%) 
Silk belts 100 7.6 0.83 11 
 
27 
Shirts 46 9 1.15 12.6 
 
13 
Ribbons 1000 25 10 40 
 
25 
Leather 150 25 0.75 3 0.75 25 
Pottery 50 25 0.42 1.7 0.42 25 
Sesame and 
halva 
150 25 12.5 50 
 
25 
Ship 150 25 150 600 
 
33 
Dayr el-Qamar 
     
Silk and 
cotton goods 
300 12.5 2.5 20 
 
38 
Aba 100 25 2.5 10 
 
25 
Based on Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent… 382.  
 
So, Syrian products were cheaper, which could defend the local 
markets with low purchase power from the penetration of import 
textiles. In Germany the daily wage of a worker was 24d (2s) in 1890, in 
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Lancashire it was 26 d, while in Aleppo it remained under 1s (5-6 
piasters). In the factory of Dobri Zhelyazkov in 1865 the daily wage was 
3 piasters68 (in Lebanon in the 1850s it was 4-6 piasters) – similar to the 
Syrian value, but as we mentioned, industrial wages went upwards in 
the Balkans after 1878 – together with unit prices.  
 
Table 24. Characteristics of textile industrial production in Aleppo Vilayet, 1890 
Products Looms 
Total 
produced 
value 
(pound) 
Daily wage 
Daily 
output per 
loom (font) * 
Value of 5 
yard clothes 
Cotton goods 1500 56 8–11 d 37,3 1 s 5d 
Cotton and silk 650 49 1 s 75,4 2s 10 d 
Silk 900 135 1 s 3d 150.0 5s 9d 
Silk with golden thread 50 25 1 s 3d 500.0 
 
Altogether 3135 270 
 
86.1 
 
Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent, 75.  
* Calculating generally 3 persons for a loom it means 1300 piaster/capita (270–300 frank) for cotton 
products and 5000 piasters (1100 francs) for silk stuff and 16 000 piasters, 3600 francs for gilded silk. 
 
Table 25. The productivity of textile industry at Damascus in 1879 
Type of 
cloth 
Worker Output 
Unit 
price 
(francs) 
Production 
per capita 
Income 
per capita 
(francs) 
Value 
of 1x0,5 
m2 
Total 
income 
(francs) 
Aladja 
(cotton 
and silk) 
1200 
100 000 
(6x0.5 
m) 
18–30 
250 m2 
(500x0,5) 
1500–2500 3–5 
1.8–3 
million 
Dima 
(cotton) 
2500 
300 000 
(6x0.5) 
3–6 720x0,5 360–720 0,5–1 
0.9–1.8 
million 
Mabrum 
(cloth) 
3000 300 000 2–4 100 200–400  
0.6–0.8 
million 
Issawi, Ch.: The Fertile Crescent… 79.  
 
What happened to the Syrian textile production under these 
circumstances? Total production was stagnating while the centre of 
production was shifting from town to town showing temporal local 
upswings. According to Boislecomte the total production in textile 
industry was 6 million francs in Damascus around the 1830s. Bowring 
                                                 
68  Demeter G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom... Vol. I. 266. 
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put it 16 million francs of which 12% was labour costs. To this we 
should add the production of Aleppo and Lebanon, making it a total of 
24 million francs. The production in Damascus had fallen back to 10 
million francs by 1898, while in Aleppo it had increased to 10-12 million 
and this was similar in Hama and Homs. The total production of the 
textile industry in this region with 4 million inhabitants was put to 24-30 
million francs similarly to the early years. Since unit prices were falling, 
the volume of production probably increased. Bulgaria with similar 
total population produced 15 million francs in the 1870s (3 million 
inhabitants), 10 million francs in 1900 (80% of this was produced in 
factories) and 20 million in 1910 (4 million inhabitants). 69 
In Syria directly 30-40 thousand people (families) were involved into 
any forms of textile industry (in Bulgaria together with shepherds it was 
60-70 thousand prior to 1878; after the liberation it shrank quickly to few 
thousand engaged in factories) for yearly 6-8 million francs wage, which 
was 20% of the value of the total production. For one person it only 
meant 200 francs yearly: this was not more than the 900-1000 piasters, 
that landless agricultural wage earners received (it was 350 francs for a 
skilled agricultural worker in Sarona), well under the Bulgarian 
industrial salaries (600-900 francs that time).70 It is not surprising 
therefore that small-scale home industry survived and the 
restratification of workforce into real, large factories did not take place – 
not even in the era between 1873–96 when tendencies in terms of trade 
favoured industrial investments. Families did not give up agriculture, 
mainly children and women were sitting next to the looms, if it was 
necessary for the family to subsist. Since the profit rate on cocoons was 
great, even surpassing 40%, smallholders did not prefer to give up 
agriculture and work for a silk-reeling factory, which produced only 
15% profits even for the owners, not to mention the ridiculously small 
earnings. The behavior of local producers – who turned towards the 
production of semi-processed material instead of end-products – 
                                                 
69  It also means that prior to 1910 the per capita output of the small-scale Syrian industry was 
larger than in Bulgaria. 
70   In Hebron at the estate of 30 ha the per capita output was larger than that. 
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created a relatively favourable situation for imported goods.71 Farmers 
even gave up crop production for cocoons – the fertile Syria became a 
net importer of grains, which makes the seemingly irrational military 
interventions and investments of the central government reasonable: the 
expensive occupation of Deir-es Zor in 1862 and the expulsion of 
bedouins from the Hauran was to serve the security of grain supply.  
 
Table 26. A comparison of the profitability and productivity of different activities in 
Lebanon 
Economic 
activity 
Capital for 
buildings, 
equipment 
(francs) 
Profits 
(francs) 
Profit 
rate (%) 
Profits 
(income) 
/ ha 
Profits / 
worker 
Income / 
worker 
Income / 
Expense 
ratio 
Wage of 
1 worker 
(francs) 
Hebron, 30 
ha, 5 adult 
males, dry 
cultivation 14500 2200 15-20% 75 (115) 440 680-700 
3400 / 
1200 = 
2.9 680 
Sarona, 7 
workers, 30 
ha, irrigated 
orchard 85000 8000 
10% / 
35% 270 (670) 1140 2900 
20 000 /  
12 000 = 
1.7 450 
100 sheep (1 
shepherd) 1000 200+170 20%         170 
Silk reeling + 
processing 
35000 
8000-
28000 5-13%   500 1500 
260 000 /  
230 000 = 
1.2 720 
Textile 
industry in 
1850 and in 
1880 
160 
(handloom) 
/ or 700   25%   ?/170 350/750   150/250 
Data from: Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. 
század végétől a 20. század közepéig. Vol. II. Rumélia, Anatólia, Közel-Kelet. Budapest, 2016. 
 
Finally, a comparison of different economic activities regarding their 
productivity is given in table 26. Profits were high in absolute numbers 
in silk-reeling, but its huge costs made profit rate the lowest among the 
enumerated. The profits in absolute number were similar in irrigated 
orchards, but it was even more expensive compared to silk-reeling or 
dry cultivation (low income/expense ratio). Profits in textile industry 
measured to initial capital did not exceed the profits in agriculture. 
                                                 
71  In 1857 in Aleppo cotton production was three times as much as twenty years later, but local 
demand shrank owing to the inflow of import cotton thread. 
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Prosperity and Ethnic Differences in Urban Spaces during 
the Tanzimat (1840–70s) 
A Comparative Analysis of Priština, Vučitrn, Some Rumelian and 
Anatolian Urban Communities 
 
 
Reforms aiming at structural changes can be considered successful, if 
they not only result in the improvement of macroeconomic situation, 
but their effect can be traced at local level as well, promoting the 
enrichment of the society. A reform resulting in the development of 
macroeconomic situation, without promoting local prosperity cannot be 
sustainable, it merely means overtaxation. Similarly, a reform triggering 
local prosperity, but at the same time increasing inequality between the 
social strata is also not a desired solution. Decreasing ineqality as a 
result of general impoverishment is also not a preferred outcome. Thus, 
there are numerous limiting circumstances that influence the present 
adjudication of reforms. In this study we examine the development of 
local welfare, including inequalities between certain socio-religious 
groups, while from methodological aspect, we intend to show the 
variety of possibilities that a certain source type (temettuat defters) can 
offer. 
It is evident that the Ottoman budget increased significantly between 
the 1840s’ and 1870s, although the role of foreign loans in this was not 
negligible. As for investigating local incomes, Ottoman sources provide 
facilities to measure and compare the welfare of the local societies 
through temettuat defters (which contain the yearly income for each 
person in the urban communities), or through the analysis of probates 
(in sicils and terekes),72 or based on tax-conscriptions. Researchers have 
                                                 
72  Originally published in: Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe 17th–21st Centuries: 
Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches. Eds.: Peykovska, P.–Demeter, G. Sofia–Budapest, 2015. 
72–93. 
Atanasov, Hr.: V osmanskata periferiya: obshtestvo i ikonomika vav Vidin i okolinostta prez XVIII v. 
Sofia, 2008. 73  For example, in 1841 the number of persons grouped into the ala (richest) 
category was 234 in Berkovitsa, 5978 were evsat and 1124 edna. In 1831 it was 227, 6247 and 
2978 respectively. Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol I. Budapest, 2014. 354–
355. 
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to face with the methodological challenge that these sources differ 
regarding their content and are not comparable to each other. The first 
source-type refers to yearly income and tells nothing about the profits 
or the wealth itself, narrowing the possibilities of a comparative 
analysis. Last wills usually contain data on wealth, but not on yearly 
income. Neither can tax-registers refer to welfare or income accurately, 
because only tithe-types taxes (ondalik) were levied proportionally on 
income, vergi-type taxes or head taxes were not always handled in the 
same manner. Furthermore, taxes and methods of taxation were 
changing, rendering temporal comparisons more difficult. The existence 
of tax-farming further aggravated the quantification of income, as the 
profit of tax-farmers often remained unknown beyond the collected 10–
12%. Although cizye (as head-tax) was collected based on wealth, the 
proportion of inhabitants classified into the different ’wealth categories’ 
were changing quickly even within 10–20 years.73 The collected amount 
of cizye per capita was also varying, not to mention its real value in 
silver or its value given in PPP (purchase power parity). Furthermore, 
Draganova proved on the example of Pleven that the extent of land was 
not in strong correlation with these cizye categories, which means that 
many villagers and urban dwellers had other sources of revenue 
beyond agriculture.74 So, cizye, as a differentiated head-tax does not 
reflect the real wealth of agrarian societies (agriculture as a source of 
living was still not negligible in Balkan towns). Furthermore, as Bilgi 
proved in the case of Salihli settlement, the proportion (%) of tax 
measured to yearly revenues could also vary between broad values 
within a community, depending on the origins of income (agriculture, 
industry, tertiary).75 These all create limits to comparison. In order to 
                                                 
73  For example, in 1841 the number of persons grouped into the ala (richest) category was 234 
in Berkovitsa, 5978 were evsat and 1124 edna. In 1831 it was 227, 6247 and 2978 respectively. 
Demeter, G.: A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol I. Budapest, 2014. 354–355. 
74  Draganova, Sl.: Documents of the 1840’s on the Economic Position of the Villages in Central North 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian Historical Review, 1988/2. 87–100. 
75  Bilgi, N.: A Developing Village in the Middle of the 19th Century: Salihli. In: Frontiers of the 
Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West. Vol. 1. Eds.: Imber, C.–Kiyotaki, K. London–
New York, 2005. 149–67. The average tax was about 16–17% of the income in Salihli, but in 
the case of richest it varied between 25–50% depending on the main occupation or sources 
of income. 
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avoid the traps discussed above, we have decided to use documents 
measuring yearly incomes even in case of regional comparisons. 
Another problem is the selection of an appropriate welfare index. 
Regional studies now tend to focus on measuring inequality instead of 
direct wealth in their calculations, as the former may destabilize a 
society even in case of general enrichment.76 Growing inequalities are 
more dangeorus – even within a society getting richer and richer 
averagely – from the aspect of social stability than increasing poverty 
with decreasing inequalities between different layers of society. The 
above mentioned investigations are usually based on wealth (and not 
on income) as a booklet of sicils (containing numerous individual cases 
from different time horizons) can supply the researcher with continuous 
sampling for temporal comparisons.77 A single temettuat defter cannot 
provide the same possibility, as it contains statistically representative, 
but static data. To measure temporal changes the researcher need more 
documents of the same type. Temettuat defter can offer possibility for 
spatial comparisons. As income data are also apt for investigating 
inequalities, and even Gini-coefficient can be calculated from them, we 
have decided to use temettuat defters. In order to assess the internal 
stratification, the income differences between occupations, mahalle-
quarters, etc. group averages, standard deviation and the mode have 
been calculated, which can serve as input data for the Gini-coefficient. 
(As we have been rather tracing between-group inequalities than 
within-group inequalities, we did not used this complex variable). 
Our comparative investigation is based on the yearly income 
differences of taxable urban population and aimed at analyzing: 
                                                 
76  See: Coşgel, M.–Ergene, B.. Inequality of Wealth in the Ottoman Empire: War, Weather, and Long-
term Trends in Eighteenth Century. Kastamonu. Working Paper 
 http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2011-29.pdf; also Canbakal, H.–Filiztekin, A.: 
Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands in the Early Modern Period. AALIMS – Rice University 
Conference on the Political Economy of the Muslim World, 4–5 April 2013 (working paper) 
http://aalims.org/uploads/Rice_v1.pdf; further: Coşgel, M.: Estimating Rural Incomes and 
Inequality in the Ottoman Empire. International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, 2008/3. 
374–375; and Milanovic, B.–Lindert, P. H—Williamson, J. G.: Measuring Ancient Inequality. 
NBER Working Paper 13550, revised (2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13550.  
77  The researcher has to chose a time interval that is broad enough to be representative for the 
whole society. But sicils usually omit or underrepresent some of the urban layers.  
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1, the income differences between occupation-groups;  
2, the income differences depending on size and functional types of towns 
(did smaller towns have poorer society, was there any difference 
between their social stratification compared to larger towns at 
different hierarchical level?)  
3, the differences in welfare of different religious communities (were 
Muslims richer in the Ottoman Empire, what temporal and spatial 
patterns can be traced?)  
4, local spatial differences (segregation) of urban dwellers based on their 
religion or wealth (differences between quarters, mahalles);  
5, regional spatial differences regarding the welfare of urban population 
(was there any difference between the welfare and social 
stratification of towns in Serbia, Kosovo, Anatolia or Bulgaria 
under Ottoman rule?)  
6, the changes over time (how did the process of Tanzimat influence the 
livelyhood of urban dwellers, did they become wealthy, did 
differences grow?)  
7, the role of migrant societies: their wealth compared to autochtonous 
populations and the identification of main source areas of 
migration. 
In the following pages we aimed at analyzing the validity of the 
statement whether the wheat producer Anatolian society was poorer 
compared to the Rumelian, as Inalcik pointed out (for the 17th century), 
or not; and to examine whether Tanzimat contributed to the enrichment 
of Christians or to the differentiation of Christian society, and whether 
these processes eliminated or enhanced material differences between 
Muslims and Christians in Rumelia. The investigations of Draganova 
and Berov claimed that broad layers of Christian society were lucky 
enough to became rich compared to their prevoius status or compared 
to other regions. Whether it was a result of the activity of Midhat Pasha 
or not, or it was rather a consequence of favourable external 
circumstances (Europe became the main consumer of Balkan wheat 
owing to the European division of labour which implied manufactures 
for wheat, and offered better prices than Istanbul) – all these questions 
are not investigated here.  
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The analysis includes the following localities in Anatolia: 
 
Salihli urbanized village, 278 tax-payers conscripted in 1845 Anatolia 
Silifke kaza (Konya), 567 tax-payers conscripted in 1844 Anatolia 
Kastamonu, Diyarbakir, Manisa, 1800–1820 Anatolia 
 
and the following in Rumelia: 
 
Priština: 1140 persons under taxation, 24% Christians, 1844 Kosovo 
Vučitrn: 282 persons under taxation, 40% Christians, 1844 Kosovo 
Provadiya: 309 persons under taxation, Christians under 50%, 1870 Bulgaria 
Anhialo-Pomorie: 200 persons under taxation in 1870, Christian majority Bulgaria 
Majdanpek: 382 persons under taxation, 1862 Serbia 
Veliko Gradište: 721 persons under taxation in 1862 Serbia 
Kyotesh village: 81 taxable inhabitants, 33% Bulgarians, 1866 Bulgaria 
 
Income differences between social strata and differences originating from 
settlement hierarchy  
 
Based on the summary of data illustrated in table 1–2, and figure 1–2, the 
following statements can be pointed out: taxpayers in all categories of 
occupation were richer in Priština than in Vučitrn – with the exception of 
craftsmen, who were characterized by nearly the same per capita revenues 
(400–440 kurush) in both towns. The income of administrative elite, soldiers 
and tradesmen was twice as much in Priština than in Vučitrn in the 
beginning of the Tanzimat (1844).  
Craftsmen were underrepresented in Vučitrn with their 15% 
compared to the more urbanized Priština (40%). It is not surprising 
therefore that land revenues were the major source of income in Vučitrn 
constituting 46+12% (in Priština it was 14+8%), and peasants and 
landowners here paid more tax compared to their % proportion.  
Land revenues were of secondary importance in Priština in 1844: here 
only 10% of the taxpayers were free peasants or landowners, while in 
Vučitrn this exceeded 30%. Agricultural wage-labourers were also 
overrepresented in Vučitrn with their proportion of 26% compared to the 
16% in Priština, but they earned less as well. The difference between the 
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average per capita income of the two settlements was more than 40%, people 
working in transportation earned 35% less in Vučitrn, teachers 50% less. 
Table 1. Distribution of income under taxation based on occupations in Priština in 1844 
Priština, 1844 
Temetuat  
(kurush) 
Income  
in % 
Persons 
Persons  
in % 
Income 
 for one  
tax-payer 
Welfare index: 
*income in % / 
nüfus in % 
local administration 
and soldiers 
226 669 28.06 102 8.9 2222 3.2 
craftsmen 200 596 24.83 455 39.7 441 0.6 
peasants, 
landowners 
113 076 14 118 10.3 958 1.4 
merchants 81 846 10.13 71 6.2 1153 1.6 
agricultural wage-
labourers 
64 517 7.99 184 16.1 351 0.5 
transportation 37 736 4.67 92 8.0 410 0.6 
teachers, priests 18 091 2.24 26 2.3 696 1.0 
other 65 262 8.08 98 8.5 666 0.9 
altogether 807 793 100 1146 100 705 1.0 
 
Table 2. Distribution of income under taxation based on occupations in Vučitrn in 1844 
Vučitrn, 1844 
Temetuat  
(kurush) 
Income  
in % 
Persons 
Persons  
in % 
Income 
 for one  
tax-payer 
Welfare index: 
*income in % / 
nüfus in % 
local administration 
and soldiers 
19 091 14 21 7 909 2.0 
craftsmen 17 065 13 42 15 406 0.9 
peasants, landowners 60 063 46 97 33 619 1.4 
merchants 11 055 8 16 6 691 1.3 
agricultural wage-
labourers 
15 426 12 74 26 208 0.5 
transportation 2 658 2 11 4 242 0.5 
teachers, priests 1 846 1 7 2 264 0.5 
other 4 713 4 20 7 236 0.6 
altogether 131 934 100 288 100 458 1.0 
Source: Osmanlı Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007. 363–413. Nr. 15477, Nr. 15465 
temettuat defters.   * equals to income per person measured to average. 
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Figure 1. Differences in wealth of strata (average revenues in Priština and Vučitrn) 
 
 
Figure 2. Differences in social stratification and welfare of strata in in Priština and Vučitrn 
 
 
The role of administrative personnel was greater in Priština than in 
Vučitrn regarding both their proportion from the population (9 vs. 7%) 
and their proportion from the income as well (28% vs. 14%). The welfare 
index, which was calculated by using the % proportion of income 
measured to the total, divided by the % proportion of population group 
was extremely high in the case of administrative personnel in Priština, 
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even higher than in Vučitrn, which means that inequalities based on 
social strata/occupation were greater in the vilayet center. This is not 
surprising. Canbakal and Filiztekin proved the same: the inequality 
between civil society and the administrative elite grew after the turn of 
the 18th–19th centuries. The latter was three times richer than the group 
average, similarly to our results regarding Priština (figure 3).78 
 
Figure 3. The changes in wealth of different social layers in Manisa, Bursa and Diyarbakir 
measured to the average (=1) 
 
Source: Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin. Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands…  
 
 
Income distribution between occupation groups  
 
The prestige of different occupations can also be estimated based on the 
yearly revenues, which enables us to classify them into social groups: 
the coloured background in table 3 represents the different social strata 
and occupations assigned to these categories. Barbers, carpenters, tailors 
and abadzhis were characterised by low income, while shopkeepers, 
peasants, bakers, bakals were among the richer. The difference between 
the two towns was also significant: certain occupations (like Muslim 
priests) belonged to different social classes based on their yearly 
income. However, it is true that we do not know anything about the 
                                                 
78 Canbakal, H.– Filiztekin, A.: Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands… 
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differences in costs of living for the two towns, therefore we cannot 
analyze differences of purchase power and the index of livelihood. It is 
highly probable that services were cheaper in Vučitrn owing to the 
lower purchase power, therefore incomes in tertiary sector were also 
lower. 
According to the internal stratification (based on the distribution of 
income) Priština was definitely characterized by higher incomes than 
Vučitrn (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Internal stratification of Priština and Vučitrn based on taxable income in 1844 (% 
and grosh-kurush). Data are given in current prices 
 
 
 
Religious differences 
 
The internal stratification of the population can be examined further by 
defining religious sub-groups. It is evident that the Moslem population 
was the wealthiest religious community in Kosovo according to the 
temetuat defters in 1844. In Vučitrn one can find only 2 Christians (10% 
compared to their 40% in the whole sample) among the 20 wealthiest 
tax payers (7% of the population). The wealthiest Moslems were 
landowners, timar rentiers or tenants (14), the mukhtar himself and only 
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2 merchants (compared to Bulgarian lands their proportion was very 
low). 10 of the richest were living in Gazi Ali bey mahalla, but the 
generally poorer Hürrem mahalla also gave 7 persons. The richest 
Christian merchants were living in the Kasaba ranked 21-25th place. 
Among the poorest 25 (10%) only 8 Christians were enumerated, a little 
bit underrepresented (33%) compared to their proportion (%) from the 
whole society.  
In Priština there were 20 timarli rentiers, 2 chiflik owners, 5 ‘peasants’ 
and only 7 merchants among the wealthiest 50 persons (4.5%) with 
income above 2000 grosh – beside the naib and the leaders of zaptie 
(police). Only 3 Christians and 1 Jew was enumerated in this group (2 of 
them were merchants). The wealthiest were dispersed among the 
districts, we could not trace significant concentration: 13 were living 
around the Great Cami and 9 in Alüaddin mahalla, 4 in Hasan Emin. 
Among the poorest 100 (under 160 grosh) one can find 33 Christians, a 
bit overrepresented compared to their 25% in the whole society. 36 out 
of these poorest 100 were living in the outskirts, 13 in Ramazanije 
mahalle, 16 in Jusuf Celebi quarter.  
A two-sample t-test proves statistically that the inhabitants of 
Priština were significantly richer than their compatriots in Vučitrn. The 
statement is true for religious groups as well: considering the average 
income (table 4) both Christians and Moslems in Priština were richer 
than in Vučitrn. The median values show that differences between 
religious groups were also diminishing (compared to average values). 
Canbakal and Filiztekin also pointed out that differences in wealth 
originating from religion were eliminated between 1720–1820 among 
the richest, meaning that the elite became religiously heterogeneous.79 
Differences within the identical religious groups in different localities 
were also smaller, if median is used as index. Standard deviation within 
groups was great, meaning that both Christian and Muslim society was very 
differentiated in 1844. Differences within religious groups were even greater 
than differences between different denominations. 
 
                                                 
79 Religion explained only 10% of the differences in 1820 and dropped back from 22%.  
Canbakal, H.–Filiztekin, A.: Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands… 
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Table 3. Social position (based on yearly income) of different occupations in Priština and 
Vučitrn, 1844 
Vučitrn, 1844 prs. 
taxable 
income 
(kuruş) 
for one 
person 
 
 
Priština, 1844 prs. 
taxable 
income 
(kuruş) 
for one 
person 
tailor of 
textiles 
4 1225 305  pasha 1 78 000 78 000 
arabadji 6 1897 316  tailor of textiles 4 1640 410 
shopkeeper 2 1300 650  arabadji 63 24 092 382 
barber 3 945 315  shopkeeper 44 31 469 715 
barber 
assistant 
3 987 329  barber 21 9010 429 
chapaldji 2 305 153  bojadji 6 2990 498 
peasant 93 51 636 555  choban 4 1170 293 
landowner 4 8426 2107  peasant 54 65 312 1209 
carpenter 2 400 200  landowner 15 29 019 1935 
baker 3 1440 480  carpenter 8 2246 281 
moslem priest 4 1113 278  baker 16 7701 481 
tailor  4 1551 388  moslem priest 16 11 954 747 
tailor assistant 5 2050 410  tailor of clothes 76 34 004 447 
spahi 1 500 500  dervish 3 300 100 
timarli rentier 7 7962 1137  hamam keeper 2 555 278 
gendarmerie 6 1763 294  coffee maker 11 4235 385 
trader 15 10 855 724  timarli rentier 76 130 000 1711 
 
 gendarmerie 12 6582 549 
 trader 61 65 497 1074 
 muezzin 3 1116 372 
 mukhtar 8 7278 910 
 
Source: Osmanlı Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. 363–413. Nr. 15477, Nr. 15465 temettuat defters. 
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When investigating the differences between the social stratificiation 
of local Muslims and Christians in Kosovo it became evident that 
Christians with their 33% proportion among the poorest were 
overrepresented in Priština (their proportion from the total population 
was about 25%), while they constituted only 8–15% of the richer (table 
5). In case of the middle classes the proportion of Christians was similar 
to their proportion of the total population. While 33% of the Muslim 
community earned more than 666 groshes at corrected prices, it was 
only 15% in the Christian society. 60% of the Christians were classified 
into the poorest categories, while among the Muslims it was only 38%. 
 
Table 4. Income inequalities of religious groups in Priština and Vučitrn towns (1844) and in 
Kyotesh village (Bulgaria) (1866) in current prices (piasters)  
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Christian  427 414 300 367 259 291 
Bulgarian 
(27)  
402 184 300 
Moslem   707 828 420 518 641 315 Ottoman (8)  456 280 300 
Jewish  811 1021 395       Tatar (46)  348 186 300 
Total  630 748 375 459 530 300 Total  392 216 300 
Source: Osmanlı Arșiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. 363–413, and 242–45. (Tab. 163.) The pasha is 
omitted from the dataset.  
 
In Vučitrn the 2 millets showed relatively balanced structure, although 
the proportion of Muslims among the poorest was 13% greater than in 
Priština (the proportion of Christians was even higher in the category 
under 333 grosh). Among the richer (1000-1333 piasters yearly income) 
Christians were overrepresented. So, while the Bulgarian and Muslim 
society was very similar at the end of the Tanzimat regarding their social 
differentiation in rural areas (table 4, Kyotesh), in the beginning of the reform 
process significant differences were observable between the average wealth and 
social stratification of the two millets in urban environments. 
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Table 5. Social stratification of Christian and Muslim societies based on the differences of 
income in Kosovo (proportion of Christians in Priština: 25%, in Vučitrn: 40%) 
Priština Muslim Christian Muslim % Christian % 
 
Muslim 
society % 
Christian 
society % 
above 1333 
grosh 
105 9 92.1 7.9 13.3 3.0 
1000–1333 51 9 85.0 15.0 6.5 3.0 
666–1000 83 25 76.8 23.1 10.5 8.3 
333–666 247 79 75.7 24.2 31.4 26.4 
under 333 299 177 62.8 37.2 38.1 59.2 
        
Vučitrn Muslim Christian Muslim % Christian % 
 
Muslim 
society % 
Christian 
society % 
above 1333 
grosh 
14 0 100.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 
1000–1333 5 7 41.6 58.3 2.8 6.1 
666–1000 13 9 59.0 40.9 7.5 7.8 
333–666 48 24 66.6 33.3 27.6 20.9 
under 333 90 75 54.5 45.4 51.7 65.2 
Source: Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti, 363–413. 
 
 
Local pattern of differences (segregation)  
 
Local (spatial) income differences within settlements can also be traced. 
In Priština the richest quarters (based on mean income), mahalles were 
all Muslims (Cami, Jararçeri) and were characterized by mediocre 
homogeneity, which refers to a differentiated local society (table 6). The 
Muslim and Christian suburbs and the Muslim Yusuf Celebi district 
were poor and relatively homogeneous. The districts of middle classes 
were not homogeneous, while the districts of lower classes showed no 
real stratification. It seems that the greater the income, the smaller the 
homogeneity was. The average income in the wealthiest mahalle in 
Vučitrn did not exceed the welfare of mahalles with mediocre wealth in 
Priština, and Christian mahalles were even poorer (table 7), compared to 
the Christian districts in Priština.  
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Table 6. Income differences of mahalles in Priština: wealth and social homogeneity 
Mahalle 
Average 
(kurush) 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Relative 
wealth 
Homogeneity  
(St. dev. / Average) 
Alaüddin (M) 786 711 525 +++ **, 0.9 
Cami kebir (M) 1195 1164 770 ++++ **, 0.97 
Hasanbey (Ch) 535 464 355 ++ ***, 0.86 
Hasan emin (M) 827 1383 405 +++ *, 1.67 
Hatuniye (M) 581 498 400 ++ ***, 0.85 
Yarar (Ch) 413 280 280 ++ ***, 0.67 
Yararçeri (M) 1109 991 821 ++++ **, 0.89 
Yunus (M) 755 714 500 +++ **, 0.94 
Yusuf Celebi (M) 337 275 250 + ***, 0.81 
Kasaba (Ch) 459 477 325 ++ **, 1.03 
Kücükcami (M) 1151 942 900 ++++ ***, 0.81 
Suburb (Ch) 207 58 200 + ****, 0.28 
Suburb (M) 240 88 225 + ****, 0.36 
Mehmed bey (M) 470 355 360 ++ ***, 0.75 
Pirnazir (M) 698 1085 504 +++ *, 1.5 
Ramazanije (M) 544 567 400 ++ **, 1.04 
Average 630 748 375 +++ *, 1.18 
Osmanlı Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. The richest mahalles are indicated by grey background, 
Christian mahalles are indicated by bold letters.                     *= least homogeneous, **** = homogeneous. 
 
 
Regional spatial differences  
 
The regional differences regarding the welfare of urban communities 
can also be measured, if the same income classification is applied for 
each. However, it raises (1) the question of rescaling the data published 
by Nikolay Todorov, who used a different grouping; (2) problems of 
converting Thalers in Serbia (B. Katić) into piasters. Furthermore, (3) the 
changes in the silver content of the currency and in the prices of goods 
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within the period also had to be considered. Thus a reclassification and 
correction of original data was required (table 8). 
As both the prices and the silver content of kurush changed during 
the investigated time interval, this required the introduction of 
purchasing power in order to substitute the different currencies. Within 
20 years the prices grew by 50%, while the piaster’s silver content was 
slowly increasing. It means that 2000 grosh in 1866 equalled to 1333 
grosh in 1844 regarding its purchase power. So, the income data for 
Vučitrn and Priština were rescaled in order to make them comparable 
with Bulgarian and Serbian towns from the later periods. 
 
Table 7. Income differences of mahalles in Vučitrn according to religion and social 
homogeneity in 1844 
Mahalle 
Average 
(kuruş) 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Relative 
wealth 
Homogeneity  
(St. dev. / Average) 
Gazi Ali bej (M) 665 822 373 ++++ *, 1.23 
Hürrem (M) 486 404 337 +++ ***, 0.82 
Kasaba (Ch) 368 238 300 ++ ****, 0.62 
Kibtiyani80 (Ch) 138 69 125 + ****, 0.49 
Mahalle (Ch) 427 293 303 ++ ****, 0.68 
Average 459 530 300 +++ *, 1.15 
Source: Osmanlı Arșiv Belgerinde. Kosova vilayeti. 363–413. The richest mahalle is indicated by grey 
background, Christian mahalles are indicated by bold letters. 
 
Generally, both real wages expressed in silver and purchase power grew 
in Bulgarian towns (figure 5). Among the compared towns the small Pomorie 
was the richest, followed by Priština – regarding the proportion of wealthy 
layers. Provadiya showed very similar stratification to Priština. They were 
followed by Vučitrn, which had more differentiated society with larger 
proportion of rich and poor and with a very thin middle-class compared 
to the two Serbian towns. 
The proportion of persons earning more than 1000 grosh a year was 
20% in Provadiya, 50% in Pomorie, while only 26% in Priština and 17% 
                                                 
80 Christian gipsies. 
68 
 
in Vučitrn using the corrected values (but only 16% and 10% 
respectively – without the usage of PPP). Urban Bulgaria was wealthier 
during the last decade of the Ottoman rule than urban Kosovo in 1844 
or Serbia in the 1860s. The fact that in Vučitrn only 1 merchant, but 3 
farmers-landowners had more than 2000 grosh yearly revenue, while in 
Pomorie (Anhialo) 25 persons or 95% of this stratum was composed of 
merchants, clearly enlightens the changes over time and the differences 
in the way of living and in these two regions of the Ottoman Empire. 
During these 25 years a new, wealthy stratum emerged in Bulgaria. In 
Priština the latter category of wealthiest people comprised 50 men 
including 23 farmers, chiflik owners and timariots (46%) and only 6 
merchants (12%). Especially the middle class was weak in Kosovo (32 
and 25% between 333–666 grosh), while in Bulgaria this layer was 
strengthening its position (42%, 500–1000 grosh).  
Was the Rumelian town/village richer than the Anatolian town or 
village? Establet and Pascual pointed out that in Damascus 75% of the 
population accumulated less than 500 grosh wealth (in 1720 it equalled 
to 8000 grams of silver, in 1780–1800 with 4000 grams), which is similar 
to the values in Vidin calculated after Atanasov.81 As for temporal 
changes, in Kastamonu town the average heritage was 1800 kurush in 
1820 and had doubled since 1720. Unfortunately, our data refer to 
yearly income, therefore not comparable. In the urbanized Salihli village 
in Western Anatolia the average income per household was 830 grosh 
(although agricultural income constituted only 55% of the total income, 
and agricultural taxes constituted only 15% of the total taxes levied); in 
Marmara it was 1935 piasters in 1844 (here 77% of revenues came from 
agriculture) and 1780 piasters in Saruhan. The latter two settlements 
were definitely richer than Priština and Vučitrn in the same era, while 
Salihli was similar to the Kosovar towns. The Anatolian Silifke kaza 
around Konya as early as in 1845 showed similar stratification to the 
rich Balkan town, Pomorie in the 1870s. 
 
                                                 
81 Establet, C.–Pascual, J. P.: Damascene Probate Inventories of the 17th and 18th Centuries. Some 
Preliminary Approaches and Results. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24, 1992. 
375–76. 
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Table 8. Social stratification of Bulgarian, Serbian, Kossovar and Anatolian towns in %  
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over 2000 13 
20 
1 3 4.6 2 2 
above 
1333 
10.5 5 11.5 
1500– 2000 10 1 5 4.2 2 9 
1000– 
1333 
6 4 33 
1000– 1500 28 6 16 7.6 5.2 33 
666– 
1000 
10 8.5 17 
500– 1000 
48.5 
42 72 39 22.6 16.4 
55 
333– 
666 
32 25 25 
under 500 38 19 36 61 74.2 
under 
333 
42 57 13 
Taxpayers and year in brackets. Serbian Thaler is counted at 6 kurush. Katić, B.: Štruktura stanovništva 
Velikog Gradišta i Majdanpeka. Istorijski Časopis 35, 1988. 119–131; Todorov, N.: Iz demografiyata na 
Anhialo (Pomorie). ИБИД, 1967. 159–181; Todorov, N.: Socialno-ikonomicheski oblik na Provadiya. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1963/2. 68–85. 
 
In rural Bulgaria the average income was around 1200 piasters82 in 
the vicinity of Pleven (for estates between 2–5 hectares, for larger estates 
it was even higher) early in the 1840s – even before the wheat prosperity 
(higher than in Priština). Average income was around 2000 grosh in 
Kjustendil and above 3000 in rural Berkovica in the 1870s.83 As neither 
the silver content of the piaster, nor the costs of living did change 
significantly during that 30 years,84 it means that rural Bulgaria had 
become richer by the end of the Tanzimat (table 10) and could even compete 
with Anatolia. The Anatolian kaza of Silifke (Konya), where agriculture 
produced 75% of the income (in Priština it was 26 %, in Vučitrn 60%), 
was also poorer in 1845 than Pleven, where 20% of tax-payers had more 
than 2000 groshes yearly income, while in Silifke kaza it was only 2% 
                                                 
82  Calculated after the yields and animal population (Draganova) before the wheat prosperity. 
83  See Draganova, Sl.: Berkovskoto selo na navecherieto na Osvobozhdenieto: statistichesko izsledvane 
spored osmanskite danachni registri. Sofia, 1985; Draganova, Sl.: Kyustendilski region, 1864–1919. 
Sofia, 1996.  
84 The costs of living were decreasing while earnings were increasing between 1840–70 in 
Constantinople. See: Özmucur, S.–Pamuk, S.: Real Wages and Standards of Living … 301. 
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(see also table 11).85 (Pleven lived from animal-husbandry prior to the 
great upswing of wheat export). Silifke was poorer than the Bulgarian 
towns in the 1870s, but not poorer than Priština or Vučitrn in 1844, or 
Kyotesh village in the 1860s (see table 9). The average income in that 
kaza was around 900 piasters, and Christians layers were the poorer (450 
piasters). Even local leaders (mukhtars) had the same income (900–1400 
kurush) as the administrative elite in Priština. 
So, rural Anatolia was not significantly poorer than the Bulgarian 
towns with the exception of the proportion of the richest layers. As the 
middle class showed similar frequency values (in percentage) both in 
Bulgarian towns in the 1870s and in rural Anatolia in the 1840s, from 
economic aspects the Tanzimat strengthened mainly the class over 2000 piasters 
yearly income (merchants) in the towns of the Danubian province. It is also 
evident that incomes both in urban and rural Bulgaria were increasing 
during the examined 30 years, exceeding the values characteristic for 
Priština and often Anatolia. 
 
Table 9. Income differences in Silifke kaza (case number in brackets) 
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67
) 
Average income in kuruş 
in 1845 (per tax-payers) 
808 434 1110 1009 610 900 
Based on Yalçin, A. Temettuat defterlerine… 
 
Table 10. Average income of different settlements in Rumelia and Anatolia in the 1840s 
and 1870s during the Tanzimat era 
Settlement 
types 
Berkovitsa 
(1870s) 
Kyustendil 
(1870s) 
Pleven 
(1840s) 
Salihli 
(1840s) 
Marmara 
(1840s) 
Saruhan 
(1840s) 
Priština 
(1840s) 
Average 
income in 
kuruş (per 
households) 
3000–3500 2000 1200 850 1900 1700 750 
 
                                                 
85  Yalçin, A. Temettuat defterlerine göre 19. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Silifke kazasının sosyal ve ekonomik 
yapısı. OTAM 15, 2004. 13–87.  http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1272/14643.pdf  
71 
 
Table 11. The differences in stratification of social layers in urban Bulgaria (1870s, in %) 
and rural Anatolia (1840s) 
Yearly income in piasters Pomorie (200: 1870s) Silifke kaza (567), 1845 
above 2000 13 2.1 
1500–2000 10 9 
1000–1500 28 33 
under 1000 48.5 55 
Based on the raw data of Todorov and Yalçin. 
 
 
Migration processes 
 
Based on their names more than 80 Muslim and 10 Christian newcomers 
were identified in Priština, which is only 9% of the population. Of course 
the proportion of not indigenous population might be greater, but could 
not be identified, because many of the ’family’ names did not refer to the 
place of origin, but to occupation. Based on these available data, Christian 
society tended to be less mobile towards the vilayet seat, as the number of 
Muslim immigrants exceeded that of the Christians by 8 times, while the 
ratio between the two millets was 3:1 among the total population. This 
might be explained by the fact that peasants settled on land were 
overrepresented among Christians and for them migration was forbidden. 
Furthermore, the ethnic proportions also show that the town was not 
among the most favoured destinations of Christians as ethnic replacement 
had already taken place by that time not only in Priština, but in Kosovo as 
well (this process accelerated in 1878, when 25% of the inhabitants were 
conscripted as Muslim muhadjir refugees from Bosnia). Those, who were 
conscripted with the name Yanovali (8 persons) were all Muslims, although 
formerly Yanova was the centre of Catholic Slavs in Kosovo who had 
strong trading relationship with Ragusa in the earlier centuries. More 
interesting is the fact that among the source areas of Muslims immigrating 
to Priština one can find Novobrdo (15 persons), the last capital city of 
medieval Serbia. This place is followed by Vučitrn (5), Prizren (4), Ipek (3), 
Lipjan (3), Zaskok (2), so most of the immigrants arrived from the nearest 
neighborhood. Djakova and Gilan gave 1-2 immigrants. Outside the 
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borders of Kosovo the main source areas were Dupnica (2), Shkodra (2), the 
Serbian Retkošer (3) and Trstenik (2). Beyond these Mitrovica (2) Skopje, 
Niš, Belgrade (1-1-1) can be mentioned. The main source of Christian 
immigrants was Vučitrn (3) followed by Prizren, Štip, Mitrovica, Ipek (1). It 
is surprising that the yearly income of immigrating Christians did not lag 
behind the income of immigrant Muslims (540 piasters), who were 
poorer than local Muslims (700 piasters). The latter fact is even more 
surprising, if we analyse the occupational structure of Muslim 
newcomers: among them one can enumerate 8 timar and 2 chiflik 
owners or rentiers/tenants/leaseholders and several richer peasants (only 
3 of them had incomes lower than 1000 piasters). But the reason of the 
relative poverty of Muslim immigrants was that most of them were 
agricultural wage-labourers, chapaldjis, bostandjis (8), or sekbans (5), 
wagoners (6), whose yearly taxable income was between 300–400 
piasters (the 2 merchants had 750 piasters each, which is lower than the 
local average). The reason for the relative wealth of immigrant 
Christians is the high income of merchants that modified the average 
upwards, which would have been around 400 kurush anyway. 
 
 
Figure 5. The daily wages and purchase power of lower classes in Bulgaria and Serbia 
 
Data from Berov, Ly.: Wages in the Balkan Lands during Manufacturing Capitalism and Industrial 
Revolution. Bulgarian Historical Review, 1979/4. 
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Figure 6. Real wages of Bulgarian agrarian earners compared to that of western countries  
(1790 = 100) 
 
Data from Berov, Ly.: Wages in the Balkan Lands … 
 
Figure 7. Differences between the daily wages (in silver grams) of middle-rank and low-
rank officials (light lines with markers) and skilled and unskilled workers (dark lines) 
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Berov, Ly.: Le salaire des ouvrieres qualifiés dans les pays balkaniques au course de la periode de 
capitalisme manufacturiére et de la revolution industrielle. Etudes Balkaniques, 1976/1. 30–54. 
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Urbanization and economic progress in Ottoman Bulgaria on maps 
(all maps were drawn by Zsolt Bottlik based on the data of Kornrumpf, J.) 86 
 
 
*Central function index is calculated based on the number of buildings with communal functions (hane, hamams, 
mosques, churches, pazaar shops, stocks, schools), divided by total number of houses. 
                                                 
86   Kornrumpf, H-J.: Die Territoralverwaltung im östlichen Teil der europäischen Türkei vom Erlass der 
Vilayetsordnung (1864) bis zum Berliner Kongress (1878) nach amtlichen osmanischen 
Veröffentlichungen. Freiburg, 1976 
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From Spahis to Modern Army 
Military Reform without Money  
 
 
Beside the fiscal policies, trade, jurisdiction and public administration 
the military policy and the army also underwent substantial changes in 
the 19th century.87 These reforms were often based on western patterns 
and were executed according to advices often serving western interests, 
but the method of executing the changes was often “Ottoman”88 indeed. 
The Tanzimat focused on the modernization of the state apparatus and 
not on the revitalization and restructuration of society (these aspects 
were not even included into the meaning of the Tanzimat, the word 
islahat was used instead).89 This meant that the “raison d’etat”, the 
improvement of efficiency in public administration and taxation (the 
improvement of state revenues) were of primary importance and not 
personal or minority rights and welfare. The adaptation of the juridical 
system did not mean the adaptation of its spirit, as sources testified 
this.90 Furthermore, the reforms regarding the income structure of the 
empire were not carried out parallelly with reforms of budget expenses 
– partly owing to the indebtedness and due to constant military-political 
challenges. Military expenses reached 60% of the budget in the 1800s, 
20% in 1875, 30% in 1898 (it was over 50% in frontier regions like Deir-es 
Zor and Macedonia) and 40% in 1912–13.91 
                                                 
87  Published in Hungarian. Demeter G.: A szpáhiktól a tömeghadseregig: Adalékok az oszmán haderő 
1826 utáni reformjának társadalmi-gazdasági hátteréhez. In: Kelet-európai sorsfordulók: 
Tanulmányok a 80 éves Palotás Emil tiszteletére. Ed.: Juhász, J:. Budapest:, 2016. 105–15. 
88  Michalis N. M.: Trying to Impose the Reforms in the Periphery: Actions and Reactions to the 
Tanzimat in Cyprus – The Case of the Muhassıl Mehmet Talat. OTAM, 34/Güz 2013. 163–184. 
89  Gürpinar, D.: The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses: Visions 
of the Turks: ’Young’ and ’Old’. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2012/3. 356–57. 
90  Rubin Avi: British Perceptions of Ottoman Judicial Reform in the Late Nineteenth Century: Some 
Preliminary Insights. Law and Social Inquiry 37, 2012/4. 991–1012; and Petrov, M. V.: Everyday 
Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864–1868. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 46, 2004/4. 
91  See: Eton, W.: A Survey of the Turkish Empire. London, 1799. 41–47. Zname, 07. 08. 1875. 
Turskiyat budjet za 1875. Hristo Botev. Statii po politicheski i obshtestveni vaprosi. 412. Strausz, 
A.: Das Osmanische Reich. Posen–Leipzig–Budapest–Konstantinopel–Sofia, 1917. 162–163. 
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The purpose of military reforms was primarily to increase efficiency 
– as the sum and proportion of military costs from the budget itself was 
already high in the beginning of the century. However, the elaboration 
of an economical and sustainable system failed, although – as the study 
tries to prove this – there were chances to establish a sustainable system 
even during the deteriorating financial circumstances after the 1850s, 
when the proportion of debt service from the budget increased to 50% 
(1875) owing to the new loans (while only 5% of loans was spent on 
military expenses up to 1910). 
During the military reforms both the obsolete spahi cavalry and the 
rebellious, but militarily worthless janissaries were substituted after 
1826 by a modern mass army, first professional, later based on 
conscriptions and compulsory service. But this nizam army still lacked 
internal cohesion, not only because of the great differences in salaries, or 
because of the unsuccessful integration of the Christians (constituting 
over 35% of the population in the 1840s). The system was unwelcomed 
even by Muslims as well (partly because of the distinction between the 
duties of Christians and Muslims, which were claimed to be uneven and 
unfair by both groups). 
It is also true that the final system, based on conscriptions was not 
the only alternative – originally the nizam army was recruited from 
professionals. British advisors criticizing the way of carrying out the 
reforms (Brophy and St. Clair)92 also adviced the establishment of some 
kind of volunteer-army, where soldiers would receive land instead of 
salary thus producing the costs of their military equipment. This idea 
was not only traditional (see the thema system in the Byzantine Empire), 
but was similar to the abandoned timar-system, which was also based 
on the Byzantine-Late Roman tradition. So, why were changes 
introduced, if a similar idea emerged again? The recurrence of the idea 
means that it was not the system itself that proved to be unviable, 
unsustainable or incompetitive, but the problems rooted in gradual 
                                                                                                            
and Szende Gy.: Földrajz-statisztikai tabellák a Föld összes államairól. s.l. 1898. Also: McCarthy, J.: 
The Ottoman Turks. An Introductory History to 1923. London–New York, 1997. 
92  St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria. Twelve year study of the Eastern Question in 
Bulgaria. London, 1877.  
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social differentiation and the insufficient income from these prebendal 
lands (inflation between 1780–1840 was 1000%). The choice between the 
different reform ideas was not only a professional decision, but a 
political question as well – it became an instrument in the political fight 
between the Russian and English-oriented elite. The circumstances of 
the fall of the anti-Russian Pertev pasha in 1837, then the counter-
offensive of his supporters leading to the revision of the pro-Russian 
Hünkjar-Iskelesi agreement (1833, 1840) proved that the question 
became politicized and instrumentalized.93 
Beside the obsoleteness of spahi cavalry another problem grew from 
the fact that many spahis became tax-farmers or managed to inherit the 
prebendal land (malikane) with no military obligations any more, thus 
the state lost control over lands and his subjects, who stepped on the 
way to become free existences. The landlords – being de facto owners of 
the land – managed to increase pressure on productive layers (by 
determining production structure, through the abolishment of free 
move, the increase of tax delivered to the landlord and the 
transformation of peasant farms to allodial lands). Together with the 
abolishment of the provisional system (which aimed at supplying 
Istanbul at fixed, low prices) and the introduction of free trade, these 
landlords became involved in grain trade and not only became 
independent from the central power, but rich as well due to the grain 
prosperity between 1840–78. On the other hand these changes meant the 
leakage of central incomes.94 
It is not surprising that after the “kardzhali” era, the state decided to 
abolish the privileges of these layers (with access both to old privileges 
and modern possibilities) in order to reinstall its own economic 
potential. Based on the idea of “divide et impera” the new Christian 
elite was used up (first the layer of Christian tax-farmers, then, later as a 
                                                 
93  Findley, C. V.: Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History. Princeton, NJ, 1989. 70–80.  
94  Local incomes from tax-farming were always higher than central incomes from selling the 
rights (muaccele). In the chiflik of Küchük Seymen 70 000 kurush was collected, but only 
40 000 was delivered to state treasury. Brophy also wrote about more than 30% difference 
between the 2 values. Eton claims that the central budget was not more than 4 million £ in 
1776, when it was over 17 million in Great Britain. But that time more than 20 million £ was 
expropriated in the Empire, which means extreme leakage. See: 59–60. 
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counterweight, urban manufacturers) to reinforce central power. These 
efforts contributed to the stabilization of the “old” and “new” chorbadjis 
(competing with each other), the local Christian elites, which later 
became nationalized, and together with the shrinkage of markets after 
1873 this also contributed to the gradual diminishing of Istanbul’s 
power. 
Due to the above-mentioned the state decided to abandon the 
traditional military structures as well. After the liberalization of trade 
(1838) the state’s interest was to exploit the increasing western demand 
(thus increasing prices) on grains and maximize land revenues, thus to 
participate in trade or at least shift from head-taxes to tithe or income 
taxes in order to finance the modernization of other sectors. The 
abolishment of spahis should be considered in this context, as it was 
solely the agriculture (and trade of agrarian goods) that could produce 
enough income surplus. But the success of the reforms was mainly 
based on external circumstances, and this made the state vulnerable. 
As the dissolution of the janissaries took decades and was 
characterized by mutual violence (1789–1826), the disbanding of spahi-
tax-farmers was based on different script. Instead of creating “tabula 
rasa”, the central government offered compensation (pensioning) for 
those spahis, who were not clever enough to extend their economic 
basis beyond their prebendal lands. This change had numerous effects 
on several layers (including producers, however one may think that 
only the direction of delivering goods had changed) and of course, the 
reforms had substantial costs. Therefore, it is worth examining (1) what 
amount of revenue could the state expect from this group compared to 
the costs; (2) the progress of social differentiation (declassation, capital-
concentration); (3) how the government executed the changes keeping 
in mind cost efficiency as a key factor; (4) whether the offered 
compensation was reasonable or not, and for whom was it 
disadvantageous. 
As for the army, the problem was not the amount of money spent on 
military purposes, but the efficient usage of the resources. Between 
1760–70 the British East India Society spent 8 million £ (yearly 1 million) 
on the sepoy army when it conquered the parts of the Indian 
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subcontinent, while in 1776 the Ottoman Empire spent 15 million 
piasters at current prices (meaning 1.5 million £) (or 35% of the 
budget),95 but the results achieved were simply not commensurable. 
This referred to the obsoletness of the Ottoman army structure! Using 
another analogy, this 1.5 million £ equalled to 150-180 million grams of 
silver: meanwhile Hungary’s contribution to the Habsburg Empire’s 
military budget was 4-5 million Florins or 50 million grams of silver, 
which made possible the supply of 30 000 soldiers. Thus, using this 
amount, the Ottoman Empire could have trained 100 000 “modern” 
soldiers!  
But that time, in case of war the Empire could count on only 50% of 
the 12 000 conscripted spahis. This was considered inferior force in the 
era of the mass armies of absolutism, even if they were equipped by the 
best weapons. In Erzurum a conscription from 1715 mentioned that only 
2119 spahis of the original 5279 were able to fulfill their tasks.96 The 
small timars were confiscated here: 70% of the confiscated estates 
produced less than 10 000 akçe; while in Morea 83% of the urban 
dwellers earned less.97 This means that there were hardly any 
differences between the askeri and reaya regarding the yearly income!98 
Less income simply did not make it possible to supply a soldier with 
modern equipment.99 Furthermore, warfare became extremely 
expensive in this century. While in the 1740s a war year meant 18 
million Florins extra costs for the Austrian budget, in 1760 it increased 
to 36-40 million (or 180-400 million grams of silver). 100  While the former 
was tolerable for the Ottoman budget (see Eton’s data from 1776), the 
latter was similar to the yearly income of central budget. Thus an estate 
                                                 
95   Eton, W.: A Survey of the Turkish Empire. London, 1799. 41–47. 
96    Dimitrov A.–Mutafčieva, V.: Sur l'état du systime des timars des XVII & XVIIIe siécle. Sofia, 1968. 
33–56. és 194–251.  
97   Data from Parveva, St.: Zemyata i horata prez XVII – parvite desetiletiya na XVIII vek. Sofia, 2011. 
98  Dimitrov, Str.: Politikata na upravlyavashtata varhushka v Turciya prez XVIII vek. Istoricheski 
Pregled, 1962/5. 32–60.  
99  Originally the minimal income of timars was set to 3000 akçe of spahi-askeris, but between 
1500–1740 the daily costs of living trippled, increasing from 1.6 to 6 akçe (almost 1 gramm of 
silver). See: Özmucur, S.–Pamuk, S.: Real Wages and Standards of Living… 
100 Szántay, T: „Életünket és vérünket, de zabot nem”. In: Válság – Kereskedelem. Magyar 
Gazdaságtörténeti Évkönyv. Eds.: Kövér, Gy.–Pogány, Á.–Weisz, B. Budapest, 2016. 
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around Edirne (Omurca), with 16 households, each ranging to 9.6 ha 
sown arable land,101 producing 7000 akçe102 nominal yearly income for 
the spahi, became useless from military aspects, although it still 
consisted of viable peasant economies compared to many other estates. 
Furthermore, 50% of askeri landholdings in Edirne in the 18th century 
did not reach this 15–20 ha of a simple peasant economy103 (or 2 raiyet 
çift), and only 20% of the estates produced more income than Omurca 
(table 1)!104 This differentiation of the askeri layer was later intensified by 
convertite peasants (new-Muslims), who became janissaries in order to 
avoid declassation (they were entitled to salary which meant a good 
supplementary income or could become artisans, guild members), when 
their land revenues proved to be inefficient. Janissaries also wanted to 
acquire land with peasants, and this led to the dilution of the askeri 
land-structure too. 
 
Table 1. Differences and differentiation of askeri and reaya landholdings around Edirne, 
cca. 1700 (in %) 
Group 
under 1 
chift* 
1–2 chift 2–3 chifts 3–4 chifts 4–12 chifts over 12 
Reaya (592) 231 (39%) 185 (31%) 79 (13%) 44 (7%) 53 (9%) 0 
Askeri (75) 19 (25%) 15 (20%) 8 (11%) 4 (5%) 21 (28%) 8 (11%) 
*chift = peasant economy of averagely 10 ha, tax unit prior to the 18th century 
 
The price of industrial goods around 1770 was higher than that of 
the wheat, thus this process was not favourable for landowners (selling 
wheat and buying industrial merchandise) to maintain their equipment 
required for military service. In the 1800s the trends changed, and the 
Napoleonic wars created favourable conditions for the Ottoman 
agrarian-military elite.105 In order to exploit this timariots wanted to join 
                                                 
101 Social differentiation among reaya was so advanced by this period, that it was rare to have 
peasant estates around 1 raiyet çift (10 ha). 
102 7 akçe = cca. 1 gram of silver in the beginning of the 18 c. 
103 Using the above mentioned example, but now including fallow land (50%). 
104 Parveva, St.: Zemyata i horata … 374. 
105 Berov, Ly.: Dvizhenieto na tsenite na Balkanite prez XVI-XIX v. i Evropeyskata revolutsiya na 
tsenite. Sofia, 1976. and Berov, Ly.: Dvizhenieto na tsenite na Balkanite prez XVI–XIX v. i 
evropeyskata revolutsiya na tsenite. Istoricheski Pregled, 1975/3. 92–102. 
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the international trade and tried to establish life-long tax-farms, 
landholdings from their prebendal land,106 which later became 
inheritable. This way began the transformation of temporary and 
conditional landownership (originally land was received to fulfill 
services) towards permanent landownership without services. Selim III 
even permitted the legal transformation of timar estates without 
military service partly as an initial step towards military reforms, partly 
targeting the increase of state revenues. In case of a timar transformed to 
tax-farm the state received income twice: first, when the tax-farmer 
bought the right, and then from the production (hazna). At first sight 
this meant recentralization (until then the timariot only delivered the 
collected tax to the treasury, most of the income was spent on the 
maintenance of his equipment), but on the other hand now it became 
possible for the vali of Konya to obtain the tax-farm of 356 timar-estates, 
while the vali of Diyarbakir acquired 270 such lands. This reasons the 
great difference between the theoretical and actual number of cavalry 
forces!107  
The transformation of timars to life-long tax-farms (malikane) had 
several consequences. (1) It invoked the weakening of the central power 
and the strengthening of local elite.108 (2) The weakening military power 
had to be reinforced somehow: the sultans began to rely increasingly on 
mercenary troops (the saridja) recruited from the local population 
instead of spahis. In the 18th century their number increased from 30 to 
90 thousand. However, unlike janissaries or spahis, they were not 
entitled to receive income in peace (like the pindari in India). This meant 
a serious risk, as most of them were reaya, who wanted to became askeri 
in order to live a more tolerable life (due to the population increase on 
the Balkans in the first half of the 18th century the fragmentation of 
reaya land began, and the demographic pressure induced uncontrolled – 
                                                 
106 They became inimical to provisionist state policy and rather smuggled the grain to the West 
at high prices instead of delivering it to Istanbul at low, fixed prices, which caused a conflict 
between the treasury and the local noblemen. The food shortage in Istanbul caused social 
unrest, inflation, thus extra costs for the budget. 
107 Mutafchieva, V.: Kardzhaliysko vreme. Sofia, 1993. 19–20. 
108 Pamuk, Ş.: The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment and 
Production. Cambridge, 1987. 8–11.  
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often illegal – migration waves among peasants towards towns, 
generating social unrest there). 
These mercenaries did not want to degrade back to the level of a 
peasant, therefore they meant a constant destabilizing factor, which 
became evident by the kardzhali era. Thus nor the spahis, neither the 
saridja were good solutions for a military reform. 
Why were these supplementary forces needed? The military power 
of the janissaries, the second constituent of the imperial military forces 
beside the spahis, was also in decay. This layer was not poor: between 
1720–1800 the janissaries of Vidin became the richest layer of the town 
(emerging from the poorest).109 They did not have prebendal lands, but 
could pursuit civil occupations and were entitled to state salary even in 
peace. They could be guild members and enjoyed tax-exemption. So, 
their situation was definitely better than that of the saridja. Due to these 
advantages many newcomers joined their lines ruining the morals of the 
troops. In parallel with the dilution of their lines, their total salary 
increased from 3700 to 10 000 purse money (this increase exceeded the 
inflation), while total central revenues ranged only to 90 000 purses!110 
Although officially more than 400 000 janissaries existed, their real 
number was only 10% of this (1782).111 Some leaders received the salary 
of the non-existing soldiers, like Mehmed Celebi sadrazam (grand vizier) 
in 1778, who obtained the salary of more than 600 janissaries.112 It is 
evident that such an army could not compete with the modern mass 
armies. Something needed to be done. 
*** 
In the 1830s the spahis were deprived of the right to collect taxes and 
were substituted by (landless) Ottoman officials working for salary, the 
                                                 
109 The proportion of janissaries in the richest category (based on sicils) increased from 30 to 
45%, the proportion of janissaries in the richest category within the janissaries increased 
from 10 to 20%., while the proportion of janissaries among the richest (considering total 
population) grew from 5 to 12%. For basic data see Atanasov, Hr.: V osmanskata periferiya… 
110 Mutafchieva, V.: Kardzhaliysko vreme… 19–20. 
111 McGowan, B.: The Age of the Ayans, 1699–1812. In: An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire. Vol II. Eds.: Inalçik, H.–Quataert, D. Cambridge, 1994/1997. 
112 Aksan, V.: Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1760–1830. The International History Review 24, 2002/2. 253–77. 
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voyvodas (often Christians!). Thus the spahis lost significant part of their 
informal power as well – especially those who yet failed to acquire their 
own land.  
Spahis were pensioned, but the pension was smaller compared to 
their former land revenues (averagely it was only twice as much as the 
income of an average peasant owning 5 ha). So, apart from the 
wealthiest, most of the pensioned spahis earned less than earlier: the 
poorest even less than 1500 piasters. The difference between the former 
spahi elite and urban dwellers decreased further (table 2). 
 
Table 2. Yearly income (in piasters) of different social layers (Priština, 1844) 
Occupation Prs. Per capita Occupation Prs. Per capita 
abadji 4 410 tailor 76 447 
grocer  44 715 müezzin 3 372 
barber 21 429 kafedji 11 385 
dyer 6 498 timarli süvari 76 1711 
landlord 15 1935 policeman 12 549 
peasant 54 1209 merchant 61 1074 
baker 16 481 clerk 2 910 
The grayscale represent different social groups determined by their yearly income. 
 
This interesting situation (after pensioning) is confirmed by the 
conscription of tax-payers in Priština from 1844. Richer timariots were 
still regarded as members of the elite: 20 out of the 50 richest urban 
dwellers were former spahis, although only one person was mentioned 
as a functioning “spahi”. The spread of chiflik, this new estate form is 
also evident in this group (15 chiflik sahibi), but there were simple 
peasants consrcipted among the richest also (chifchi). Detaching these 
two agrarian layers from the group related to timar-estates, we can 
come to the conclusion that the latter still were averagely richer. 50% of 
the timarlis had more than 1500 grosh yearly income, while in the other 
group this was only 10% (due to the numerous chifchi). It is also true 
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that there was hardly any difference between the yearly incomes of 
chiflik sahibi (average: 1900 grosh) and timarli (1750 grosh averagely).113  
These all refer to the fact that there was a significant change 
regarding the relation and the legal status towards the land between the 
social groups. The formerly consolidated categories became ’fuzzy’. 
The askeri society had become very differentiated by that time. Due 
to the inflation, a rifle worth 50 piasters in 1750 (700 grams of silver) cost 
800 piasters in 1840. According to the heritage inventories of Vidin in 
1720 45%, in 1800 20% of janissaries could not afford to buy such a rifle 
clearly indicating the diminishing military functions in this group. In 
1844 25–30% of the timariots in Kosovo could not afford to buy the 
weapon from their yearly incomes. If we consider the original limit of 
3000 akçe (this enabled to equip a cavalryman in the 16th century, its 
value was 2500 grams of silver, or 2500 piasters in 1844), we can say that 
80% of the timarlis in Priština would not have been able to pay this sum 
(partly because of the decreasing incomes due to pensioning). 
Owen states that the finacial surplus stemming from the abolition of 
timarlik and the introduction of tax-farming in these newly acquired 
lands was consumed by the pension of the spahis.114 In the following 
pages we prove that it was not true. In our calculations we used the 
conscription of spahis in Radovište (1841) and the conscription of 
pensioned spahis from 1869 (there is a generation difference between 
the two datasets). Table 3 clearly indicates that in 1841 only 50% of the 
spahis reached the limit of 3000 akçe (3000 piasters by then), while the 
aggregated income reached yearly 350–370 000 piasters (grosh), which 
makes an average of 3500 piaster/capita. These data also prove the 
differentiation of the spahi-layer. This meant that the 50 able soldiers 
(instead of 100) cost 350 000 piasters for the state (because the other 50 
did not reach the income limit to be equipped). Thus the real cost of 
equipping one soldier exceeded 7000 piasters.  
If the timarlik is abolished, this money flows into the central treasury. 
This amount could be spent on compensating the timariot (pension) and 
                                                 
113 Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, T.C. Başbakanlik. Devlet Arşivleri Genel 
Müdürlüğü, 2007. 363–413. Temettuat defter nr. 15477 and 15465. 
114 Owen, R.: The Middle East… 60. 
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recruiting and training a soldier substituting the pensioned spahi. 
Calculating with the income distribution given in table 3 for 1869, the 
compensation of 100 spahis meant 250 000 piasters. (Using Draganova’s 
data it is evident that the average pension of spahis was less than their 
former average income from land. It is also clear that by cutting the 
extreme values, the social stratification of pensioned spahis became 
more even: only 20% earned more than 3000 piasters after 1869). Thus a 
difference of 100 000 piasters still remained to train a soldier instead of 
each ’lost’ spahi. If only the 50 spahis over the 3000 piaster limit was 
considered, this meant 2200 piasters (or 450 francs) per soldiers. In the 
new military system the daily allowance of an ordinary soldier was 6 
piasters (1 piaster salary+4 piasters supply+clothing), which makes it 
2200 piasters yearly, thus it was enough to substitute the spahi. And if 
we calculate with only 6 month of training yearly (as officially), even the 
original 100 men can be equipped and trained from this amount of 
money. (Of course, the quality of supply and training is questionable).115 
We suppose that this military (and social) reform could be carried out 
without extra costs and significant conflict of interest of the affected layers. 
Furthermore, the law of 1858 on land allowed the purchase of former 
timar-estates as well. The average landholding/spahi in the Balkans is 
questionable, but we have analogies to calculate this from later periods. 
In Macedonia the tax-farm of a chiflik ranging to 500 ha cost 50 000 
grosh/piaster in 1912, meaning 100 piaster/ha tax (or 800 piaster/ha 
income), thus the “average” pension of the spahi, the 2000-2500 piasters 
equaled with 20 ha sown area (altogether 30 ha, adding up the fallow). 
Since the price of 1 ha arable land was rated at 400–700 piasters between 
1850–70 in Bulgaria, the redemption of 30 ha (a very small spahi timar) 
cost 1200-2100 piasters yearly for the peasant (throughout 10 years, built 
in the tithe tax as an additional 2.5% surtax). In other words, in case of 
selling the estates of 100 pensioned spahis an income of 120-210 000 
piasters appeared (yearly), which could finance any other needs. So, the 
background of the Ottoman military reform was secured by the high 
                                                 
115 A peasant family of 5 members had 1000 francs income or 1000 piaster/capita, meaning daily 
3 piasters. Military training was not cheap. 
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grain prices owing to western demands (influencing land prices as 
well), which caused land-hunger among local cultivators. 
 
Table 3. Income differences of active and pensioned spahis  
1840, Radovište  
spahis 
1-500 
piasters 
400 grams 
of silver 
500-1000 
piasters 
400-800 
grams of 
silver 
1000-2000 
piasters 
800-1600 
grams of 
silver 
2000-5000 piasters 
1600-4000  
grams of silver 
over 5000 
piasters 
Estate number 
and % 
7 (8%) 17 (19%) 16 (18%) 3 (3%) 46 (51%) 
1869, pensioned 
spahis 
1-500 
piasters 
500-900 
piasters 
900-1500 
piasters 
1500-2000 
piasters 
2-3000 
piasters 
over 3000 
piasters 
Estate number 
and % 
2 (5%) 6 (15%) 9 (22%) 10 (25%) 7 (17%) 8 (20%) 
Dimitrov, Str.: Kam vaprosa za otmenyavaneto na spahiyzkata sistema v nashite zemi. Istoricheski 
Pregled, 1956/6. 36; Dimitrov, Str.: Politikata na upravlyavashtata… and Draganova, Sl.: Materiali za 
Dunavskiya vilayet: Rusenska, Silistrenska, Shumenska i Tutrakanska kaza prez 50-te-70-te godini na 
XIX v. Sofia, 1980. Table 19. Page 1. 
 
As for other income sources: owing to the result of the military 
reform the differentiated head-tax of the Christians (cizye: 15-60 
piasters) was substituted by an equally levied tax of 27 piasters (the 
median value of the former), as they were not serving in the army. From 
fiscal aspect, this tax did not create significant income surplus for the 
budget (under 10% from the total income; table 4). The values rather 
show that the evident increase was due to the strict fiscal policy: state 
taxation was extending to everyone.  
If a Muslim wanted to avoid military service (reaching even 6 month 
yearly) once and for all, he had to pay 8000 piasters, contrary to the 
Christian’s 27 piasters, which was only 800 piasters for 30 years 
(although still producing 60 million piasters income for the state)! So, 
the yearly redemption of a Muslim reached 250 piasters. While the 
Muslims paid larger sums, if wanted to work on their own lands during 
the 185 days of their compulsory military service, the Orthodox reaya 
had 185 days of feasts and ritual holidays with no military service. It is 
not surprising that Muslims felt this was an unjustice, and it was against 
the western principle of ’common charges’. The Christians also used the 
latter argument, when they objected against the special tax imposed on 
them, also claiming that their exclusion from the army referring to their 
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religion (based on mutual untrust) was against civil rights (degrading 
them to secondary citizens). 
Another consequence of this regulation was that Christians were 
overrepresented among seasonal workers (they were simply cheaper 
and were exempted from compulsory military service). If the Muslim 
peasant was unable to hire wage labourers (after his son had been 
enrolled into the army for half a year), his harvest was ruined, 
especially if his land exceeded 5 ha (in case of grain producing farms), 
because such a farm needed extra labour force to cultivate. (In case of 
grain producing estates smaller than 5 ha labour surplus occurred, thus 
the military service of the Muslim children was economically reasonable 
in these estates). 
 
Table 4. The income of the Ottoman budget from military tax paid by Christians and 
exemption fees paid by Muslims (million piasters) and the number of redeemed  
Year 
Christian, 
military tax* 
Muslim, 
military tax 
Redeemed Christian 
grown-ups (million) 
Redeemed Muslim 
grown-ups*** (million) 
1887 45 55 1.67 (6.5)** 0.222 
1900 71 91 2.63 0.364 
1908 86 93 3.19 (12)** 0.372 
Shaw, S. J.: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System. International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 6, 1975/4.   
*Abolished after 1908. 
** With family members in brackets: in 1908 the total Christian community was successfully taxed.  
*** Data based on the decomposition of aggregated values to 1 year (250 piasters/Muslim). 
 
Surprisingly still more income arrived to the treasury from Muslims 
than from Christians, meaning that many Muslims decided to pay the 
price of exemption (there was no economic, but purely personal reason 
behind this, as hiring Christian labour force would have been cheaper). 
This can also be considered as a sign of the demoralization of the Empire 
(table 4). On the other hand, the improvement of tax-discipline can be 
observed in the fact that between 1887–1908 the state income from 
military taxes and redemptions increased from 100 to 190 million 
piasters. The lack of enthusiasm towards the new military system is 
indicated by the fact that many Muslims rather sold their estate and 
became industrial workers in order to pay the redemption for his sons, 
and that in 1871 a new regulation was installed, which forbade the 
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acceptance of money originating from selling the property (in these 
cases the recruited was enrolled to the redifs, the reserve). 
Furthermore, the newly established army was not efficient: the 
soldier received the same amount of money as supply (5 piasters or 1 
franc daily) as an industrial or agrarian worker, who was involved in 
effective production, unlike the recruited. And although the share of 
military expenses from the central budget reached 30%, this also 
comprised significant inequalities regarding salaries. The salary of the 
leader of a division equalled to that of 700 privates (table 5). The supply 
was insufficient (except the quantity of bread): an average soldier spent 
yearly 500 piasters to supply himself beyond his regular portion. Prior 
to 1907 the officers of the Ottoman army earned better salaries than the 
officers of Austria-Hungary, and earned similar salaries to the Bulgarian 
officers (here 25% of the military budget, similarly ranging to 30% of the 
total budget was spent on the officers’ salary!). 
 
Table 5. The salary of the Ottoman officers, 1868 (1000 piasters) 
Monthly 
salary 
(piaster, 1868) 
Rank (military and government 
officials) 
Austria-Hungary prior to 1907, monthly 
salary converted to piasters, without 
additional money, rank in brackets 
14 000 Ferik pasha (division commander) 5250 (IV.) 
7000 Liva pasha (brigadier general) 3500 (V.) 
4500 Miralaj (colonel) 2500 (VI.) 
4000 Kaimakam (lieutenant colonel) 1750 (VII.) 
1800 Bimbaşi (major) 1400 (VIII.) 
700 Kolasi (captain) 750-1000 (IX.) 
400 Yüzbaşi (liutenant) 500 (XI.) 
St. Clair, S. G. T.–Brophy, Ch.: Residence in Bulgaria… 422. and Hajdú, T.: Tisztikar és középosztály. 
Ferenc József magyar tisztjei. Budapest, 1999. 12–13. and 240.    5 piasters = 1 korona = 1 franc. 
 
To sum it up, the Ottoman state had the opportunity to finance 
military reforms without extra costs due to the favourable external 
circumstances (increasing grain and land prices), thus to utilize loans 
for the modernization of other sectors (only a small proportion of loans 
was spent on the army), but these efforts failed because of the problems 
in their execution. The internal inequalities within the army did not 
decrease compared to the era of spahis, saridjas and janissaries, and this 
ruined efficiency.  
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The Economic Background of Ottoman Reforms 
Tracing the Effects of Grain Prosperity Based on Commercial Registers  
 
 
Introduction: methods, aims 
 
(1) From methodological aspects this study116 attempts to contribute to 
(a) the understanding of regional and macrolevel processes by utilizing 
local scale data, (b) and to the understanding of the mechanism of 
center-periphery interactions, offering a new way of data interpretation. 
Commercial registers can be regarded as one of the best sources, as here 
the data (representing the economic performance of the ’hinterland’) are 
concentrated to one locality, easily accessible and systamatically organized, 
while reflect the processes of a larger region. Commercial registers also 
afford a detailed analysis of processes both in exports and imports, thus 
the economic performance of different nations participating in interregional 
trade can be evaluated. This enables us to examine the influence of Europe 
on the Balkans, and adversely, the effect of the Balkans on Europe.  
(2) Beside the methodological aspects this study deals with the 
impact of the industrial revolution on the commercial balance of the Balkans, 
revealing the commercial penetration and the rivalry among the western 
states with different merchandise structure (representing different level of 
development), characterized by different trade techniques. The analyzed 
data provide us opportunity to measure the role of grain export of the 
Balkans toward Europe, contributing to the mitigation of the ’great famine’ in 
1846–47. Data also offer possibility to estimate the income surplus of the 
producers as a result of the growing exports, which was able to mitigate 
the social tensions, thus contributing to the prevention of the outburst of 
conflicts in 1848. 
Our investigation is based on the commercial reports of consul Blunt 
in Saloniki,117 which contain data in connection with the quantity, value 
                                                 
116 A shortened version was published in the Bulgarian Historical Review 38, No. 1–2. 151–70. 
117 Dokumenti za balgarskata istoriya iz germanskite arhivi 1829–1877. Sofia, 1963. 94–150. No. 22. 
Doklad-statisticheski tablici na pruskiya konsul Ch. Blunt do Lecoq otnosno 
koraboplavaneto, targoviyata i predaneto na koprina v Solun prez 1840–1845 g. Sächsisches 
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and directions of goods. The published tables were full of mistakes, thus 
a thorough revision and re-evaluation was needed. These reports were 
utilized by Bailey,118 to analyze the emergence of British Levantine 
trade, but only for the period between 1835–39 (prior the free-trade 
agreement). The period between 1845–51, which we considered more 
interesting because of its international context (implementation of free 
trade, great famine, revolutions, Ottoman reform processes, abolition of 
Corn Laws), remained unevaluated. When selecting this period, we 
were driven by the presumption that these events had to have impact 
on trade patterns and terms of trade, therefore can be recognised in / 
evidenced by the analyzed data. We assume that the chosen interval 
reflects the imprint of the early period of the industrial revolution, the 
beginning of the new economic system characterized by the ’wheat for 
manufactures’ international division of labour. The results confirmed that 
our decision was good, and even the data structure of a single port can 
reflect the changes of international processes, thus our hypothesis was not 
flawed. Furthermore, even such a short time-interval is enough to 
reflect the changes. 
The reason for the short (but still dynamic) period of the 
investigation can be explained by the fact that the Turkish piaster lost 
80% of its original value within 30 years making comparative 
calculations more complicated. A merchandise that was worth 100 
piasters in 1832 was sold for 471 piasters in 1832, but after this the 
depreciation process decelerated: between 1832–51 the nominal price 
increased only to 528. 
Our reconstruction was limited mainly to the attraction zone and the 
harbor of Saloniki, although other ports (like Varna) had similarly good 
data series.119 The town had approximately 50 thousand inhabitants at 
that time, thus Plovdiv and Adrianople had overshadowed it regarding 
                                                                                                            
Landesarchiv, Dresden, Korrespondenz mit dem königlichen Konzul zu Konstantinopel. 
No. 23. Doklad statisticheska tablica na Ch. Blunt do Lecoq za dvizhenieto na korabite na 
Solunskoto pristanishte prez 1847 g., see: No. 24-32. (Further: Dokumenti…). 
118 Bailey, F. E.: British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement. A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations 
1826–1853. Cambridge-London, 1942. 303. 
119 But partly from different period, partly these Balkan ports were isolated from 
Mediterranean-Atlantic trade. 
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the numbers of inhabitants by 1850. Although its attraction zone was 
limited to areas south of the Balkan Mountains, thanks to its 
geographical location and economic significance, it was considered a 
gateway either to Africa and Europe (Western Mediterranean), and to 
its hinterland, the Balkan Peninsula. Its location was excellent for transit 
trade. Territories north of the Balkan Mts. carried goods mainly to ports 
like Sulina to supply Constantinople (or to trade with Austria along the 
Danube), and usually were unable to enter into the European 
intraregional commercial system until provisionist policy in Istanbul 
existed. Contrary to Sulina, Saloniki represents a good example both for 
international and domestic trade after the liberalization of trade in 1838 
(after the Crimean War Sulina quickly overtook Saloniki regarding 
trade volumes). 
 
 
Regional-scale analysis: the role of Saloniki in the inter- and intraregional trade 
and in the mitigation of the western agrarian crisis (1846-47) 
 
After identifying Saloniki’s attraction zone, and comparing the town to 
other ports regarding the intensity, volume and values of trade, we 
evaluated the significance of the port by using data referring to the 
commercial presence and trade intensity of the most industrialized 
country, England.  
Compared to other Mediterranian ports in the 1830s only Sulina and 
Smirna (Izmir) surpassed Saloniki regarding the number of ships, the 
latter reaching 20% from the whole incoming traffic (without 
Constantinople). Much more interesting is that – just prior to our period 
of investigation – Saloniki surpassed only Beirut based on the quantity 
of traded goods. And, based on the average piasters/ton value Saloniki 
was ranked the last among the investigated ports (table 1), reaching only 
350 piasters/ton – equivalent of one ton of grain in 1835 (as calculated 
later) – while 10 years later this value reached 450–500 piasters/ton. 
However, the growth originated not from the increasing proportion of 
valuable merchandise, but mostly from inflation or price increases. The 
same situation was true in case of ships leaving the port.  
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These results led us to the conclusion that while Saloniki’s traffic was 
quite great, the volume (or load) of ships was originally small (under 
100 tons/ship). This rather refers to transit and short-distance commerce 
than interregional trade prior to the 1840s. It is well known after Bailey 
that Saloniki was only a transit port for ships arriving from Western 
Europe, their main destination remained Izmir (150 tons/ship). 
Examining the commercial balance of these mentioned ports, only Izmir 
and Beirut had positive balance within the given time-interval, while 
Iskenderun (Alexandrette) and Trebizond showed the highest price/ton 
values.  
 
Table 1. The contribution of Saloniki and other ports to the trade of Ottoman Turkey120 
 In Out 
year port ships tons 
tons/ 
ship 
million 
piasters 
piasters 
/ ton 
ships tons 
tons / 
ship 
million 
piasters 
piaster 
/ ton 
1836 Trebizond 172 25 718 150 155 6026 163 25 000 153 93 3720 
1837 Iskenderun 24 3327 139 20 6011 22 3068 139 2.3 766 
1835 Smirna* 1255 118 865 95 50.3 424 1210 112 823 93 74.7 662 
1835 Beirut 341 21 247 62 13.6 642 216 19 112 88 14.7 
768** 
(1087) 
1835 Saloniki 473 45 569 96 16 351 473 45 569 96 7.4 163** 
Altogether 2265 214 726 95 255 
average 
1188 
2084 205 572 99 192.1 
average
934 
Saloniki 21% 21%  6.3% last 22.7% 22%  4% last 
* In 1839 Izmir (Smirna) produced positive balance too: 74 million piasters vs. 156 million.  
** Without English ships, as their load is unknown, after subtracting their volume, see piaster/ton 
prices in the brackets. 
 
                                                 
120 Calculated based on the data of Bailey and MacGregor. MacGregor, J.: Commercial Statistics, a 
Digest of the Productive Resources. Commercial Legislation … of all the Nations. 5 vols. London, 
1850, data quoted by Bailey, F. E. Data are expressed here in piasters instead of English £, 
since Blunt always refers to the Turkish currency. But the value of Turkish piasters 
decreased expressed in silver, while that of the £ remained nearly constant. For the original 
exchange rate we used the following data: in 1841 the Ottoman State issued 60 million 
piasters, which equalled to 552 thousand English £ to diminish the negative balance of 
commerce. In: Bailey, F. E.: British policy… 76–77. According to Bailey’s data in 1851 goods 
exported by the English to Saloniki equalled 78 thousand pounds, which – using 1841 
exchange rates – was worth 8.5 million piasters. But Blunt originally mentioned 10.6 million 
piasters, which refers to 25% inflation. The corrected values are given in brackets. 
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Analysing the origin and the unit prices of the imported goods (per 
tons), we see that the role of English ships and merchandise was 
overwhelming. In 1846 England had a share of 40% in Saloniki’s import, 
declining to 25% in 1851, while England’s import from Saloniki 
constituted 7.5% of the whole export of the port in 1846 and 10% in 
1850–51. (It also implies that the English had positive balance with the 
port). This situation was not unique: British merchandise spread in 
other ports as well. The role of English commerce and trade has 
increased unquestionably by the 1840s, thus – from methodological 
aspect – even this single country allows us to compare Saloniki’s export-
imports with other East Mediterranean ports. In the 1830’s the value of 
English exports to Saloniki was 41 £/tons, while in Iskenderun it was 98 
£/tons and in Trebizond 126 £/tons.121 The small value (but still 4 times 
higher than in Izmir) generally referred to mass products, while high 
unit prices referred to luxury articles or local shortages in certain 
consumption goods. 
 
Table 2. The value and share of English export and import in the main Mediterranean 
ports (based on Bailey and MacGregor) 
Port 
From England to Ottoman ports From Ottoman ports to England  
year 1000 pounds 
share from total  
English exports 
1000 pounds 
share from total  
English imports 
Smirna 1839 189 5.30% 419 35% 
Alexandretta 1837 165 4.60% 1,7 0% 
Trebizond 1836 326 9.10% 70 5.9 
Saloniki 1835 44 1.20% n.a. n.a. 
Turkey altogether 1836 3650 100% 1196 100% 
 
In 1836 3.7% of the total English exports went to Turkey (3.65 million 
out of 97.6 million £), it was 5% in 1845 (7.6 million out of 150.8 million 
£), and 7.5% in 1848. Thus, Ottoman Turkey played an increasing role in 
the English economy (in 1851 the proportion dropped back to 3.5%).122 
Smirna received 5.3% of British exports in 1835, Trebizond more than 
                                                 
121 The low value in Izmir explains the negative balance of the English. 
122 In: Bailey, F. E.: British policy… 70–76.  
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9%, while 35% of British imports came from Izmir and 6% from 
Trebizond (these values also highlight why the British were anxious of 
the Russian political and economic advance through the Straits and in 
the Black Sea).  
Compared to these harbors, Saloniki remained underrepresented in 
the trade, since it had a share equalling only to 1.2% of the total English 
trade in 1836, and 1.4% in 1846 (table 2), reaching 11.8 million piasters, 
while the population of its ’hinterland’ constituted 3-4% of the Empire’s 
total population. Two evident explanations can reason this fact: either 
the Balkans had low purchase power, or the peninsula was able to cover 
its needs from its own production, thus did not need foreign goods. 
And there is evidence for the latter, as local textile and ore production 
was able to supply other parts of the Empire too – for decades prior to 
the influx of English goods. Reden claimed that the peninsula had 
positive trade balance – with the exception of Constantinople 
characterized by overconsumption patterns, turning the trends 
backwards (table 11). 
 
Table 3. Saloniki’s role in Englands commerce with Ottoman Turkey 
Saloniki’s share in English imports from Turkey 
Merchandise year 1000 pounds 
total traded 
(million piasters) 
Saloniki’s share  
(million piasters) 
proportion 
Silk 
1846 250 27 1.2 4.4% 
1850 450 61 (49) 0 0% 
Wheat 
1845 15 2 (1.6) 0.4 20% 
1850 100 13.5 (11) 3 22% 
Saloniki’s share in English exports to Turkey 
Iron ore/steel 
1845 70 7.6 0.44 6% 
1850 90 12 (9.8) 0.80 7% 
Textiles 
1845 1920 220* 8.4 4% 
1850-1851 2140 287* (232) 5.4 2% 
Data based Bailey, MacGregor and Dokumenti…  
*aggregated value, () without correction 
 
The competitiveness of the Balkans decreased, when in Bursa a silk 
factory was opened in 1850, and the center of silk trade had moved to 
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Izmir (Smirna). Earlier, in 1846 in Saloniki the proportion of the silk 
reached 33% of the shipped merchandise from Turkey to England, (it 
only constituted 4.4% of the total English silk imports, but the role of the 
peninsula in silk exports was still overrepresented measured to the 
population of the hinterland). By 1850 the proportion of the silk had 
fallen to 18% of the total goods exported to England from the harbor. 
(table 3). An interesting data refers to the industrial de-development of 
the Balkans: Saloniki still received 6-8% of the English ore export, 
although the first iron mines in Samokov had already been under 
exploitation for years. This meant some kind of concentration since 
Saloniki’s average share in the English exports constituted only 1.4%. 
British ore was cheaper and of better quality.123 Textile was not 
overrepresented: the proportion of textiles imported to Saloniki reached 
2–4% of the total Ottoman textile import (while the population of its 
hinterland ranged to 4% of the total).  
According to Lampe, it was not the English export that was 
responsible for Bulgaria’s negative commercial balance between 1857–
77, since Bulgaria exported more products to England than adversely. 
Lampe stated that Austrian and French ships were responsible for the 
Bulgarian import surplus. The share of these countries in the Bulgarian 
imports (of non-Turkish origin) reached 30-30%, while they bought only 
15–15% of Bulgarian export value.124 Lampe’s statement may be true, 
but not for the period before 1856. Before the mid-19th century, English 
ships provided 25-40% of the import of Saloniki, while their proportion 
from the exports remained around 10%. In contrast, French and 
Austrian ships (including steamships) transported 23 and 45% of the 
export of Saloniki, while their proportion from the import was 
significantly lower.125 Nonetheless, it raises another question: to what 
extent did ships represent the export/import of a nation? Beside the 
                                                 
123 See Chapter 1. While 1 ton of Bulgarian iron cost 400 francs, the English iron was only 200 
francs/ton. Although the Bulgarian production reached 2000 tons in the 1860s, the value of 
the British import was about 800 000 piasters early in the 1840s, which means 800 tons 
imports.  
124 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan economic history... 138–39. 
125 Based on Dokumenti... 
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origin of ships, it also depended on the origin of the transported 
merchandise. 
After having compared Saloniki to other Mediterranian ports it is 
worth analysing the main destinations of trade. With the exception of 
1847, Saloniki’s relation rather linked the port with Asian Turkey than 
with Europe (even 10 years after the introduction of free trade!), but 
trade destinations were quite flexible. In 1846 404 ships arrived from 
Turkey (62%), while 433 (62%) left for Asia Minor. In 1851 356 (68%) 
ships headed for Ottoman Turkey and 323 arrived from the Empire 
(63%), while the number of ships altogether did not decrease 
significantly. The proportion of ships arriving from Europe hardly 
reached 11% in 1846 and 15% in 1851, while their number decreased. 
25% of the ships headed for Greece. The only exceptional year in this 
period was 1847, when 357 ships travelled to Europe reaching 50%, 
meaning a sevenfold increase compared to 1845 (55 ships).126 (The 
reason of this phenomenon is discussed later). 
According to Blunt’s data European merchandise was dominantly 
carried by European ships. The Dutch, Austrian, French and English 
examples indicate that Saloniki was not a target destination, just a 
transit port. European merchandise was unloaded and ships continued 
their cruise to Asia Minor with the products of the Balkan Peninsula on 
board (transit commerce, indirect interregional scale trade).  
A different type of commerce was pursued by Norway, Sweden and 
the Kingdom of Naples: their ships returned to Europe after unloading 
and uploading the ships (direct interregional trade). In this case the 
carried goods could be considered as the export and import of the 
mentioned nations.  
Greek and Ottoman ships represented a third type of commerce: 
these ships were commuting, realizing intraregional trade. Their number 
was often high, because they visited one port several times a year. The 
carried goods often could not be considered as merchandise produced 
in these states. Russian ships had negligible commerce with the Balkans 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
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via Saloniki.127 It is also interesting that while in 1845 only 25% of the 
ships were steamers, and the ratio increased to 50% within 5 years.128  
The number of English, Greek and Italian ships increased till 1847, as 
well as the freight did, but after this, a decline can be observed. The 
reasons might be complicated – our aim is to investigate them – but the 
modest decrease in the number of ships and in freight cannot explain the 
balance of the port having turned into negative by 1851 (chart 1), because an 
increase in value/tons might counterbalance this decrease in the number 
of ships. Therefore further investigations are needed to analyse the 
commercial balance of the port (1), the structure of goods (2) and the changes in 
stock prices (3). 
(1) Chart 1 showing the short-term trends of exports and imports 
between 1846–51 clearly indicates that the southern part of the 
peninsula lost its export surplus and its positive balance of trade,129 
which characterized Saloniki’s commerce between 1845–47. The value of 
the exports decreased to 50% of the original, while imports increased 
with 20 million piasters to 1851. Thus, the surplus of 12 millon piasters 
in 1846 turned into a deficit of 29 million piasters in 1851, while the 
weight of the load had not changed significantly.130 The process was not 
favourable for inner capital accumulation, on the contrary, the negative balance 
indicated growing consumption and capital outflow from the region.  
Examining the different countries, the data show that while 
commerce with France meant an income surplus for the Balkan 
Peninsula, English ships transported merchandise 5 times more 
valuable (expressed in piasters) to Saloniki than they shipped out of the 
                                                 
127 In 1846 5 Russian ships arrived from Europe, 3 from Greece, 30 from Turkey, but only 9 
were loaded with sugar, lead, soap etc. In 1851 the number of ships decreased to 9, all 
arriving from Ottoman Turkey. 
128 In 1846 33%, in 1851 45% of the import of Saloniki – expressed in piasters – arrived on 
Austrian or Ottoman steamers, 9% arrived on Greek ships.  
129 On the long run Saloniki’s balance remained positive up to the 1870s, as the whole 
peninsula was dominated by positive balance acccording to Reden. (see below table 10). 
130 It is a general phenomenon: in 1910 the volume of the Bulgarian exports was twice as much 
as of the imports, but their value was the same. Vachkov, D.: Balgarskata ikonomika i voinite na 
XX vek. Razum, 2005/3–4. 187. The Balkans were unable to produce goods with high added 
value after the production of luxury articles (like silk) had moved to Anatolia – reasoning 
Izmir’s positive balance.  
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port, while the transported load (both in and out) did not differ 
significantly! This refers to the fact that the structure of merchandise 
might be responsible for this inequality in export-import. While in 1846 
only the English and Austrians had positive balance of trade with 
Saloniki, by 1851 Greeks, Dutch, Italians, and Sweden had joined them 
too. The Italian commercial fleet had doubled its export in terms of 
value. Only the French, Prussian and Ottoman ships produced negative 
balance of trade with the port (table 4). 
Based on chart 1, it seems to be evident that nor the number of ships, 
neither the weight of the cargo increased in such a manner that could verify a 
doubling in export values of the main commercial partners within the 
examined 7 years. This could only be possible, if there was a sudden 
change either in export-import structure or in unit prices. 
 
Table 4. The role of nations in the export/import of Saloniki (based on Dokumenti...) 
 Incoming 1846 1851 Outgoing 1846 1851 
Trade of 
Saloniki 
million 
piasters 
% 
million 
piasters 
% 
million 
piasters 
% 
million 
piasters 
% 
English 11.5 42 10.6 22 3.33 9 2 10 
Austrian 1.2 4 0.48 1 0.98 3 0.3 2 
Russian 0.4 1 0.14 0 2 5 0.54 3 
Sardinian 0.84 3 1.6 3 6 16 0.38 2 
Ottoman 5 19 7.5 15 5 14 2.05 10 
Ottoman 
steamships 
3.6 13 4.35 9 4.6 13 3.45 17 
Austrian 
steamships 
2.75 10 17.95 37 1.7 5 6.8 34 
Greek 2.2 8 4.1 9 6.5 18 1.36 7 
French 0.1 0 1.1 2 5.6 15 1.9 9 
Prussian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 4 
 
(2) Analyzing the incoming merchandise to Saloniki it is worth 
mentioning that the proportion of machines, artifacts or manufactured 
goods reached 30–40%, and these were mainly transported by the 
English. In 1846 the share of manufactures from the total English 
exports to Saloniki reached 70% (expressed in quantity), and by 1851 it 
had increased to 90%. This might have profited well, because in 1851 the 
Austrian and Ottoman steamers also took part in exporting 
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manufactured articles to Saloniki. In 1846 75% of the manufactures 
(expressed in piasters) arrived on British ships to Saloniki, Ottoman and 
Austrian steamships represented 10–10% respectively (or 2–2 million 
piasters). By 1851 the English manufacture export had reached only 51% 
(9 million piasters) of the total manufacture import of Saloniki, while 
Austrian steamers’ proportion was 33% (6.5 million), representing 50% 
of their freight.  
Between 1845–51 the value of luxury articles like pepper, coffee131 
and of manufactures seemingly increased (chart 2). Coffee transport – a 
colonial product – also increased from 2 million to 7 million.132 Imports 
of manufactured goods grew from 10 to 18 million piasters, but it is 
important to emphasize that neither the proportion of artifacts – this 
remained around 40% (10/26 and 18/50 million) –, nor the quantity – 
which was about 3000 tons – increased. Therefore, the main cause of the 
increase in export values could be found in the change of unit prices.  
 
Chart 1. The export (darker) and import (lighter) of Saloniki and the weight of the load 
(dotted) 
 
 
From among the articles exported through Saloniki the share of 
grains showed significant decrease from 70% to 25%, silk sank from 30% 
                                                 
131 By this time the Ottoman Empire had not been functioning as the supplier of these luxury 
articles any more, it became a consumer supplied by western countries bypassing the 
Empire, the former mediator in trade. 
132 Ibid. 
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under 15%, sesame from 15% to 5%, while tobacco increased its 
proportion from 5 to 20 % within those 6 years. The ratio of textiles also 
grew from 5 to 15%133 as a result of the first wave of the state-
encouraged Ottoman industrial revolution (chart 2).134 Although exports 
were halved after the peak in 1847, the absolute value (expressed in 
piasters) of these merchandise still increased. 
 
Chart 2. Distribution (%) and value (piasters) of merchandise arrived to Saloniki 1845–51 
 
Distribution (%) and value (piasters) of merchandise departed from Saloniki 1845–51 
 
Based on Dokumenti... 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
134 See: Clark, E. C.: The Ottoman Industrial Revolution. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 5, 1974/1. 65–76. 
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There were remarkable differences not only between the export-
import structure of the port itself, but of different nations. Furthermore, 
the patterns also changed over time even within this short period. In 
1846 Italians transported from Saloniki only wheat, by 1851 the 
proportion of grains had decreased to 45%, while wool had reached 35% 
and silk 8%. 70% of the Ottoman ships’ transports from Saloniki was 
wheat in 1846, while in 1851 Macedonian, Thracian tobacco became the 
leading merchandise with 66%, overtaking textiles and wood. In 1845 
the English carried hardly any wheat from the peninsula, but by 1851 it 
had become the main merchandise, while the proportion of imported 
silk (33%) decreased significantly. Italians brought mainly leather (75%) 
in 1846 to the port, but by 1851 it had been overwhelmed by the 
competition of luxury articles like coffee and pepper, reducing the 
proportion of leather to 33%.135 The Turkish, French and Russian 
merchandise structure did not change formidably. 
Based on chart 2 we may point out that neither the structure, nor the 
volume of imported goods changed significantly in the port itself, but the 
import of Saloniki was continuously increasing (both the total value and 
quantity of the imported goods). As the proportions remained nearly 
constant, it is the price fluctuation of certain merchandise (chart 3) that can be 
responsible for the changes in import values too. In normal cases, when 
having stabile merchandise structure one should not expect changes in 
prices – apart from the inflation,136 but due to the tight interval it was 
insignificant –, but the average value of certain merchandise showed 
here fluctuation (chart 4), which definitely reflects a specific economic 
phenomenon. 
(3) Though in 1846–47 the quantity of exported and imported goods 
was almost the same, the unit price/ton was 160–330 piasters higher in 
the case of exports from Saloniki. But by 1851 the situation had 
completely changed, and the average value of import (piaster/tons) was 
some 500 piasters higher than that of the goods exported from Saloniki, 
while in 1845 the average aggregated unit prices (per tons) of export 
                                                 
135 See Dokumenti... 
136 Or because of climatic fluctuations in case of agrarian mass products. 
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and import were the same. On the long run this process, together with the 
low tariff rates (3%) was favourable for the exporting western countries.  
It was also possible to measure the unit prices of certain merchandise, 
especially when the ships contained only one sort of product. For 
example, in 1851 English ships carried wheat from Saloniki weighting 
5100 tons for 1.9 million piasters, which means that the average 
price/tons was around 370 piasters. Contrary to this, English ships 
brought manufactured goods (reaching 90% of the load) to Saloniki that 
year for 9.3 million piasters weighting only 1440 tons, which meant an 
average 6400 piasters/ton price.137  
Wheat was able to counterbalance the impact of manufactures on 
commercial balance only in the early years of the examined period; while silk 
and tobacco was not able to substitute the income from wheat.  
 
Chart 3. Average value in piasters per tons of incoming (light) and outgoing (darker) 
merchandise in Saloniki 
 
 
The unit prices of imported goods were high, while the export prices showed 
fluctuation and finally decreased. The question is: (a) what was the reason 
of the fact that the Balkans were capable of competing with the western 
nations in, and only in 1846–47? (b) Why did the unit prices of exported 
                                                 
137 Swedish ships brought iron ore of 185 tons for 200 thousand piasters, so the average value of 
iron was 1080 piaster/tons. The soap carried on the ships of the Ionian Islands was worth 
122 thousand piasters, while the load was 43 tons, thus the unit price reached 2800 
piaster/tons in 1851. 
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goods fluctuate in Saloniki? (c) Which nations were responsible for the 
growing deficits?  
 
Table 5. Average unit prices in piasters/tons for different nations 
 
(c) To answer the latter question table 5 provides us data, giving an 
outlook to the changes in the export and import unit prices for each 
nation. The table also contains the average load of a ship, referring to 
the trade type. Russian, Ottoman and Greek ships transported smaller 
quantities, they might be used for short-distance commerce. English, 
French and Austrian ships were able to carry larger volumes. And, as 
the unit prices of English exports doubled within in 5 years, while the 
import unit prices decreased by 50% for the same period, and this made 
exports (per tons) more profitable than imports. Italian, Austrian and 
Greek ships also experienced an increase in average export unit prices, 
while unit prices of import fell. 
to Saloniki          
  (tons/ship);             (piasters/ton) 
from Saloniki 
(tons/ship),                 (piasters/ton) 
Ships 1846 1851 1846 1851 1846 1851 1846 1851 
French 122 113.6 54 710 134 112 2793 1113 
English 143 48 3505 7361 244 160 866 375 
Ionian 31 43 152.6 2837 32 117 4634 521 
Austrian 191 268 392 301 184 266 413 236 
Russian 72 117 150 133 72 101 728 487 
Sardinian 148 137 123 1941 148 143 943 330 
Dutch 198 66.5  n.a 1160 63 66 383 42 
Swedish 111 185  n.a. 1080 112 185 718 n.a.  
Norwegian 193 180  n.a. n.a.  92 180 1773 623 
Ottoman 92 91 260 942 84 97 286 256 
Ottoman st. 212.5 229 393 380 213 229 496 302 
Austrian st. 155 235 684 1493 155 236 414 569 
Samos 82 76 90 479 88 76 359 181 
Greek 60 67 121 276 58 68 366 87 
Prussian n.a.  230  n.a. 354  n.a. 226 n.a.  667 
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To answer the first and second question it is worth examining the 
prices of wheat and manufactures, representing the main export and 
import products of Saloniki (chart 2). The average unit prices of 
manufactures were high, but stagnating compared to that of the wheat, 
and after 1849 a sudden increase occurred (chart 4-5). In the same period 
Saloniki’s wheat export fell from 19 (in 1846) or 40 million (in 1847) to 
4.3 million piasters. While constituting 50% of the export in 1846 and 
70% in 1847, the share of grains from exports had also fallen back to 20% 
by 1850. The reason of this decline could either be the fluctuation of the 
exported quantity or the fluctuation of prices, or both. Chart 4-5 shows 
that both were responsible: there was a great increase in grain prices for 
the short period between 1846–47, followed by the increase of export 
volumes.138 
The reason for the sudden increase of unit prices might be the 
agricultural crisis that swept across Europe in 1846–47 resulting in the Irish 
famine and the revolt of Polish peasants in Galicia in 1847, both 
increasing the demand for wheat.  
This hypothesis is supported by the results seen in chart 4-5. The 
reason of the sudden price increase cannot be explained by shortages in 
the Balkan peninsula (local shortages could also increase prices!), 
because both prices and the exported wheat quantity increased with a certain 
lag in Saloniki. So, it was rather the shortage in Western Europe 
responsible for the changes (prices were determined by demand and not 
by supply). The climate diagrams of Keith Briffa also show (chart 6) that 
– unlike in Western Europe – the temperature anomalies experienced in 
the West remained moderate in the Balkans during 1846–48. Indeed, the 
Balkans had wheat surplus in those crucial years and could supply Europe.  
 
                                                 
138 The data for 1846 were calculated using Italian ships: based on Blunt’s report Italians 
imported 6200 tons of wheat for 5.6 million piasters, resulting 886 piasters/tons unit price. 
In 1845 Maltese ships transported only wheat (496 tons) for 199 thousand piasters, putting 
the price for 400 piasters/tons. The wheat price for 1847 can be calculated by using 
Prussian ships: 290 tons of wheat was worth 256 thousand piasters, resulting more than 
880 piasters/tons. The value for 1851 was calculated based on English ships, where 90% of 
the freight was wheat, estimating 370 piaster cost for each tons. The overall quantity of the 
exported wheat was estimated using the total value and the calculated unit prices. 
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Chart 4-5. Above: unit prices of merchandises. Below: the quantity of exported wheat (t) 
from Saloniki 
 
 
(dark gray lines represent grain prices/tons, light gray indicates manufacture prices/tons) 
 
Chart 6. Regional distribution of temperature anomalies in Europe compared to the 
average between 1961–90 
 
 
Keith Briffa: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/temmaps/decade/184x.htm  
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One question remains: what was the destination of ships leaving 
Saloniki – as it was also possible to transport the wheat to 
Constantinople instead of Europe and in the latter case Saloniki did not 
contribute to the mitigation of the crisis.  
 
Table 6. The value of wheat leaving Saloniki (piasters), its proportion from the total 
freight, and the target destinations of ships in 1845 and 1847 
 
In table 6 we compared the target destinations, number of ships, and 
the proportion of wheat from the total load in 1845 and 1847. Within 
two years the quantity of exported wheat increased by 600% and the 
number of ships increased from 55 to 357. The Prussian, English, 
Maltese, Italian, French, Ionian, even Turkish and Russian vessels 
moved towards Europe, while formerly the continent was not a target 
destination for the latter three. Wheat constituted 80–100% of the load 
Ships 
Load in 1847, 
in piasters 
Proportion 
of wheat  
Total 
ships 
Ships 
to Europe 
Load in 1845, 
in piasters 
Proportion 
of wheat   
Total 
ships 
Ships to 
Europe 
Prussian 256 000 100% 1 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
English 9 600 000 95% 58 36 400 000 32% 21 4 
Maltese 1 733 000 100% 7 7 200 000 100% 3 3 
Ionian 220 000 100% 3 3 9600 100% 2 0 
French 2 451 000 55% 15 14 0 0 16 9 
Austrian 401 000 79% 12 6 576 000 29% 11 11 
Russian 1 000 000 36% 21 11 132 000 31% 29 0 
Naples 4 181 000 98% 31 23 289 000 59% 7 4 
Sardinian 11 924 000 94% 74 69 1 492 000 83% 23 18 
Norwegian 725 000 100% 4 3 0 0 1 1 
Swedish 333 000 100% 2 2 216 000 100% 2 2 
Dutch 450 000 100% 3 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Toscanian 40 000 99% 1 1 204 000 100% 2 2 
Danish 323 000 100% 3 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hannover 370 000 100% 3 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bremen 136 000 100% 2 2 128 000 100% 1 1 
Greek 4 054 000 80% 207 31 1 912 000 37% 259 0 
Ottoman 2 072 000 45% 160 135 830 000 31% 136 0 
Altogether 40.7 million    6.4 million    
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for almost all of the ships, which was an uncommon phenomenon 
compared to the earlier periods. It is also worth mentioning that even 
ships of distant countries (Norway) visited Saloniki and loaded wheat 
on board as a new phenomenon. Thus, our conclusion is that the wheat 
of the Balkan Peninsula reached Western Europe and contributed to the 
mitigation of the crisis and to the wealth of merchants.139 
The high English wheat import can be explained by the fact that in 
1846 England put an end to protectionism, allowing free trade to secure 
the inflow of cheaper grains. As a result, between 1815–50 unit prices of 
wheat fell from the average 67 shilling to 52 shilling,140 as the transport 
costs decreased from 30% of the freight to 5%, while tariff rates 
decreased from 20% to 10% between 1853–61. So, free trade contributed 
to the increase in the general standards of living, but this process was 
disadvantageous for the local (European) agrarian producers. Cheaper 
food meant cheaper labour costs, therefore the change was 
advantageous for the industrial entrepreneurs, who finally overcame 
the agrarian lobby and the merchants’ lobby.141 (The social 
                                                 
139 Dokumenti... In 1847, the Italians (30%) and English (25%) imported the largest quantity of 
wheat, followed by the ships of Naples and Greece (10-10% respectively). By 1851 the 
Prussians (17%) and Russians (10%) had become the greatest importers beside the English 
(44%), while the wheat-quantity fell to 25% compared to 1847, and its value in piasters 
decreased to 10%. While the weight of the freight decreased to 67%, the proportion of the 
wheat reached 90% compared to the 15% in 1846. This led to the (unfavourable) 
uniformization of the trade structure. In the beginning of the famine England carried wheat 
for only 0.5 million piasters, meaning 560 tons approximately, a year later this increased to 
10 million piasters, weighting 10 880 tons calculated from the unit prices. After the crisis 
England still bought 5100 tons of wheat for 2 million piasters, since it became cheaper. 
140 Fairlie, S.: The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production, 1829–76. The Economic History Review 
22, 1969/1. 88–116.  
The decrease in the export of Saloniki can be explained by the decrease in wheat demand of 
Europe after 1848. Italians in 1846 brought wheat for 5.6 million piasters (6300 tons), in 1851 
only for 170 thousand piasters (450 tons), however it still meant 50% of the freight expressed 
in piasters (calculated from Dokumenti...). During the Crimean war the exports of Saloniki 
b(l)oomed again. While the total grain exports were 300-350 thousand hl (only 75 000 hl of 
this was wheat) during the war the wheat exports increased five-fold, such as prices (1 hl = 
5.5 francs in 1840, 8 francs in 1847, and 25 francs in 1856).  
141 There was a century-long economic fight (reaching the Houses of Parliament) between these 
groups. The members of the British East India Society were the propagators of importing 
cheap hand-made textiles from India, that endangered the interests of British industrial 
producers (who have been demanding restrictions on Indian textiles since the 1720s), and 
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consequences of this change for the Balkans are investigated in the 
second part of this study).  
The increase in grain imports induced the decrease of local 
production: a 1% increase in the grain output of the USA resulted in a 
0.6% decrease in the British production and a yearly 3% increase in 
grain imports between 1838–1929.142 Due to the constantly growing 
population and the shift in its economic policy, England became 
dependent on grain imports. While in 1830 only 5% of the wheat 
arrived from abroad, by 1860 it had increased to 25% and by 1880 to 
45%. Regardless of the grain price England always imported sufficient 
quantity to secure at least 200 kg/capita consumption (table 7, chart 7).  
In order to balance the growing demand for food financed now 
from external sources (imports), Britain had to rely on its industrial 
exports for which new markets and favourable trade conditions were 
required, reasoning the ’rediscovery’ of the Ottoman Empire. The 
German protectionist turn – they were the former grain exporters and 
manufacture consumers of Bristish articles - also urged this. The 
positive balance of trade (the British were aware of its significance), 
and the high added value of manufactures resulted in increasing 
purchase power (welfare), that could finance the maintenance of 
population growth and the exisiting trading practices. As the Ottoman 
market was extensive, but characterized by masses with weak purchase 
power, it was evident that the cheap products would be welcomed on 
this market. This required the decrease of profit rate (after the increase 
of labour wages in the second half of the 19th c. in England this could 
be only counterbalanced by mass production and mechanization) and a 
change in the product structure (cheap industrial mass-products 
became predominant overshadowing the luxury articles consumed by 
the elite). 
 
 
                                                                                                            
also that of the declassed agrarian producers, who were restratified into industry as cheap 
labour force. 
142 Sharp, P.: Pushing Wheat: Why Supply Mattered for the American Grain Invasion of Britain in the 
Nineteenth Century. Discussion Papers Department of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen. No. 08-08.  
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Chart 7. British wheat consumption (production + imports in 1000 quarters) measured to 
population increase  
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As 1 quarter equals to approximately 220 kgs, which is equal to the yearly consumption of 1 person, 
thus the quantities in the vertical axis refer to each other. It means that the interference of the two 
curves highlights periods characterized by consumption above 220 kg/prs and grain shortages (after 
the 1880s’). 
 
Table 7. Import dependency and per capita grain consumption in England and Wales 
between 1830–1920  
Year Wheat production Imports 
Import 
dependency 
Per capita 
consumption  
1830 
13-15 million 
quarter, or 3-4 
million t 
1.5 million 
quarter (0.3 
million t) 
5% 
13.9 million = 215-
310 kg 
1842 
12 million quarter = 
2.6 million t 
12 million cwt = 
0.6 million t 
18% 16.1 million = 200 kg 
1845 
18 million quarter 
(max. production) = 
4 million t 
5 million cwt 
0.25 million t 
6.5% 16.7 million = 254 kg 
1860 
5.3 million t 
or 18 million quarter 
= 4 million t 
8 million quarter 
(1.76 million t) 
24–40% 
20 million = 260-350 
kg 
1864 
18 million quarter 
(max. output) = 4 
million t 
20 million cwt = 1 
million t 
cca. 20% 20.9 million = 240 kg 
1880 4.5 million t 
60 000 000 cwt. 3 
million t 
45–65% 26 million = 280 kg 
1920 
6 million quarter = 
1.3 million t 
110 000 000 cwt = 
5.5 million t 
80% 35 million = 200 kg 
Data indicated by bold letters are from literature (or interpolated from literature data in case of 
population number) others are calculated. 
Data from: Sharp, P.: Pushing Wheat: Why Supply Mattered for the American Grain Invasion of 
Britain… Mitchell, B. R.–Deane, P.: Abstract of British Historical Statistics. Cambridge, 1953. and 
Mitchell, B. R.: European Historical Statistics, 1750–1975. New York, 1980. 
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The role of Saloniki was not exceptional.143 The total quantity of 
exports and imports in Sulina was 50% higher than in Saloniki even in 
1847, and it had reached 220 000 tons by 1850. Even in 1837 Sulina 
exported more wheat (54 000 tons) than Saloniki. In 1847 its grain 
export reached 124 000 tons, and in 1862, 265 000 tons (table 8–9).144 But 
being under Russian occupation before 1856 its significance in 
international trade remained small. Most of the ships of Western 
Europe were not allowed to enter the Black Sea prior to the 19th 
century, and after the Russians incorporated the Danubian Delta, they 
did not develop the port (did not need a rival for Odessa). Saloniki was 
an excellent choice for our investigation: Sulina – with the exception of 
1847 – exported wheat in order to supply Constantinople,145 thus the 
port did not appear on the world market, and prices there were 
influenced only by the market of Constantinople. After the Crimean 
War, when the harbour opened again for international trade, the Greek, 
Dutch and English began to prefer Sulina to Saloniki, and this port also 
became a part of the world market. 
 
Table 8. The commerce of Sulina 
 1847 1850 1853 
ships tons load 
(tons / 
ship) 
ships tons load 
(tons / 
ships) 
ship tons load 
(tons / 
ship) 
Austrian 144 29000 201 96 19500 203 111 19500 176 
Ottoman 663 76500 115 174 29400 169 406 56300 139 
Greek 630 94000 149 860 155000 180 1049 199300 190 
English 151 22600 150 108 17700 164 205 35200 172 
Based on Hajnal, H.: The Danube. The Hague, 1920. 
 
                                                 
143 Fényes, E.: A Török Birodalom leírása történeti, statisztikai és geographiai tekintetben. Pest, 1854. 
423.; Bailey, F. E.: British Policy… 105. The commercial significance of Varna also exceeded 
that of Saloniki in the Balkans by 1845–48. Lampe, J. R.: Balkan Economic History… 138. 
144 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Európa gazdasága a 19. században 1780–1914. Budapest, 1987. 592. 
Hajnal, H.: The Danube. The Hague, 1920. 156–57, 164; Sugar, P. F.: Economic Considerations for 
Political Decisions in Romania, 1878–1883. 95. In: Nationality and Society in Habsburg and 
Ottoman Europe. Collected Studies. Aldershot (Hampshire) 1997. 
145 Istanbul imported yearly 150 000 tons in the 18th century, which was more than the total 
exports of Braila and Galați in 1843. Aynural, S.: Bakers and Millers of Istanbul. In: Crafts and 
Craftsmen of the Middle East. Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean. 
Eds.: Faroqhi, S.–Deguilhem, R. N.Y. 2005. 153–73. 
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Table 9. A comparison of Sulina and Saloniki 
Ships 
Sulina out in 1856 Saloniki out in 1851 
ships freight tons tons/ship ship freight tons tons/ship 
English 161 32084 199.2 32 5113 159.7 
Austro-
Hungarian* 239 45035 188.4 5+51 1332+12019 266+236* 
Greek 996 157821 158.4 234 15832 67.6 
Dutch 104 9817 94.3 4 265 66.2 
Romanian 119 8246 69.2 0 0 0 
Ottoman* 125 13661 109.2 83+50 8059+11454 97+229* 
Altogether 2221 338200 152.2 517 61177 118.3 
Based on the Dokumenti… and Hajnal, H.: The Danube. *Ships and steamships calculated separately. 
*** 
The changing character of international trade is confirmed by other 
data. The correlation coefficients in Varna also show that “wheat for 
manufactures” worked (table 10). Imports were not characterized by 
traditional luxury articles any more, but by industrial goods. 
(Exporting wool as raw material for textile industry still played an 
important role as de-industrialization was going on). The process 
induced three other phenomena: beside the sudden increase of Balkan 
exports, the formerly positive balance of trade (table 11) soon turned 
into negative, because the extension of exports was not able to keep up 
with that of the imports. This is true for the Romanian principalities 
(larger ports also had positive balance of trade with Europe prior to the 
Crimean war) or regarding Austrian-Ottoman relations as well (chart 
9–10). The third characteristics of the trade is that the diversity of 
exports of the Balkans decreased (see the chart 16 representing Varna), 
which had dangerous consequences on the long run as the case of the 
Danubian principalities exemplified, making the Balkan economies 
more vulnerable to external changes (like the collapse of grain prices). 
 
Table 10. The correlation between main exported and imported goods in Varna (1853–78) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
(r2) 
Wheat vs. 
total 
exports 
Manufactures 
 vs. total 
imports 
Iron* vs. 
total 
imports 
Coffee vs. 
total 
imports 
Sugar 
vs. 
imports 
Wheat vs. 
Manufactures 
Wool 
vs. 
exports 
0.85 0.27 0.48 0.02 0.52 0.55 0.53 
Data: Michoff, N.: Contribution a l’histoire du commerce Bulgare I. Rapports consulaires Belges. Sofia, 
1941. *Iron was abundant in the dataset until 1867, the construction of the Ruse-Varna railway. 
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Table 11. Export surplus of Ottoman ports in 1850–53 (yearly average in million francs) 
Settlement Imports to the Empire 
Exports from the 
Empire 
Surplus 
Constantinople 
without transit  21.75 15.5 –6.25 
Monastir 2.88 1.89 –0.99 
Burgas 0.52 1.00  0.48 
Saloniki 2.36 2.11 –0.25 
Seres 1.00 0.86 –0.14 
Kavala 0.08 1.05  0.97 
Volos 0.46 2.40  1.94 
Janina 1.75 1.05 –0.70 
Scutari 1.22 0.80 –0.42 
Durazzo 0.45 0.67  0.22 
Vidin 0.18 0.26  0.08 
Ruse 1.50 2.00  0.50 
Svishtov 0.40 0.57  0.17 
Tulcea 0.05 0.21  0.16 
Niš 0.57 0.72  0.15 
Varna 1.90 1.53 –0.37 
Altogether 37.3 32.9 –4.40 
Reden, Fr. W. von: Die Türkei und Griechenland in Ihrer Entwicklungs-Fähigkeit. Frankfurt am Main, 
1856. 259. 
 
The grain prosperity even reached distant areas. In Moldova 
between 1837–47 the proportion of grains from exports doubled 
(reaching 80% from total exports) owing to the 60% price-increase and 
the doubling of exported quantity (table 12). This increase – parallel in 
prices and exports – can be explained by the fact that the devalvation of 
Ottoman piaster increased export exigency (merchants wanted to get 
valuable currency through the intensification of foreign trade). Contrary 
to this, the next price increase (33%) in 1859 was unable to increase the 
exported quantity, and this refers to local limits of export capacities. 
Finally, in 1863 an only ten-percent price increase generated again a 
growth in export quantities: it definitely meant that export exigency 
persisted, even when price conditions were not so favourable at all. This 
was the direct consequence of the homogenization of the Moldavian 
agrarian structure and it proved to be very dangerous. (The lessons of 
this process were valid for the whole Balkans). 
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Table 12. Wheat export of Moldva and grain prices 
Year 
Total 
exports in 
(million lei) 
Wheat 
exports 
Wheat 
volume 
(1000 hl) 
Price 
increase 
% 
Wheat from 
total 
exports (%) 
Grain t 
Grain prices 
Lei/t146 
1837 30 12 691  40 53 898 222.6 
1843  30 1118 57  87 204 344.0 
1847 52 45 1591 -8 87 124 098 362.6 
1857 58 40 1527 -7 69 119 106 335.8 
1859 73 59 1728 33 81 134 784 437.7 
1863 134 120 3409 10 90 265 902 451.3 
Based on: Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History… 
 
Chart 9. Ottoman trade balance with Austria in the 1830s (given in 1000 Florins, dark line) 
 
See: Paskaleva, V.: Sredna Evropa i zemite po Dolniya Dunav prez XVIII–XIX. v. Sofia, 1986. 
 
Chart 10. Balance of trade of the Romanian principalities 
(in million lei; imports are marked by squares) 
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146 1 leu equalled to 40 para prior to 1837 (like the piastre), 60 paras prior to 1843 100 para after 
1850. Diculescu, Vl.–Iancovici, S.–Danielopolu, C.–Popa, M. N.: Relaţiile comerciale ala ţari 
Romaneşti cu Peninsula Balcanica (1829–1858). Bucharest, 1970.  
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Grain price (thus the export capacity of countries with decreasing 
export diversity) neither remained constant nor high: it fluctuated 
partly because of the climatic anomalies, partly because of the supply 
surpluses (from other source areas, like Russia, Argentina, USA). 
 
Chart 11. Prices of meat and wheat (silver g/kg) 
 
 
Berov, Ly.: Änderungen der Preisbedingungen in Handel Österreichs mit den Balkanländern im 15-18 
Jahrhundert. 13-35. In: Österreichs Handel mit Südosteuropa und die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der 
bulgarischen Länder bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts. Mitteilungen des Bulgarischen 
Forschungsinstitutes in Österreich. IV/B/II. Wien, 1981. 
 
Prior to the 1840s exporting wheat was not profitable (beside being 
forbidden) for the Balkans. Berov’s chart indicates that wheat prices 
were smaller in Vienna than in the peninsula even during the 
Napoleonic era, when grain prices generally increased. Transport costs 
were still high on mainland (Hungary as a rival was near Vienna) prior 
to the appearance of steamships (the blockade during the wars also 
Balkans 
Vienna 
meat 
117 
 
contributed to this). This phenomenon also meant that the peninsula did 
not have substantial income surplus from grains (Istanbul was supplied 
with the grain at low, fixed prices first). It was the flesh then, 
functioning as an export article, because the Viennese prices were 
higher than the Balkan prices (chart 11).  
 
Chart 12. Macedonian price index based on 26 foodstuffs using a 5-year moving average 
(1888=100) 
 
Berov, Ly.: The West European Trade Cycle and Price Movement in the Salonica Economic Region 
during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. In: Southeast European Maritime Commerce 
and Naval Policies from the Mid Eighteenth Century to 1914. War and Society in East Central Europe. 
Eds.: Vacalopoulos, A. E.–Svolopoulos, C. D.–Kiraly, B. K. Thessaloniki, 1988. 291. 
 
Chart 13. Price fluctuations of wheat on European markets, 1815–61 (shilling/quarter)147 
 
The two trendlines (England and Odessa).represent the equalization of prices between the E and W.  
                                                 
147 Odessa represents the Eastern regions, Trieste the transition zone. Data: Fairlie, S.: The 
Nineteenth-century Corn Law Reconsidered. The Economic History Review 18, 1965/3. 562–75; 
Fairlie, S.: The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production... 
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By the 1840s the situation had changed. The Balkan became a wheat 
supplier until the interregional price differences equalized (chart 13), but 
prices fluctuated even after this (chart 12). The curve rather coincides 
with the Kondratieff-cycles, showing an upswing between 1840s–1870s, 
then a fallback till the turn of the century (after the dumping of Russian 
and American wheat). 
The early stages and the sensitivity of grain exports can be observed 
in Burgas (chart 14): here the Ottoman devalvation and the free trade 
first increased exports from 1000 to 12000 tons between 1826–39, then it 
grew to 30 000 tons in 1847, peaking once again with 30 000 tons in 1853 
as a result of the war prosperity.148 The population of Danubian ports, 
like Ruse increased by 40% even between 1831–66 (prior to the opening 
of railway) and a 25% increase was measured in Vidin at the same time, 
while this remained under 10% in the landlocked Sofia and Shumen.149 
 
 
Chart 14. Early stages of grain exports and reasons of fluctuation in Burgas 
 
Data: Shterionov, St.: Yuzhnoto Chernomorie prez Vazrazhdaneto. Sofia, 1999. 
 
 
                                                 
148 Shterionov, St.: Yuzhnoto Chernomorie prez Vazrazhdaneto. Sofia, 1999. 165. 
149 Todorov, N.: The Balkan Town in the Second Half of the 19th century. Etudes Balkaniques 2, 1969. 
32–35. 
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Reconstructing local scale processes based on regional scale data 
 
By using the data of travelers and statistical compilations we tried (1) 
to measure the changes in the quantity of grain exports of the Balkans 
during the wheat prosperity of 1840–70. We also attempted (2) to assess 
the participation of small producers in this process – by comparing this 
period to the previous, Napoleonic upswing – in order to reveal the 
effects of wheat boom on livelihood/living standards and to measure 
its mitigating effect on social tensions. For this per capita production 
and export values for the Balkans were derived from macroeconomic 
data (table 13).  
Our presumption was that if producers managed to participate 
indirectly in exports, thus in earning profits due to the increasing grain 
prices, this could decrease social tensions. For example in Ottoman 
Bulgaria numerous revolts and uprisings broke out (1835, 1836, 1837, 
1841, 1842, 1850, 1862, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1876), but none during the 
great western famine of 1845–49, and the peninsula – with the 
exception of the Danubian principalities, where the socio-economic 
system differed from that in Serbia or Bulgaria – managed to avoid the 
revolutions in 1848. 
Although wheat prices doubled during the Napoleonic era 
compared to 1787, transport costs also increased by 50% according to 
Berov.150 This also meant that most of the profits were realized 
in/consumed by transport and trade that time. Export was only 
profitable, if local producers were forced to sell grains cheaper. Thus, 
they did not benefit from the processes until freight costs decreased.  
By the 1840s this situation changed: grain prices had doubled again, 
while freight rates declined quickly. In Bulgaria fixed prices were 
abolished, and the maktu system was adopted in 1832:151 the spahi-tax 
farmers lost their right to collect taxes in kind, and vojvodas collected it 
in cash instead. It meant that peasants were forced to sell their wheat at 
the markets. The Ottomans gave up the monopoly of wheat export in 
Bulgaria. As a result the wheat export of Bulgaria doubled between 
                                                 
150 Berov, Ly.: Transport Costs… 74–99. 
151 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History… 135. 
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1850–70.152 Even the official purchases of Istanbul had increased from 
500 thousand to 1 million kile of wheat by the 1840 from N-Bulgarian 
lands.153 According to our calculations averagely 30–40% of the harvest 
was exported during these years (chart 15).  
Owing to these circumstances even smallholders were able to 
receive extra income, unless they were excluded from the market 
processes. In order to assess per capita income surpluses first the extent 
of attraction zones had to be defined for the major harbors,154 then we 
had to estimate the population of these territories155 and to adjust the 
different scales to be able to compare wheat amounts,156 and finally we 
converted volumes to values (which were all difficult to comply).157  
In case of Saloniki the commercial data of the Romanian 
principalities were used as analogy to estimate the extent of the 
attraction zones. In 1837 the wheat export of Moldva reached 54 
thousand tons, in 1847 it increased to 124 thousand tons.158 For the 
latter, using an average price of 800 piasters/tons, the income can be 
estimated to 99 million piasters, exceeding the total export value of 
Saloniki. In 1837, using 400 piasters/tons pre-prosperity unit price, the 
value of exported crop was estimated to 22 million piasters.  
 
                                                 
152 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19-20. században. Budapest, 
1969. 84.  
153 Kosev, D.: Vastanieto na selyanite v Severozapadna Balgariya prez 1850 g. i negovite prichini. 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1949–1950/6. 474–493. and Hristov, Hr.: Nyakoi problemi… 83–107. 
154 Boundaries of attraction zones were delimited based on geographical conditions (using 
watersheds), administrative boundaries, analogies and based on the method of equal 
distances from major ports.  
155 For the population of administrative units see Fényes E.: A Török Birodalom leírása… 387–424. 
and McGowan, B.: Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and Struggle for Land, 
1600–1800. Cambridge, 1981. 88–92. 
156 The Istanbul kile is only 20 okes, Burgas kile and Saloniki kile are 60–100 okes. 
157 McGowan claimed that in 1780 1 kile wheat cost 1.5 piasters, while in 1812 the nominal price 
was 15 piasters – due to the inflation, and to the great demand during the Napoleonic wars. 
In 1758, 6.5 million kile wheat arrived to Constantinople equalling to 237 000 tons. 
McGowan, B.: Economic Life … 14. Thus 1 ton of wheat equalled to 27 kile (officially 40 kile of 
Constantinople equals to 1 ton!). So, a ton of wheat cost 40 piasters in 1780 and 400 piasters 
in 1812. After the 1820’s the price remained stable until 1846. 
158 Berend, T. I. – Ránki Gy.: Európa gazdasága a 19. században… 592. (given in hectolitres - 1 
hectolier equals to approximately 75 kg of wheat). 
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Table 13. Production and exports of main harbors prior to and during the wheat prosperity 
Port, area, 
attraction zone 
Wheat 
production in 
million kile of 
Constantinople 
Exports in 
million kile 
and % 
Value of 
total 
production 
(million 
piasters)* 
Value of 
exports 
in 
million 
piasters* 
Families (6 
persons 
averagely, 
in millions) 
Production 
per family 
(kile) and in 
piasters 
Exports 
(income 
surplus) 
per 
family in 
piasters 
Surroundings of 
Edirne, 1849 
2.6 0.5 (25%) 25-27 5 0.1 
25 
(500 kg) 
250 p 
50 
Pleven, 13 villages, 
husbandry, 1840 
200 000 kg  0.1  
385 
households 
250 p  
Moldva, 1837 
1847 
 
54 000 tons, 
124 000 tons 
 
21.6 
50* 
0.2  
110 
250 
Edirne, 1846  5.2  40 0.1?  400? 
Enos, 1845  0.4  4 0.06-0.1  50 
Enos, 1847  1.5  15 0.06-0.1  150 
Burgas, 1851, 1852  0.3 and 0.9  3 and 9 0.1  
30 and 
100 
Svishtov  2.5  25 0.12  200 
Macedonia, 1847 
(and Saloniki, 1852) 
5.7-6 
2.6 (33%) 
67 
26* 
(total of 
Saloniki 
= 40 
million 
piasters, 
1847) 
0.12 
50 
(1000 kgs) 
510 p 
180  
(and 270) 
Seres, 1851–53 1.9 and 3.1 20 and 33 0.03 
60 - 100 
(1500-2500 
kgs) 
600 - 1000 p 
Volos 4.1 0.4 (10%) 41 4 0.03 
120 
(3000 kgs) 
1200 p 
130 
Bulgaria and 
“Rumelia”, 1848 
 4.4-5  45-50 
3 million 
persons 
 = 0.5 m 
families 
 95-100 
Anatoly, 1858 25  250  
7.4 million 
persons, 
=1.25 m 
families 
20 
200 p 
 
Stara Zagora kaza, 
1859 
0.75 0.2 (30%) 14 4 0.0055 
125 
2300 p 
700 
Kazanlik kaza, 1859 1 0.3 (30%) 15,2 4.5 0.008 
122 
1855 p 
550 
Sanjak of Plovdiv, 
1867, (here 1 kile 
=60 okes!)** 
4.5 1.2 (25%) 260** 70** 
0.8 million 
persons= 
0.15 m 
families 
30** (90) 
(2250 kgs) 
1700 p** 
460** 
* Original data are indicated by bold letters, others are calculated using 400-500 piaster/ton prices = 
during the wheat boom the prices doubled, so, the per capita production and exports mentioned here 
should be doubled. 
** In 1867 calculated with 1000 piasters/t and 1 kile = 60 okes  
Data: Heuschling, X.: L’Empire de Turquie. Territoire. Population. Gouvernement. Finances. Industrie 
agricole, manufacturiére et commerciale. Voies de communication. Armée. Culte… Bruxelles, 1860; 
Farley, J. L.: Modern Turkey. London, 1872; Ubicini, A.: Letters on Turkey. London, 1856. 327; 
Viquesnel, A.: Voyage dans le Turquie d’Europe. Description physique et géologique de la Thrace. 
Paris, 1868; Hochstetter, F.: Reise durch Rumelien im Sommer 1869; Kanitz, F.: Donau-Bulgarien und 
der Balkan. Historisch-geographisch-etnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1860–1879. Band II. 
Leipzig, 1882. 214. 
122 
 
The proportion of wheat from the exports increased from 40% up to 
80% within this 10 year period (similarly as observed in Saloniki). From 
these income data we can conclude – supposing similar agricultural 
techniques and social background – that the attraction zone of Saloniki 
cannot be larger (or more populated) than the principality of Moldva 
with a population of 1.3 million. 
So, the attraction zone of Saloniki might extend to Macedonia and 
Thessaly, as its population was 1.3 million according to Fényes. The 
data collected by McGowan for 1815, who put the number of families 
under taxation to 188 000 (and Muslim families were not conscribed) 
confirmed the reliability of this assessment (calculating with cca. 6 
persons/family). 159 
The value of grain shipped in harbors measured to the population 
of their hinterland indicates regional differences in the intensification of 
trade (table 13), while giving the possible maximum earnings per 
households. But as we cannot suppose that all the profits were received 
by the producers, these raw export/household values have to be 
decreased by the costs of transport and the profits of merchants (25%). 
As the existing agrarian system also determined whether the peasant 
could participate in the export or not, the remainder income was 
distributed among the productive layers with regard to the regional 
differences of agrarian structure (landuse, estate structure, the average 
parcel size of cultivated land, the system of land tenure all influenced 
the proportion of exportable wheat, beside the profit of merchants). 
For example, in the Danubian principalities the role of allodial 
estates was decreasing from 1818 on. The tithe increased from 1/10 to 
1/5 of the production,160 thus grain delivered to landlords by peasants 
exceeded the amount produced on allodial holdings using corvéé by 
three to five times. Therefore, landlords rather leased the land than 
forced the corvéé. Half of the cultivated land had been utilized by 
peasant smallholders put under severe taxation from 1833. High taxes 
deprived smallholders of almost all surplus. Therefore they were 
excluded from profiting grain sales: markets were dominated by the 665 
                                                 
159 McGowan, B.: Economic life in Ottoman Europe … 100–103.  
160 Ibid. 73. 
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merchants (among them many Jews) and owners.161 As most of the profit 
landed in the hands of the landlords and merchants being the main beneficiaries 
of export, this generated further tensions in Moldva and Walachia contributing 
to the revolution of intelligentsia and smallholders in 1848. 
Compared Bulgaria, in Macedonia the profits of peasants were also 
smaller, where smallholding dominated and the proportion of chifliks 
from total cultivated land was around 20%,162 and where 30-40% of the 
produced grains was exported163 similarly to the Interwar period. In 
Macedonia the proportion of chifliks reached 50% (87/165 settlements 
were considered chifliks in Monastir, 87/150 around Skopje)164 and the 
producer was deprived of one-third or even half of the production 
which was sold directly by the landlord. Landlords even tended to 
substitute tenants’ share from the yield with paid labour, just to curtail 
producers of the grain itself.165 Since in Macedonia smallholding was 
not the exclusive form of cultivating the land, in order to measure 
peasant participation in exports, the share of the landlords from total 
grain production was calculated based on the local frequency of large 
estates (chart 15, table 14). This part was subtracted from the total output 
together with the aggregated profits on transportation in order to assess 
producers’ share.  
To calculate the income surplus, yearly export values were 
compared to 1845 as basic value in case of Saloniki. This meant that 
1846 represented +12.5 million piasters surplus, 1847 produced +34 
million, and 1848 +8 million. After having assessed the population, in 
the second step we divided this surplus between the different layers of 
society based on the calculation shown in chart 15.  
                                                 
161 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Európa gazdasága… 592. 
162 There is a debate about the effectiveness of chitfliks. If we accept Lampe’s data that only 
10% of the Bulgarian peasantry worked on the 20% of the lands, producing 30% of output, 
that would put per capita effectiveness too high, which is in contradiction to the assumption 
that ”corvéé-like services” are not profitable. But most of the chifliks were not allodial units, 
but composed of smallholdings, where certain amount of agricultural output was 
expropriated by the landlord beyond the state’s share (gospodarlik). 
163 Berend, T. I.–Ránki, Gy.: Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése… 84. During the decline in 
1880–1910 it was only 15-18%. 
164 Hristov, H.: Agrarnite otnosheniya v Makedoniya prez 19.v. i v nachaloto na 20.v. Sofia, 1964. 86. 
165 Lampe, J. R.–Jackson, M. R.: Balkan Economic History… 134. 
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Table 14. Share of products on a chiflik estate (calculated to 1 ha)* around 1850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The total estate was 150 ha, calculating with 5 member-families, and 300 kgs per capita consumption. 
**Owing to tax-farming usually higher, around 200 kgs. The production per ha was somewhat higher 
than on small estates, see chapter 1. *** 5 ha of cultivated land, 5 adult units 200 kg/capita consumption 
(for consumption see Tomasevich) + animals. 
 
Chart 15. The distribution of the harvest among the owners, merchants and producers in 
Macedonia and Bulgaria based on their different estate structure  
 
White represents wheat not exported, grey symbolizes surpluses (possible exports) of producer strata 
 
Without subtracting the landlord’s share, the transport costs and the 
local and regional price differences, in 1847 this 34 million piaster 
surplus in Saloniki would produce 225 piasters income surplus per 
family. These modifying factors reduced the income surplus to 90 
piasters per farms in 1847, and 20–30 piasters in 1846 and 1848. Due to 
Total production  1500 kgs 100 % 
Tithe tax (10%) 150 kgs** 10% 
Seed for next year (7x output) 200 kgs 15% 
Remainder (1, 2) 1100 kgs 75% 
(1) Owner’s share 550 kgs 37% 
Consumption of owner* 10 kgs 1-2% 
Remainder to be exported 500 kgs 35% 
(2) Peasant’s share 550 kgs 37% 
Peasant’s consumption*** 300 kgs 
15% (40-45% of 
his share) 
Remainder to be exported 300 kgs 20-22% 
125 
 
the better social structure this was over 100 piasters around Svishtov, 
and it could reach 200 piasters around Plovdiv.166 
Was it a significant amount to mitigate social tensions? Definitely, 
especially compared to the situation in the Romanian principalities. 
These 30–60 piasters of surplus equalled to the yearly cizye167 (in 
Moldova cizye incomes still constituted 70% of central incomes in 1839, 
even after the limitations of the Reglament Organique by Count 
Kiselev, who decreased its value from 78 piasters), or with the monthly 
salary of an industrial worker.168  
Furthermore, the total income of peasants from grain trade reached 
250 piasters per family,169 which is not negligible compared to the tithe 
incomes of the central government in the Tuna vilayet, which was 150 
piasters per household in 1864 (totalling 60 million piasters) and 250 
piasters few years later (equalling to appr. 100 million or 16-20% tax 
rate).170 Without substantial profits, the Bulgarian peasants could not 
have bought land after the land reforms in 1858 (by the 1870s, 70% of 
the peasants around the Black Sea had owned their smallholdings).  
On the other hand, one year’s profit was not enough to buy a 
modern plough, that cost 370 grosh (70 francs), and after 1858, when 
the tithe was increased from 10% to 12.5%, this step deprived the 
peasants of just the same sums as calculated above.171 It is not 
surprising that this attempt of the Ottoman Empire to shift the burdens 
of merchants to producers after the abolishment of export tariffs (the 
                                                 
166 In the region of Varna the French shipped grains worth 45 million piasters, or 50 thousand 
tons. Damianov, S.: French Commerce with the Bulgarian Territories… 20. After the deduction of 
the trade profits 30 million piasters remained, which made the total income per household 
to 150 piasters calculating with 200 thousand families. After the deduction of the landlords’ 
share (chiflik was significant in this region) 75–100 piasters still remained. 
167 Hadzibegić, H.: Džizja ili Harač. Prilozi 5. Sarajevo: Oriental Institute, 1954–1955. 102. In 1839 
the 200 thousand peasant families of Moldva paid 6.16 million piasters as direct taxes, 
constituting 70% of the income of the budget of the principality. In Walachia the head-tax of 
peasants was about 8.7 million piasters, contributing to the budget by 54% 
168 Todorov, N.: Za naemniya trud v balgarskite zemi… 10–11. 
169 So, this is the value of grain marketed by the producer and not the total output! 
170 Palairet, M.: The Balkan Economies…  48. 
171 Further 2.5% was levied on those, who bought land after 1858, but were unable to pay 
immediately the whole sum as redemption. 
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increase in tithe was to compensate the losses of the central budget), 
was not welcomed, and revolts broke out. 
 
Table 15. Wheat exports and production decomposed to one family (1839–77) 
Region Population 
Production or 
export 
Production per 
capita (and per 
family of 5 
members) 
Value of 
production/exports per 
capita (and per family of 5 
members) 172 
Production of Tuna 
vilayet, 1876 
2 300 000 32 000 000 kile 360 kgs and 2000 kgs 300 p and 1500 p** 
Exports of Tuna 
vilayet, cca. 1850  
 
3 million kile = 
78 000 tons 
35 and 200 kgs 30 and 180 p 
Exports of towns 
along the Danube, 
1854 
110 000 
families 
250 000 kile (1 
kile = 50 p. for 
wheat, altogether 
10 million. 
15 kg and 7 kgs 20 and 100 p 
Exports of Ruse and 
its hinterland, 1876 
55 families = 
300 000 
persons 
500 000 centner 
= 25000 tons, 21 
million piasters 
100 kgs (and 450 kgs) 100 and 400 p 
 
Exports of N-
Bulgarian lands and 
Plovdiv region,* 1840 
2 500 000 
800 000 kile =  
21 000 tons 
8 and 45 kgs 4 and 20 p 
Vidin, total 
production in 1847  
7000 families* 
1,1 million kile = 
28 000 tons 
0.8 t and 4 t 700 and 3800 p 
Exports of Burgas, 
1848 
700 000 prs. 
(total Sanjak 
of Plovdiv) 
1.3 million kile = 
32 500 tons 
50 kgs 25-40 p and 125–200 p 
Exports of N-
Bulgarian lands and 
Plovdiv region, 1847 
2 500 000  
4.3 million kile = 
110 000 tons 
44 and 220 kgs 35 and 200 p 
Production of Tuna 
vilayet, 1865 
 
7 100 000 kile = 
185 000 tons 
85 and 420 kgs 85 and 420 p 
Exports of Tuna 
vilayet, 1865 
 
4 335 000 kile = 
110 000 tons 
50 and 250 kgs 50 and 250 p 
Exports of Edirne 
vilayet, cca. 1870 
1 300 000 
28 million 
piasters 
 25 and 125 p 
Prior to prosperity 
Production of 
Saloniki, 1839 
 
75 million 
piasters (12–20 
piasters/kile) 
 250 piasters/household 
Exports of Saloniki, 
1839 
 
5 million piasters 
(7–8%) 
 17 piasters/household 
Production of 
Macedonia, 1840 
800 000 
3 million kile = 
78 000 tons 
100 kgs and 500 kgs 40 and 200 p 
Exports of 
Macedonia, 1840 
800 000 450 000 kile 15 and 75 kgs 8 and 40 p 
Calculated from: Bulgarie et Roumelie. Annales du commerce extérieur. Paris, 1850. 9–10. and 
Michoff, N.: Beiträge zu Handelsgeschichte Bulgariens II. Band 1–2. Sofia, 1953. 
* Plovdiv sanjak probably with Burgas, but without Edirne and Thrace – the later E-Rumelia, as named 
in the French source.  ** Piasters. 
                                                 
172 Prior to 1846 the grain price is calculated as 400 piasters/ton, after 1846 we calculate with  
840 piasters/ton. 
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Adding up the performance of different regions (Varna, 60 000 tons 
in 1866 – chart 16, Moldova, 250 000 tons in 1863, Burgas 30 000 tons, 
Saloniki 40 000 tons in 1847, which had doubled by the 1860s), the total 
grain export of the Balkans reached 90 million francs. This managed to 
secure the grain consumption of more than 2 million western 
inhabitants (calculating with 200–225 kg/capita consumption), which is 
not a high proportion. 
The main grain exporting areas had more than 10 kile/capita 
production (over the 250 kgs yearly human consumption), like Thrace 
(11 kile/capita), Rila-Vitosha (30), Danubian Bulgaria173 (17) (tables 16-
17). In Bulgarian lands prior to 1878 66% of the exports was given by 
grains (10 francs/capita), but the value of grain exports per capita was 
even greater in Romania, reaching 15 francs. 66% of the Balkan grain 
exports came from Romanian lands. 
 
Chart 16. Grain exports of Varna in percent of total exports 
 
Data: Michoff, N.: Contribution a l’histoire du commerce Bulgare I.  
 
It is also noteworthy that areas still characterized by the highest per 
capita export values were originally not grain growing regions, and this 
warns that there were more favourable agrarian products than wheat, 
                                                 
173 Tuna vilayet without Sofia and probably without Niš. 
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like cotton in Macedonia.174 The 35 francs/capita in Macedonia and the 
65 francs in Thessaly were extreme values compared to the imperial 
average (then 15–20 francs).175 It is not surprising that these provinces 
were in the centre of interest of the young Balkan states. 
 
Table 16. Agrarian production in Rumelia in the 1870s based on the data of Sax 
Product 
Thrace, 1873 S-Macedonia, 1873 W-Macedonia 
1.1 million, 
without Burgas, 
Sozopol, Midia, 
Aitos 
per 
capita  
1.3 million 
to Maleš 
and 
Plačkavica 
per 
capita 
800 000 prs, 
Monastir-Janina, 
Ohrid, Prilep 
per 
capita 
Wheat (kile = 25 kg) 7 000 000 6.4 1 500 000 1.15 1 500 000 1.88 
Maize (kile) 1 500 000 1.4 2 200 000 1.69 800 000 1.00 
Barley (kile) 3 000 000 2.7 1 500 000 1.15 1 000 000 1.25 
Rye (kile)   
1 000 000 0.77 900 000 1.13 
Oat (kile) 500 000 0.5   
120 000 0.15 
Grains total: (in kile). 
The yearly need of a 
person is 10 kile) 
12 000 000 10.9 6 000 000 4.62 4 320 000 5.40 
Silk (oke) 200 000 0.2 200 000 0.15   
Cotton (oke)   
3 000 000 2.31 100 000 0.13 
Tobacco (oke) 1 000 000 0.9 3 000 000 2.31 280 000 0.35 
Sheep (pcs) 2 000 000 1.8 1 000 000 0.77 1 000 000 1.25 
Goat (pcs) 1 500 000 1.4 800 000 0.62 1 500 000 1.88 
Cattle (pcs) 200 000 0.2     
Wine (stock) 50 000 000 45.5 38 000 000 29.23 70 000 000 87.50 
Rice (oke) 500 000 0.5 1 000 000 0.77 180 000 0.23 
Bean (oke) 100 000 0.1   
1 000 000 1.25 
Sax, C.: Türkei. Bericht verfasst im Austrage des Comité für den Orient und Ostasien. Wien, K.u.k. 
Hof– und Staatsdruckerei, 1873. 
                                                 
174 Wool became of secondary importance everywhere (18 million francs) owing to the 
international division of labour. Thessaly was in the lead regarding cotton production per 
capita, but most of the cotton exports stemmed from Macedonia (50% of the exports) 
overtaking tobacco (15%), silk (15%) and grains (12%). 
175 Calculated after Dufour, B. J.: Étude du mouvement commercial de la Turquie en 1863. Annales 
du commerce extérieur. Paris, 1865. 3–71. 
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Table 17. Agrarian production in Rumelia in the 1870s based on the data of Sax II. 
Product 
Rila–Vitosha, 1873 Danubian Bulgaria, 1873 
Danube vilayet, 
1864 
Edirne vilayet 
(Thrace, 1877) 
500 000 
prs 
per 
capita 
2.5 million. 
with Niš, 
without Sofia 
per 
capita 
2.3 million 
per 
capita 
1.5 
million 
per 
capita 
Wheat (kile = 25 
kgs) 
7 000 000 14 23 000 000 9.20 5 500 000 2.39 7 000 000 4.67 
Maize (kile) 1 000 000 2 6 500 000 2.60 760 000 0.33 750 000 0.50 
Barley (kile)   
10 000 000 4.00 840 000 0.37 3 000 000 2.00 
Rye (kile) 7 500 000 15 1 000 000 0.40   
2 000 000 1.33 
Oat (kile) 
500 000 1 2 000 000 0.80 
too small amount of 
grains measured to 
the exported 5 
million kile 
  
Grains total: (in 
kile, yearly need of 
a prs in 10 kile 
16 000 000 32.0 42 500 000 17.00 7 200 000 3.13 15 000 000 10.00 
Silk (oke)   
1 500 000 0.60 
  
200 000 0.13 
Cotton (oke)       
500 000 0.33 
Tobacco (oke) 700 000 1.4 1 000 000 0.40   
1 000 000 0.67 
Sheep (pcs) 1 500 000 3 3 500 000 1.40 
6 300 000 2.74 
2 500 000 1.67 
Goat (pcs) 500 000 1 500 000 0.20 700 000 0.47 
Cattle (pcs) 100 000 0.2 500 000 0.20 1 000 000 0.43 250 000 0.17 
Wine (stock) 1 000 000 2 12 000 000 4.80   
50 000 000 33.33 
Bean (oke)   
1 000 000 0.40 
    
Sax, C.: Türkei. Bericht verfasst im Austrage des Comité für den Orient und Ostasien. Wien, 1873. 
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